The vines, however, are permitted, as the small courtyard does not extend into and impact upon the large one. The converse is also true: If there are vines in the small courtyard, it is permitted to sow other crops in the large one ab initio, even if they are not planted four cubits away from the vines, because the vines are not considered to be located in the larger courtyard, and therefore there is no prohibition whatsoever.

Likewise, if there were two adjacent courtyards, and a wife, who owned both courtyards, was standing in the large courtyard, and her husband threw her a bill of divorce into the small courtyard, she is divorced. Her presence in the larger courtyard extends to the smaller one, and she is therefore considered to be standing in the small courtyard. If, however, the wife was in the small courtyard and the bill of divorce was thrown into the large one, she is not divorced.

Likewise, with regard to communal prayer, if the congregation was in the large courtyard, and the prayer leader was in the small one, they fulfill their obligation through his prayer, as the congregation is considered to be in the small one as well. However, if the congregation was in the small courtyard, and the prayer leader was in the large one, they do not fulfill their obligation.

The same principle applies to a prayer quorum: If there were nine men in the large courtyard and one man in the small one, they join together to form the necessary quorum of ten, as the small courtyard is subsumed within the large one, and the individual is considered to be in the large courtyard. However, if there were nine men in the small courtyard and one in the large one, they do not join together.

Furthermore, if there was excrement in the large courtyard, it is prohibited to recite Shema in the small one, as the excrement is considered to be in the small courtyard as well, and it is prohibited to recite Shema in the presence of excrement. If, however, there was excrement in the small courtyard, it is permitted to recite Shema in the large one.

Abaye said to them: If so, we have found a partition that causes prohibition. According to these principles, the existence of a partition renders sowing crops prohibited; in the absence of a partition sowing the crops would have been permitted due to their distance from the vines. Ostensibly, this is a counterintuitive conclusion. As, were there no partition at all, it would be sufficient to distance oneself four cubits from the vine and sow the crop, whereas now that the area is divided into two courtyards by means of a partition, it is prohibited to sow the crop in the entire small courtyard.

Rabbi Zeira said to Abaye: And didn’t we find a partition that causes prohibition? But didn’t we learn in the mishna: With regard to a large courtyard that was breached into a small one, it is permitted for the residents of the large courtyard to carry, but it is prohibited for the residents of the small one to do so. That is because in that case, the legal status of the breach is like that of the entrance of the large courtyard.

And if he were to even its protrusions by constructing partitions in the larger courtyard so that the large courtyard no longer protruded beyond the smaller one, carrying in the large courtyard would also be prohibited, as it would now be completely breached into the smaller courtyard. Apparently, in this case, construction of additional partitions causes prohibition.

Abaye said to Rabbi Zeira: The two cases are not comparable, as there, adding partitions in order to even the protrusions is not considered establishment of partitions. On the contrary, it is effectively the removal of partitions. These partitions are designed to negate the original partitions of the courtyard.

Rava said to Abaye: And didn’t we find a partition that causes prohibition? But wasn’t it stated: