סקר
באיזה גיל התחלת ללמוד דף יומי






 

Steinsaltz

the Paschal offering during the rest of the days of the year, i.e., not on the fourteenth of Nisan after midday, when it is fit to be sacrificed, which is not fit if it was sacrificed for its sake, but is fit if it was sacrificed not for its sake. The Gemara responds: The Paschal offering during the rest of the days of the year is considered to be a peace offering, not a Paschal offering that was slaughtered not for its sake.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the following baraita supports the opinion of Rabbi Ḥilkiya, who holds that one who slaughters a guilt offering whose time has not yet arrived, outside the courtyard, not for its own sake, is liable: One might have thought that I exclude from the category of those who are liable for slaughtering outside the courtyard even one who slaughters a burnt offering whose time has not yet arrived due to its being premature for its owner, e.g., a woman after childbirth whose term of impurity is not yet finished, and one who slaughters the guilt offering of a nazirite and the guilt offering of a leper before they are fit to sacrifice their offerings.

To counter this, the verse states with regard to slaughter outside the courtyard: “Whatever person there be of the house of Israel that slaughters an ox, or lamb, or goat, in the camp, or that slaughters it outside the camp” (Leviticus 17:3). “Ox” indicates in any case of an ox, “lamb” indicates in any case of a lamb, and “goat” indicates in any case of a goat, that one is liable for slaughtering them outside the courtyard; while a sin offering was omitted from the cases in the baraita where one who slaughters the offering outside the courtyard is liable.

The Gemara clarifies: What are we dealing with in this baraita when it discusses the guilt offering of a nazirite and the guilt offering of a leper? If we say that it is dealing with a guilt offering that was slaughtered outside the courtyard at its proper time, why state that one is liable specifically for a guilt offering? One would be liable for slaughtering a sin offering outside the courtyard at its time as well. Rather, it is discussing a guilt offering that was slaughtered not at its time, i.e., when the nazirite or leper’s time had not yet arrived.

The Gemara explains: And what is the baraita dealing with? If we say that it is dealing with one who slaughtered it for its sake, why would he be liable for a guilt offering that was slaughtered outside the courtyard if it is not fit for sacrifice? Rather, is the baraita not dealing with one who slaughtered it not for its sake, and the baraita states that one would be liable, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥilkiya? The Gemara rejects this: Actually, the baraita is dealing with one who slaughtered a guilt offering outside the courtyard at its proper time and not for its sake.

And although there is ostensibly no need for an additional verse from which to derive the halakha in this case, as a guilt offering that was slaughtered not for its sake inside the courtyard is fit for sacrifice, the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says: We juxtapose a guilt offering with a sin offering in the verse: “As is the sin offering, so is the guilt offering; there is one law for them” (Leviticus 7:7), from which it may be derived that they have equivalent halakhic status. Therefore, a guilt offering that was slaughtered not for its sake is disqualified, and consequently one might say that one who slaughters a guilt offering not for its sake outside the Temple courtyard is exempt, as it is not fit for sacrifice. Therefore, the derivation from the verse is necessary.

And the tanna of the baraita taught: Guilt offering, which, in this context, is secondary to the sin offering, as it is derived from the latter. But the same is true of the primary, i.e., the sin offering: One who slaughters it outside the courtyard not for its sake is liable.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a baraita in support of Rabbi Ḥilkiya: One might have thought that I include in liability even one who slaughters a burnt offering whose time has not yet arrived because it is intrinsically lacking, i.e., eight days have not yet passed; and one who slaughters a sin offering whose time has not yet arrived, whether because it is intrinsically lacking or because it is premature for the owner.

To counter this, the verse states with regard to one who slaughters outside the courtyard: “And has not brought it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:4), which teaches that for any sacrifice that is unfit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, one is not liable for slaughtering it outside the courtyard. But a guilt offering whose time has not yet arrived was omitted by the tanna, from which it can be inferred that one who slaughters a guilt offering outside the courtyard is liable.

The Gemara asks: What are we dealing with? If we say that the baraita is dealing with a case where one slaughtered a sin offering whose time has not yet arrived, outside the courtyard for its sake, then one who slaughters a guilt offering should also be exempt, as it is an offering whose time has not yet arrived. Rather, is it not dealing with a case of one who slaughtered a sin offering whose time has not yet arrived, outside the courtyard not for its sake? In this case, one would be exempt for slaughtering it outside the courtyard, as if it is slaughtered inside the courtyard not for its sake it is disqualified. But in the case of a guilt offering whose time has not yet arrived one would be liable, since it is fit for sacrifice, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥilkiya.

The Gemara responds: Actually, the baraita is dealing with one who slaughtered a sin offering whose time has not yet arrived, outside the courtyard not for its sake. And nevertheless, it may not be inferred that in the case of a guilt offering one would be liable, as this baraita may be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who juxtaposes a guilt offering with a sin offering; and one who slaughters a guilt offering is also exempt. The tanna of the baraita omitted mention of a guilt offering because he taught: Sin offering, which is the primary case of the disqualification of an offering slaughtered not for its sake, and all the more so it applies to the secondary case, i.e., the guilt offering.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof for the opinion of Rabbi Ḥilkiya, as when Rav Dimi came to Babylonia from Eretz Yisrael he said that the school of Rabbi Livai taught a baraita: One might have thought that I exclude from the category of those who are liable for slaughtering offerings outside the Temple courtyard even one who slaughters a burnt offering whose time has not yet arrived due to its being premature for its owner, or who slaughters a guilt offering of a nazirite or the guilt offering of a leper whose time has not yet arrived due to its being premature for its owner. From where is it derived that one is liable for doing so? Rav Dimi added: And the Sages brought a derivation from a verse to prove that one is liable, but I do not know what the derivation is.

The Gemara clarifies: What is the biblical derivation? Ravina said that it is derived from the verse cited above with regard to offerings that are slaughtered outside the courtyard, where “ox” indicates in any case of an ox, “lamb” indicates in any case of a lamb, and “goat” indicates in any case of a goat. This supports the opinion of Rabbi Ḥilkiya, as the baraita is discussing a guilt offering whose time has not yet arrived that is slaughtered not for its sake, and contradicts the opinion of Rav Huna. The Gemara asks: What contradiction is this? It can be resolved as you stated earlier: That the baraita is dealing with a guilt offering that was slaughtered not for its sake at the proper time, and is accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

Rav Naḥman said that according to the opinion of Rav Dimi, the baraita cannot be interpreted as dealing with a guilt offering that was slaughtered at its proper time, because he raises a contradiction between the baraita that the school of Rabbi Livai taught and a baraita that Levi taught: The guilt offering of a nazirite and the guilt offering of a leper that one slaughtered not for their sakes are fit, but they do not satisfy the obligation of the owner.

If one slaughtered them in a case where the offering was premature due to its owner, or if the lambs were in their second year when one slaughtered them, and not in their first year as required, they are disqualified, and one who slaughters them outside the Temple courtyard is not liable. This contradicts the baraita taught by the school of Rabbi Livai.

And Rav Dimi answers: This is not difficult. Here, in the baraita that states that one who slaughters outside the courtyard is exempt, it is referring to a case where the animal whose time has not yet arrived was slaughtered for its sake; there, in the baraita that teaches that one who slaughters outside the courtyard is liable, it is referring to a case where the offering was slaughtered not for its sake.

Likewise, Rav Ashi raises a contradiction between the mishna, which teaches that one who slaughters a guilt offering whose time has not yet arrived outside the courtyard is exempt, and the baraita, which teaches that one who does so is liable. And Rav Ashi answers: Here, the mishna that teaches that one is exempt is referring to a case where the offering was slaughtered for its sake. And there, the baraita that teaches that one is liable is referring to a case where the offering was slaughtered not for its sake, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥilkiya.

The Gemara says: If so, shall we say that this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Huna, who holds that one who slaughters a guilt offering whose time has not yet arrived not for its sake outside the courtyard is exempt?

The Gemara replies that Rav Huna could have said to you: What are we dealing with here, in the baraita that deems one liable for a guilt offering that was slaughtered not for its sake? We are dealing with a case where one separated two guilt offerings as a guarantee, so that atonement would be achieved through the sacrifice of the second if the first was lost, but before the proper time arrived he slaughtered one of them as a burnt offering rather than as a guilt offering. In this case there would be liability for slaughtering outside the courtyard, as is the case with one who slaughters a burnt offering outside the courtyard, since one of them, i.e., the one that will not effect atonement, is a burnt offering from the outset.

Talmud - Bavli - The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren No=C3=A9 Talmud
with commentary by Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz Even-Israel (CC-BY-NC 4.0)
אדם סלומון
© כל הזכויות שמורות לפורטל הדף היומי | אודות | צור קשר | הוספת תכנים | רשימת תפוצה | הקדשה | תרומות | תנאי שימוש באתר | מפת האתר