סקר
כמה לומדי דף יומי יש במשפחתך הקרובה?






 

Steinsaltz

should also receive lashes for sacrificing it, just as one would for violating other Torah prohibitions. Why did Rabbi Zeira say elsewhere that one who slaughters, inside the Temple courtyard, an offering whose time has not yet arrived does not receive lashes for having violated the prohibition of: “It shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 22:23), which is the general prohibition against sacrificing animals that are not fit to be sacrificed. Rabbi Zeira explains that he does not receive lashes because the verse has transmuted the negative precept into a prohibition that is stated as a positive mitzva, in the verse: “But from the eighth day forward it may be accepted” (Leviticus 22:27). There is no punishment of lashes for violating such a prohibition. Rabbi Yirmeya is asking that one should still receive lashes for having violated the prohibition of: “You shall not do.”

The Gemara responds: That statement of Rabbi Zeira applies only according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Shimon in the mishna and hold that the verse that states: “You shall not do,” does not indicate that one who slaughters an animal whose time has not yet arrived is in violation of a prohibition. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, one would indeed receive lashes for slaughtering an animal whose time has not yet arrived inside the Temple.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Rabbi Zeira’s statement is even in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who also holds that one would not receive lashes for slaughtering inside the Temple courtyard an offering whose time has not yet arrived. A prohibition cannot be derived from the prohibition stated with regard to the Tabernacle in Gilgal, since inside the Tabernacle in Gilgal, in relation to the Tabernacle in Shiloh, is considered like outside, and the prohibition: “You shall not do,” pertains only to sacrificing an offering whose time has not yet arrived outside the Temple courtyard.

Rabba said: The reason of Rabbi Shimon is not based upon: “You shall not do,” as Reish Lakish claims, but upon another verse. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon says: From where is it derived that one who slaughters his Paschal offering on a private altar at a time when it is prohibited to sacrifice offerings on private altars violates a prohibition? The verse states: “You may not sacrifice the Paschal offering within any of your gates; but at the place that the Lord your God shall choose to cause His name to dwell in, there you shall sacrifice the Paschal offering” (Deuteronomy 16:5–6).

One might have thought that even at a time when it is permitted to sacrifice offerings on private altars this is so. Therefore, the verse states: “Within any [be’aḥad] of your gates,” which indicates that I said this prohibition to you only when all of the Jewish people enter the Temple through one [eḥad] gate in order to sacrifice their offerings. When there is no permanent communal altar, it is permitted to slaughter the Paschal offering on a private altar.

Rabba analyzes the baraita: When was this Paschal offering, for which one violates a prohibition for slaughtering it during a time when it is forbidden to sacrifice on private altars, slaughtered? If we say that it was after midday on the fourteenth of Nisan, which is the proper time for sacrificing the Paschal offering in the Temple, then one who sacrifices it then violates not only a prohibition, he should also be deemed liable to receive karet as well, as would anyone who slaughters a fit offering outside the Temple courtyard. Rather, is it not discussing one who slaughtered the Paschal offering on a private altar on the fourteenth of Nisan before midday, when its time had not yet arrived?

The Gemara rejects Rabba’s explanation: Actually, the Paschal offering may have been sacrificed on a private altar after midday of the fourteenth of Nisan, and it is referring to a time when it is permitted to sacrifice on private altars, i.e., the periods of Gilgal, Nov, and Gibeon. The verse teaches that although it was permitted to sacrifice voluntary vow offerings and gift offerings on a private altar, the Paschal offering may be sacrificed only on a great public altar.

The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the baraita state: At a time when it is prohibited to sacrifice offerings on private altars? The Gemara responds: The baraita means that it is prohibited for one to sacrifice the Paschal offering on a private altar, but it is permitted to use a private altar for another offering, i.e., a voluntary vow offering or gift offering.

§ The mishna teaches that with regard to an offering whose time has not yet arrived because it is premature for its owner, one who sacrifices it outside the Temple courtyard is exempt. This category includes a zav, a zava, and a woman after childbirth, any of whom sacrificed a sin offering or guilt offering outside the Temple courtyard during the days that they are counting toward purification. The Gemara asks: And are these individuals subject to the obligation to bring guilt offerings? Ze’eiri said: The text of the mishna should teach: Leper, together with the zav, zava, and woman after childbirth. A leper brings a guilt offering as part of his purification process.

The mishna also teaches that if those whose time has not yet arrived sacrifice their burnt offerings or their peace offerings outside the Temple courtyard, they are liable. The Gemara asks: And are these individuals subject to the obligation to bring peace offerings? Rav Sheshet said: Teach the case of a Nazirite as part of the list in the mishna. A nazirite brings a peace offering at the conclusion of his term of naziriteship. The Gemara notes that the addition of Ze’eiri to the text of the mishna, i.e., the case of a leper, was fixed by the tanna’im in the version of the mishna that they would teach, while the addition of Rav Sheshet, i.e., the case of a nazirite, was not fixed by the tanna’im in the mishna that they would teach.

§ The mishna teaches that if one whose days of purification are not complete, e.g., a leper, slaughters his guilt offering outside the courtyard, he is exempt, since the offering is not fit for sacrifice at that time. With regard to this, Rabbi Ḥilkiya, a Sage from the school of Rav Tovi, says: They taught this only with regard to one who slaughters a guilt offering outside the Temple courtyard for its own sake. But if he slaughtered it outside the Temple courtyard not for its own sake but for the sake of a different offering, he is liable for having sacrificed outside the courtyard. This is because it was fit to be sacrificed not for its own sake inside the Temple courtyard, as a guilt offering that was slaughtered not for its own sake is fit for sacrifice (see 2a).

The Gemara asks: If so, one who slaughtered the guilt offering for its own sake should also be liable for having slaughtered it outside the Temple courtyard, since it was fit to be slaughtered not for its sake inside the Temple courtyard. The Gemara answers: In order for a guilt offering that was slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard to be considered fit to be sacrificed inside it, it first requires uprooting of its status, i.e., the one who slaughters it should intend explicitly that it be a different sacrifice. If its status as a guilt offering has not been uprooted, it is not considered fit to be sacrificed inside.

Rav Huna objects to Rabbi Ḥilkiya’s statement that a guilt offering whose time has not yet arrived is fit to be sacrificed inside if it is slaughtered not for its own sake: And is there anything that is not fit if its action is performed for its own sake, but is fit if its action is performed not for its sake? The Gemara replies: And is there not? But there is

Talmud - Bavli - The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren No=C3=A9 Talmud
with commentary by Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz Even-Israel (CC-BY-NC 4.0)
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