and doesn’t Rabbi Shimon say: With regard to one who performs any prohibited labor that is not necessary for its own sake, it is labor for which he is exempt? In this case, causing the wound was inadvertent and was not his objective when performing the action.

§ The Sages raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: What is the halakha with regard to whether a son may be designated an agent of the court in order to flog his father or to curse him if the court sentenced him to ostracism?

Rav Sheshet said to them: And did the Torah render it permitted to flog or curse another who is not his father? The Torah prohibited such actions. Rather, the reason that an agent of the court may flog or curse the one found liable is that the honor of Heaven takes precedence over the honor due to another. Here too, a son may serve as an agent of the court because the honor of Heaven takes precedence over the honor due to his father.

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: And just as with regard to one who is commanded to strike him there is a mitzva not to strike him under other circumstances, with regard to one who is not commanded to strike him is it not right that there is a mitzva not to strike him?

The Gemara explains the baraita: What, is it not that both this first clause of the statement of the baraita and that latter clause of the statement of the baraita are referring to a situation where striking another is a mitzva, e.g., where the other is liable to receive lashes. The distinction between them is that this latter clause, which is referring to one who is not commanded to strike him, is concerning a case where the agent is his son and is therefore prohibited from striking his father even in that capacity, while that first clause, which is referring to one who is commanded to strike him, is concerning a case where the agent is another individual and not his son. This indicates that it is prohibited for a son to flog his father as an agent of the court.

The Gemara answers: No, in both this clause and that clause it is no different if the agent is his son and it is no different if the agent is another. And it is not difficult to distinguish between the clauses: Here, in the first clause, the reference is to a situation where striking another is a mitzva, as he is an agent of the court; there, in the latter clause, the reference is not to a situation where striking another is a mitzva.

And accordingly, this is what the baraita is teaching: And just as in a situation where striking another is a mitzva, where the agent of the court is commanded to strike him, there is a mitzva not to strike him even one lash beyond the number determined by the court, as it is written: “Forty lashes shall he strike him, he shall not exceed, lest if he shall exceed to strike him” (Deuteronomy 25:3), accordingly, in a situation where striking another is not a mitzva, where one is not commanded to strike him, is it not right that there is a mitzva not to strike him? The general prohibition against striking another in any situation is derived from this verse.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: In the case of one who emerges from the court condemned to be executed and his son came and struck him or cursed him, the son is liable to be executed for striking or cursing his father. If another came and struck him or cursed him, he is exempt. And we discussed it as follows: What is different about the case where his son strikes or curses him that he is liable, and what is different about the case where another strikes or curses him that he is exempt? And Rav Ḥisda says: The baraita is referring to a case where they are imploring the condemned man to emerge from the court to be executed but he is not emerging. Therefore, it is necessary to employ force. Apparently, even under those circumstances, where the use of force is sanctioned by the court, it is prohibited for the son to strike his father.

The Gemara rejects this proof: Rav Sheshet interprets this baraita as referring to a case where they are not imploring him to emerge from the court for his execution. It is referring to a case where the condemned man is proceeding willingly, and it is not an agent of the court but someone else who strikes and curses him at his own initiative.

The Gemara challenges: If so, even another who strikes one who is condemned to death should be liable, as it is prohibited to strike or curse another. The Gemara responds: If another does so he is exempt, since the legal status of the one condemned to death is that of a dead man. Therefore, one is not liable for striking or humiliating him.

The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rav Sheshet himself say: If one humiliates another who is sleeping and the individual never awakens and dies, the one who humiliated him is liable to compensate his heirs for that humiliation? Apparently, even if the status of the condemned is that of a dead person, the one who cursed him should be liable to compensate his heirs. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here in the baraita? We are dealing with a case where he struck him with a blow that does not have sufficient force to cause damage worth one peruta, in which case no compensation is paid.

The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rabbi Ami say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In a case where one struck another with a blow that does not have sufficient force to cause damage worth one peruta, he is flogged for violating the prohibition: “He shall not exceed”? Why does the baraita exempt another entirely? The Gemara explains: What is the meaning of the term exempt that is stated in this baraita? It means that he is exempt from monetary restitution, but he is liable to receive lashes.

The Gemara asks: If the clause of the baraita that discusses a case where another individual strikes or curses him and states that he is exempt only from payment of restitution, one may conclude by inference that the clause of the baraita that discusses his son states that he is liable to pay monetary restitution. That is certainly not the case. Rather, the clause of the baraita that discusses his son states that he is liable to be punished in accordance with his appropriate sentence; here too, the clause of the baraita that discusses another individual states that he is exempt from punishment in accordance with his appropriate sentence. The question remains: Why is another exempt from receiving lashes in a case where he struck him with a blow that does not have sufficient force to cause damage worth one peruta?

The Gemara answers: Rather, this is the reason that another is exempt: As the verse states: “Nor curse a ruler of your people” (Exodus 22:27), from which it is inferred that this prohibition applies only with regard to one who performs an action of “your people,” i.e., an action befitting a Jew. There is no prohibition against cursing one whose actions are inconsistent with the conduct appropriate for a Jew.

The Gemara asks: This explanation works out well with regard to cursing, as that is the prohibition mentioned in that verse. From where do we derive that the halakha is the same with regard to striking? The Gemara answers: We derive that the halakha is the same for both, as we liken striking to cursing based on the juxtaposition between the verses that address the cases of one who strikes his father (Exodus 21:15) and one who curses his father (Exodus 21:17).

The Gemara challenges: If so, and the prohibition does not apply to one whose actions are inconsistent with the conduct appropriate for a Jew, his son too should be exempt if he strikes or curses his father whose conduct is inappropriate. The Gemara explains: As Rav Pineḥas says in another context that the reference is to a case where the one in question repented, so too, the baraita is referring to a case where the condemned man repented. Although he is being taken to his execution, because he repented he is considered as one who performs actions “of your people,” and his son is liable for striking or cursing him.

The Gemara challenges: If so, and the baraita is referring to one who repented, another should be rendered liable as well. Rav Mari says: One derives from the expression “of your people” that the prohibition applies only to one enduring among your people, not to one whose execution is imminent.

The Gemara challenges: If so, his son should be exempt as well, since his father’s execution is imminent.