as it could enter your mind to say that since it is written: “You shall eat no leavened bread with it; seven days you shall eat with it matzot” (Deuteronomy 16:3), one might have thought that anyone included in the obligation to eat matza is also included in the prohibition against eating leavened bread. And these women, since they are excluded from the obligation to eat matza, as it is a time-bound, positive mitzva from which they are exempt as a rule, I might say they are also excluded from the prohibition against eating leavened bread. Therefore, the verse teaches us that women are also prohibited from eating leavened bread.

The Gemara comments: And now that women have been included in the prohibition against eating leavened bread, they should also be included in the obligation to eat matza, even though it is a time-bound, positive mitzva, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. As Rabbi Eliezer said: Women are obligated to eat matza by Torah law, as it is stated: “You shall eat no leavened bread with it; seven days you shall eat with it matzot” (Deuteronomy 16:3). These two commandments are juxtaposed to teach that anyone included in the prohibition against eating leavened bread is also included in the obligation to eat matza. And these women too, since they are included in the prohibition against eating leavened bread, they are also included in the obligation to eat matza.

The Gemara questions this derivation: What did you see that led you to understand that the term anything [kol] comes to include women and to exclude leaven in its mixture? On the contrary, say that it comes to include in the punishment of karet one who eats its mixture.

The Gemara answers: It is reasonable to explain that the verse comes to include women since the verse is dealing with those who are obligated in the mitzva not to eat leavened bread, it includes those who eat, as the verse says: “For anyone who eats leavened bread…shall be cut off.” It stands to reason that the expression: Anyone [kol] includes additional people who are punishable by karet, not additional types of leaven. Would a verse that is dealing with those who may not eat leaven come to include additional types of foods that may not be eaten?

Rav Natan, father of Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, strongly objects to this: And anywhere that a verse is dealing with those who eat, does it necessarily not come to include additional types of food in the prohibition? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: “For anyone who eats the fat of the domesticated animal, of which men present an offering of fire to God, the soul that eats it shall be cut off from its people” (Leviticus 7:25)? The Sages interpreted this verse: I have derived from this verse that the prohibition applies only to the fats of unblemished animals that are fit to be sacrificed. From where is it derived that it is also prohibited to eat the fats of blemished animals, which may not be offered as sacrifices? The verse states: “Of the domesticated animal.” From where is it derived that it is prohibited to eat the fats of non-sacred animals? The verse states: “For anyone who eats the fat.” Rav Natan explains his objection: Here, isn’t the verse dealing with those who eat fats, and nevertheless, its superfluous phrases come to include types of foods that may not be eaten.

The Gemara answers: There, in the verse concerning prohibited fats, where there are no additional people who eat of it to include, as the prohibition already applies to everyone, the superfluous expression comes to include additional foods. Here, in the verse that deals with leavened bread, where there are people who eat of it who can be included, namely women, the verse does not exclude people who eat and include foods that are eaten. Generally, there should be a connection between the content of a verse and that which is derived from it. Only when no other derivation is possible is a less related matter derived.

The Gemara explains: And the Rabbis, who are not of the opinion that leaven in a mixture is included in the prohibition, do not interpret that the term: Anything [kol], comes to include other matters; neither with regard to leaven in a mixture nor with regard to karet. The Gemara asks: However, in that case, from where do they derive that it is prohibited for women to eat leavened bread?

The Gemara answers: Although they do not derive a halakha from the term: Anything, they derive a halakha from the expression: For anyone [ki kol], in the verse: “For anyone who eats leaven.”

The Gemara asks: And if indeed the phrase: For anyone, is a more inclusive expression than the simple word anything, then according to Rabbi Eliezer, another halakha could also be derived from here. Say that the phrase: Anyone who eats leaven, comes to include the women, and the phrase: For anyone who eats, comes to include leaven in its mixture. According to Rabbi Eliezer, then, one would be punishable by karet for eating leaven in a mixture.

And lest you say that Rabbi Eliezer does not derive a halakha from the phrase: For anyone [ki kol], as he does not consider this an inclusive expression, the result would be another contradiction. Wasn’t it taught in another baraita: “For no [ki kol] leaven nor any honey shall be offered as a burnt-offering before God” (Leviticus 2:11)? Had the verse stated only: You shall not offer leaven, I would have derived nothing other than the halakha that it is prohibited to sacrifice an entire piece of leaven. From where is it derived that it is also prohibited to sacrifice part of it? The verse states: “No [kol] leaven,” indicating that it is prohibited to sacrifice even part of it. From where is it derived that it is prohibited to sacrifice leaven in a mixture? The verse states: “For no [ki kol] leaven.” The Gemara analyzes this statement: Whom did you hear who derives halakhot from the term: Kol? It is Rabbi Eliezer, and nevertheless, he derives additional details from the expression: Ki kol.

The Gemara concludes: This matter remains difficult, as no satisfactory explanation has been found for why Rabbi Eliezer does not derive from the expression ki kol that leaven in a mixture is also prohibited.

After discussing leaven in a mixture, the Gemara states a more general principle. Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to all prohibitions of the Torah, a permitted substance does not join together with a prohibited substance. If one eats a permitted food with a prohibited food, and together they constitute the minimum prohibited measure, he is exempt from punishment for this act of consumption. This principle applies to all halakhot except for the prohibitions of a nazirite, who is liable for eating a mixture of that kind, as the Torah said with regard to a nazirite: “He shall abstain from wine and strong drink; he shall drink no vinegar of wine, or vinegar of strong drink, nor shall he drink anything soaked in grapes” (Numbers 6:3). This verse indicates that a nazirite is prohibited from consuming not only wine and vinegar, but also any food that was soaked in these liquids.

And Ze’eiri said: Permitted and prohibited substances also combine with regard to the prohibition against offering leaven on the altar, as it states: “For no [kol] leaven and no [kol] honey shall be offered as a burnt-offering before the Lord” (Leviticus 2:11). This indicates that one is also liable for sacrificing leaven in a mixture (Tosafot) in addition to the liability for sacrificing pure leaven.

The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion did Ze’eiri issue his ruling? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who derives from the term kol that any mixture that contains any amount of a prohibited substance is not nullified.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so,