MISHNA: These are the transgressors who are strangled in the implementation of the court-imposed death penalty: One who strikes his father or his mother, and one who abducts a Jewish person, and a rebellious elder according to the court, and a false prophet, and one who prophesies in the name of idol worship, and one who engages in intercourse with a married woman, and conspiring witnesses who testify that the daughter of a priest committed adultery, even though were she guilty, she would be executed by burning. And her paramour is also executed via strangulation as in any case where a man engages in intercourse with a married woman.

GEMARA: The mishna teaches: One who strikes his father or his mother is executed by strangulation. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha? The Gemara answers: It is derived from a verse, as it is written: “One who strikes his father or his mother shall be put to death” (Exodus 21:15), and every death stated in the Torah without specification is referring to nothing other than strangulation.

The Gemara suggests: Say that one is not executed for striking his father or mother unless he kills him or her. The Gemara explains: Does it enter your mind to say that if one kills one other person, he is executed by beheading with a sword, but if he kills his father or mother he is executed by strangulation? That is not reasonable.

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who said that strangulation is a more lenient form of execu-tion than decapitation. But according to the one who said that strangulation is a more severe form of execution than decapitation, what is there to say? Perhaps one is liable to receive the death penalty for striking his father or mother only if he kills the parent, and the added severity for killing a parent is in terms of the specific form of death penalty.

The Gemara answers: Rather, prove that one is executed by strangulation for striking his father or mother even if he does not kill them from the fact that it is written: “One who strikes a man and he dies shall be put to death” (Exodus 21:12), and it is written: “Or if in enmity he struck him with his hand and he died he shall be put to death” (Numbers 35:21). Learn from these verses in which it states: Strikes and he dies, that anywhere that there is mention of striking without specifying a resultant death, it is not referring to a case where the blow caused one’s death.

The Gemara notes: And it was necessary for the Torah to write: “One who strikes a man,” and it was necessary for the Torah to write: “Anyone who kills a soul, the murderer shall be slain on the basis of witnesses” (Numbers 35:30), since if the Merciful One wrote only: “One who strikes a man and he dies,” I would say that one who strikes a man, i.e., an adult, who is obligated in the fulfillment of mitzvot, yes, he is executed, but one who kills a minor, no, he is not executed. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “Anyone who kills a soul.” And if the Merciful One wrote only: “Anyone who kills a soul,” I would say that one is executed even if he killed a non-viable newborn, or even if he killed a child born after a gestation period of eight months, who, in talmudic times, was also considered non-viable. Consequently, both verses are necessary.

The Gemara asks: But if that is the source for the halakha that one is liable for striking his father or mother, why not say that he is liable even though he did not wound him or her and draw blood? Why, then, did we learn in a mishna (85b): One who strikes his father and his mother is not liable unless he wounds them?

The Gemara answers that the verse states: “And one who strikes an animal shall pay for it; and one who strikes a person shall be put to death” (Leviticus 24:21), juxtaposing one who strikes an individual with one who strikes an animal. An earlier verse states: “One who strikes the soul of an animal shall pay for it” (Leviticus 24:18). Based on this it is derived: Just as one who strikes an animal is not liable unless he wounds it and draws blood, as “soul” is written concerning it, and it can be derived from the verse: “For the blood is the soul” (Deuteronomy 12:23), that the term “soul” is a reference to blood, so too, one who strikes a person is not liable unless he causes a wound and draws blood.

Rav Yirmeya objects to this proof: If that is so, then in a case where one weakened the animal by placing a burden of stones upon it and thereby injured or killed it, would one say that so too in that case he is not liable because he did not draw blood? Clearly he is liable to pay for the damage that he caused. Rather, with regard to the term soul in the verse: “One who strikes the soul of an animal,” if it is not a matter that is relevant to the soul of an animal, as even in a case where one weakens the animal by placing a burden of stones upon it, he is liable, apply it to the matter of the soul of a person, and thereby derive that one who strikes his parent is liable to be executed only if he wounds his parent and draws blood.

The Gemara asks: But if the fact that one who strikes his parent is liable only if he draws blood is derived based on the principle: If it is not a matter, why do I need the juxtaposition between the striking of a man and the striking of an animal? The Gemara answers: The juxtaposition is necessary in order to derive the halakha for that which is taught in a baraita in the school of Ḥizkiyya: Just as in the case of one who strikes an animal there is no distinction between one who does so unwittingly and one who does so intentionally, and in both cases he is liable to pay damages, so too, in the case of one who strikes a person there is no distinction between one who does so intentionally and is executed, and one who does so unwittingly and is not executed. In both cases he is exempt from paying damages based on the principle that one receives only the greater punishment.

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who holds in accordance with the opinion of the tanna of the school of Ḥizkiyya, but according to the one who does not hold in accordance with the opinion of the tanna of the school of Ḥizkiyya, why do I need the juxtaposition between the striking of a man and the striking of an animal?

The Gemara answers: He derives that just as one who strikes an animal for medical purposes is exempt from payment of restitution, so too, one who strikes a person for medical purposes is exempt, even if it results in the death of the one that he treated.

The Gemara explains: As a dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the halakha with regard to whether a son may let blood for his father? Is he liable for wounding his father? Rav Mattana says that it is written: “And you shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18); just as one would want others to heal him when the need arises, one must heal others when the need arises. It is prohibited for one to do to others only those actions that he would not want done to him. Therefore, it is permitted for one to heal his father even if the procedure entails wounding him. Rav Dimi bar Ḥinnana says: This is derived from the juxtaposition between one who strikes a person and one who strikes an animal. Just as one who strikes an animal for medical purposes is exempt from paying restitution, so too, one who strikes a person for medical purposes is exempt from liability.

The Gemara relates: Rav did not allow his son to extract a thorn from him, due to the concern that his son would unwittingly wound him. Mar, son of Ravina, did not allow his son to pierce his blister, lest he wound him, which would be an unwitting violation of a prohibition.

The Gemara challenges this: If so, this should be a concern when another who is not his son treats him as well, as it is prohibited for one Jew to injure another. The Gemara explains: There is a distinction, as when another treats him, the concern is that the individual would be in unwitting violation of a prohibition. By contrast, when his son treats him, the concern is that he would be in unwitting violation of a prohibition punishable by strangulation.

The Gemara asks: But with regard to that which we learned in a mishna (Shabbat 122b): It is permitted on Shabbat to move an ordinary hand needle used for sewing garments to extract a thorn with it, why is it permitted to extract a thorn on Shabbat? Let us be concerned lest he wound the individual in the process, which would be an unwitting violation of a prohibition punishable by stoning.

The Gemara answers: There, even if one wounds the individual, he is unwittingly performing a labor for a destructive purpose, i.e., he is causing an injury, and one is liable to be executed only for the performance of a labor for a constructive purpose on Shabbat.

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who said that one who performs a labor on Shabbat for a destructive purpose is exempt. But according to the one who said that even when performing the labor for a destructive purpose, there are cases where one is liable if he benefits from the action, what is there to say?

The Gemara answers: Whom did you hear that said that one who is destructive in causing a wound is liable to be executed if there is a constructive element to his action? It is Rabbi Shimon,