This teaches that if wine flows in a person’s house like water, there is a blessing, but if not, there is no blessing.

Rabbi Elai said: In three matters a person’s true character is ascertained; in his cup, i.e., his behavior when he drinks; in his pocket, i.e., his conduct in his financial dealings with other people; and in his anger. And some say: A person also reveals his real nature in his laughter.

The Gemara returns to the topic of eiruvin: Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: It once happened that there were two courtyards, one within the other, with a Jew and a gentile living in the inner courtyard, while a single Jew lived in the outer one. The case came before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi for a decision as to whether carrying in the outer courtyard could be permitted without renting from the gentile, and he prohibited it. The case then came before Rabbi Ḥiyya, and he too prohibited it.

Rabba and Rav Yosef were sitting at the end of Rav Sheshet’s lecture, and Rav Sheshet sat and said: In accordance with whose opinion did Rav say this ruling of his, with regard to the residents of two courtyards? It was in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who maintains that a gentile renders it prohibited for even a single Jew who resides with him to carry in the courtyard, and therefore it is necessary for the Jew to rent from him. Rabba nodded his head in agreement with this explanation.

Rav Yosef said: Would two great men like these Sages, Rabba and Rav Sheshet, err in such a matter? If this ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, why do I need to state that there is a Jew in the outer courtyard? According to Rabbi Meir, even a single Jew who resides with a gentile may not carry in his courtyard, whether or not another Jew is present.

And even if you say that indeed this is the halakha, that the Jew in the outer courtyard is of no consequence, and that he is only mentioned because the incident that took place, took place in this way, and those who came to ask the question provided all the details without knowing whether they were relevant, this is still difficult. Wasn’t a dilemma raised before Rav himself with regard to this very issue: What is the halakha governing a Jew living in the inner courtyard with regard to his own place? Can he carry in the inner courtyard? And he said to them: It is permitted for him to carry there. Therefore, according to Rav, a gentile does not render it prohibited for a single Jew to carry, which is actually contrary to Rabbi Meir’s opinion.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: Rather, what else can you say? Can you say that he ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov? Didn’t Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov say: The gentile does not render it prohibited to carry unless there are two Jews living in the same courtyard who themselves render it prohibited for one another to carry without an eiruv? In this case they do not render it prohibited for each other to carry without an eiruv, as they do not live in the same courtyard.

Rather, you might say that he ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who said: The foot of one who is permitted in his own place nonetheless renders it prohibited not in its own place. The Jew in the inner courtyard is permitted to carry in his own courtyard. However, in order to leave his courtyard, he passes through the outer one, in which it is prohibited for him to carry. Therefore, he renders it prohibited for the resident of the outer courtyard as well.

But if that is the case, the following difficulty arises: According to this opinion, why do I need a gentile in the inner courtyard? The single Jew living in the inner courtyard would also suffice to render it prohibited for the resident of the outer courtyard to carry in his own courtyard, even if no gentiles were present at all.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said that Rav’s ruling should be understood as follows: Actually, Rav ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov with regard to a gentile, and in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva with regard to a foot that renders it prohibited to carry. And with what we are dealing here? This is a case where the two Jews established an eiruv with one another. And the reason that Rav prohibited carrying in the outer courtyard is that there is a gentile who renders it prohibited to carry, but if there is no gentile, it is not prohibited, as the Jews established an eiruv with one another, and therefore they are permitted to carry.

The Gemara relates that Rabbi Eliezer raised a dilemma before Rav as follows: If a Jew and a gentile live together in the outer courtyard, and a Jew lives alone in the inner one, what is the halakha? May they carry in the outer courtyard without renting from the gentile? One could argue as follows: There, in the case where the Jew and the gentile share the inner courtyard, the reason the Sages prohibited carrying is because it is common for a Jew and a gentile to live together in such a fashion. Ordinarily a single Jew would not live together in the same courtyard as a gentile, for fear that the gentile might kill him. However, here, the Jew living in the inner courtyard believes that the gentile would be afraid to kill him, as the gentile thinks to himself: Now, were I to kill my neighbor, the Jew living in the outer courtyard might come and say to me: The Jew who used to live by you, where is he? The gentile would not be able to offer as an excuse that the Jew left, for the other Jew from outer courtyard would know whether or not he passed through his courtyard. Therefore, since that living arrangement is common, the decree applies, and the gentile’s residence in the courtyard renders it prohibited to carry there.

However, here, where the gentile lives in the outer courtyard, he is not afraid of killing his Jewish neighbor, as he says to himself: If the other Jew comes to question me, I will say to him: He went out and went on his way; I do not know where he went. In this case, the gentile would not be concerned that the Jew from the inner courtyard might question his story. Since it is uncommon for a Jew and a gentile to live together in such a fashion, the Sages did not issue a decree that the gentile’s residence renders the courtyard prohibited for carrying.

Or perhaps one would say that here, too, the gentile would be afraid to kill his Jewish neighbor, as he thinks to himself: Now, were I to kill my neighbor, the Jew living in the inner courtyard might come at any moment and see me in the act of killing his friend. Since the gentile does not know when the resident of the inner courtyard will pass through the outer courtyard, there is a chance his crime might be witnessed. In that case, it would not be uncommon for a Jew and a gentile to live together in such a fashion, and the Sages’ decree that the gentile’s residence renders carrying prohibited would apply.

Rav said to Rabbi Eliezer the following verse: “Give to a wise man, and he will be yet wiser” (Proverbs 9:9), i.e., it is proper to be stringent even in such a case. Consequently, carrying is prohibited in the outer courtyard unless the Jews rent from the gentile.

The Gemara relates that Reish Lakish and the students of Rabbi Ḥanina happened to come on Shabbat to a certain inn that had at least three permanent residents, two Jews and a gentile who rented their quarters from the gentile innkeeper. Although the gentile tenant was not present on that Shabbat, the gentile landlord was present. Concerned that the gentile tenant might return during Shabbat and render it prohibited for them to carry, Rabbi Ḥanina’s students wondered whether the gentile landlord can rent out the gentile’s room again for the purpose of an eiruv.

They said: What is the halakha with regard to renting from him? The Gemara clarifies: Anywhere that the landlord cannot remove the tenant, you need not raise the dilemma, for they clearly cannot rent it from him. If the landlord is unable to expel the tenant, the residence temporarily belongs completely to the tenant, and only he can rent it out. Where you need to raise the dilemma is with regard to a situation where he can remove him.

What is the halakha? Does one say that since the landlord can remove the tenant, they can rent the residence from him, as the landlord retains a measure of control over it, and therefore he can rent it out again for the purpose of an eiruv? Or perhaps now, in any case he has not actually removed him, which means the residence is still entirely under the tenant’s jurisdiction?

Reish Lakish said to them: Let us rent it now, as the principle is that one may act leniently in a case of doubt involving a rabbinic prohibition, and when we arrive at our Sages in the South we shall ask them whether we acted properly. Later they came and asked Rabbi Afes, who said to them: You acted well when you rented it from the landlord.

The Gemara relates a similar incident: Rabbi Ḥanina bar Yosef and Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba and Rabbi Asi happened to come to a certain inn, and the gentile innkeeper, who was absent when Shabbat began, came on Shabbat. They said: What is the halakha with regard to renting from him now? The Gemara explains the two sides of the question: Is renting from a gentile like making an eiruv? If so, just as one who establishes an eiruv may do so only while it is still day, so too, one who rents a gentile’s property must do so while it is still day.

Or perhaps one who rents from a gentile is like one who renounces rights to his domain; just as one who renounces rights to his domain may do so even on Shabbat itself, so too, one who rents a gentile’s property may do so even on Shabbat. In that case, they would be able to rent from the gentile in exchange for something of value, even on Shabbat itself.

Rabbi Ḥanina bar Yosef said: Let us rent, while Rabbi Asi said: Let us not rent. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to them: Let us rely now on the words of the Elder, Rabbi Ḥanina bar Yosef, and rent. Later they came and asked Rabbi Yoḥanan about the matter, and he said to them: