There was a certain man who had a son who seized in theft sheaves [keifei] of flax, and the father took a vow prohibiting his son from deriving any benefit from his possessions. They said to the father: And if the son of your son would become a Torah scholar, and you would want him to be able to inherit your possessions, what would you do? He said to them: Let this son of mine acquire the possessions, and only if the son of my son becomes a Torah scholar then let him, my grandson, acquire them from my son. They asked: What is the ruling?

The Sages of Pumbedita say: This is just as if he stated: Acquire the property on the condition that you transfer it to your son. In such a case he has not given anything to the recipient, but has merely made him a conduit to transfer the item to someone else. And in any case where one says: Acquire this item on the condition that you transfer ownership, the recipient does not acquire the item, and the statement has no effect.

But Rav Naḥman said: He does acquire, as an acquisition by means of a cloth is a case of an act of acquisition performed only in order to transfer ownership. In such a case, one gives another a cloth in order to confer ownership of some other item, but the cloth itself does not assume new ownership. Still, this is an effective means of acquisition. So too, the property of the grandfather may be effectively conferred upon the grandson through the son, without the son acquiring it himself.

Rav Ashi said: And who will say to us concerning the cloth that if the recipient of the cloth would seize it with the intention of keeping it that it would not be an effective seizure? While the cloth is technically transferred, the recipient does not usually exercise his right to it. And furthermore, an acquisition by means of a cloth is a case where the giver is saying: Acquire only in order to transfer ownership, but acquire from now. However, with regard to these possessions of this one who took the vow, when does the son acquire? Only when his son’s son becomes a Torah scholar. And when he becomes a Torah scholar, the cloth has already been returned to its owner, i.e., the act of acquisition had taken place long before the grandson became a Torah scholar. The initial transfer therefore has no effect.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: But the gift of Beit Ḥoron discussed in the mishna is an example of an acquisition performed only in order to transfer ownership, and there he did not acquire it at all.

The Gemara recounts: Sometimes when Rav Naḥman was asked this question he said to him: That is because his wedding meal proves about him that he did not truly intend to give the items to the recipient, and not because such an acquisition is invalid per se. And sometimes he said to him that in that case they followed the stringent opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who said: Even negligible benefits ordinarily waived are forbidden to one prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another. So too, Rabbi Eliezer holds that one cannot rely on an act of acquisition performed merely in order to transfer ownership to a third party.

§ We learned in the mishna (48a): The Sages therefore said: Any gift that is not so absolute so that, if the recipient were to consecrate the gift it would be consecrated, is not a gift. The Gemara asks: What is added by the word: Any? Is it not adding this matter of one who seized sheaves of flax, and to say that the gift of the father has no effect? The Gemara responds: No, the intent is to add the latter version of the aforementioned statement of Rava, that a gift given as a means of circumventing a vow has no effect, even when the giver mentions the nature of the gift only casually and does not stipulate it as a formal condition.