Rather, is it not referring to a case where the gentile arrived on Shabbat, and Shmuel is teaching: In a place where they render each other prohibited from carrying but they may not establish an eiruv together, in such a situation they may not renounce their rights for each other. Therefore, you can learn from this that if the gentile arrived on Shabbat, they cannot rent his property and then renounce their rights to one of them. This explains Rabbi Elazar’s surprise at Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling, as it appears to contradict this teaching of Shmuel, his first teacher.

Rav Yosef said: I have not heard this halakha of Shmuel’s with regard to two courtyards situated one within the other, that the residents of the inner courtyard may renounce their rights to the outer courtyard in favor of the residents of that courtyard. Abaye said to him: You yourself told it to us. Rav Yosef forgot his studies due to illness, so his student Abaye would remind him of his own teachings. Abaye continued: And it was with regard to this that you told it to us. As Shmuel said: There is no renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another. In other words, while one may renounce his rights to his own courtyard for the other residents of that courtyard, he may not renounce his rights to another courtyard for the residents of that courtyard.

Likewise, there is no renunciation of property rights in a ruin. If a ruin was shared by two houses, neither can renounce its rights to the ruin in favor of the other. The Sages instituted renunciation of rights only with regard to a courtyard, as that is the typical case.

And you said to us with regard to this matter: When Shmuel said that there is no renouncing of rights from one courtyard to another, we said this only with regard to a case of two courtyards, one alongside the other and each opening into an alleyway, that have a single opening between them. However, if the two courtyards were situated one within the other, since the residents of the courtyards render each other prohibited from carrying, they may also renounce their rights in favor of each other.

Rav Yosef said to Abaye in surprise: I said that in the name of Shmuel? Didn’t Shmuel say: We may be lenient with regard to the laws of eiruvin only in accordance with the wording of the mishna, which states that the residents of a courtyard, in the singular, may renounce their rights, but not the residents of courtyards in the plural. Therefore, the option of renouncing rights does not apply to two courtyards.

Abaye said to him: When you told us this ruling of Shmuel’s that we may be lenient with regard to the laws of eiruvin only in accordance with the wording of the mishna, you said it to us with regard to the following mishna, which states: That an alleyway in relation to its courtyards is like a courtyard in relation to its houses. Shmuel inferred from this that there must be at least two courtyards with two houses each that open into an alleyway in order to permit carrying there by means of a side post or a cross beam.

The Gemara examines the ruling of Shmuel that was cited in the previous discussion. Returning to the matter itself, Shmuel said: There is no renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another, and there is no renunciation of rights in a ruin. But Rabbi Yoḥanan disagreed and said: There is renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another, and there is renunciation of rights in a ruin.

The Gemara comments: It is necessary to explain that Shmuel and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagreed with regard to both cases, as neither case could have been learned from the other. As, if it had taught only that there is no renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another, one could have said that it is only with regard to this case that Shmuel said that there is no renunciation of rights, because the use of the one courtyard stands alone and the use of the other courtyard stands alone. Each courtyard is not used by the residents of the other courtyard, and therefore there is no renunciation of rights from one courtyard to the other. However, with regard to a ruin, where there is one common use for both neighbors, as the residents of both houses use it, I would say that he concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan.

And conversely, if it was stated only with regard to the case of a ruin, one could have said that it is only with regard to this case that Rabbi Yoḥanan stated his position, but with regard to the other case, renouncing rights from one courtyard to another, perhaps he concedes to Shmuel. Therefore, it is necessary to teach both cases.

Abaye said: With regard to that which Shmuel said, that there is no renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another, we said this only with regard to two courtyards, one alongside the other and each opening into an alleyway, that have a single opening between them. However, if there were two courtyards, one within the other, since the residents render each other prohibited to carry, they may also renounce their rights in favor of each other.

Rava said: Even in the case of two courtyards, one within the other, sometimes the residents may renounce their rights in favor of each other, and sometimes they may not renounce them. How so? If the residents of the two courtyards placed their eiruv in the outer courtyard, and one person forgot to do so, whether he was a resident of the inner courtyard or of the outer courtyard, and he therefore did not establish an eiruv with the others, then it is prohibited to carry in both courtyards. The person who neglected to establish an eiruv renders it prohibited for the residents of both courtyards to carry, because the eiruv for both courtyards is located in the outer one, and it is prohibited to carry there without an eiruv due to the right of passage of the residents of the inner courtyard through the outer courtyard. Therefore, there is no effective eiruv at all, not even for the residents of the inner courtyard.

However, if the residents of the two courtyards placed their eiruv in the inner courtyard, the following distinction applies: If a resident of the inner courtyard forgot and did not establish an eiruv, both courtyards are prohibited. In that case, it is prohibited to carry in the inner courtyard itself, due to the one who did not join in the eiruv. Since the inner courtyard is prohibited, it also renders the outer one prohibited, as the residents of the inner courtyard must pass through it.

On the other hand, if a resident of the outer courtyard forgot and did not establish an eiruv, it is permitted to carry in the inner courtyard and it is prohibited to carry in the outer courtyard. The residents of the inner courtyard have an eiruv, as they established an eiruv together, and therefore they may carry in their courtyard. The residents of the outer courtyard do not render it prohibited for them to carry, as they do not have the right to pass through the inner courtyard, and the inhabitants of the latter could bar their entrance to the inner courtyard by locking their doors.

The Gemara explains why the residents of these courtyards cannot avail themselves of the option of renunciation: If the residents of the two courtyards placed their eiruv in the outer courtyard, and one person forgot to do so, whether he was a resident of the inner courtyard or of the outer courtyard, and he therefore did not establish an eiruv with the others, then it is prohibited to carry in both courtyards, and the person who forgot to join in the eiruv cannot renounce his rights to the courtyard. The reason for this is as follows: That resident of the inner courtyard who forgot to place his eiruv, in favor of whom can he renounce his rights? Let him renounce them in favor of the residents of the inner courtyard, yet that is ineffective, as their eiruv is not with them but in the outer courtyard. Consequently, they would remain without an eiruv, which means they would render it prohibited to carry in the outer courtyard. Let him renounce them in favor of the residents of the outer courtyard, but that too is ineffective, as Shmuel ruled that there is no renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another.

Similarly, that resident of the outer courtyard who forgot to place his eiruv, in favor of whom can he renounce his rights? Let him renounce them in favor of the residents of the outer courtyard, but there is still the inner courtyard that renders them prohibited from carrying. Let him renounce them in favor of the residents of the inner courtyard, but there is no renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another. Therefore, the mechanism of permitting carrying by means of renunciation cannot be applied in these cases.

Likewise, if the residents of the two courtyards placed their eiruv in the inner courtyard, and a resident of the inner courtyard forgot to do so and did not establish an eiruv, it is prohibited to carry in both courtyards. The reason is as follows: That resident of the inner courtyard who forgot to place his eiruv, in favor of whom can he renounce his rights? Let him renounce them in favor of the residents of the inner courtyard, yet there is still the outer courtyard that renders them prohibited from carrying, as the eiruv shared by the courtyards is in essence a valid eiruv, which gives the residents of the outer courtyard the right to enter the inner one. Let him renounce them in favor of the residents of the outer courtyard, but that is ineffective, as Shmuel maintains that there is no renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another. In that case, since the inner courtyard is prohibited, it renders it prohibited to carry in the outer one as well.