it is possible for a woman who gave birth to count dispersed days? No, as the Rabbis say that she counts the days from the birth of the second fetus. Rather, is it not the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? And therefore, conclude from it that Rabbi Yehuda is of the opinion that the second offspring is considered as though it exists only where a stringency results, but where a leniency results, he is not of the opinion that the second offspring is considered to have existed.

And further, Rav Ashi said: Come and hear a proof from a baraita, which discusses the verse: “Sixty days and six days” (Leviticus 12:5). One might have thought that she counts these six days whether they are continuous or dispersed, so that if, for example, she miscarried on the sixty-third day, she would complete the remaining three days of purity for the first fetus after completing the period of purification for the second. Therefore, the verse states: “Sixty” to teach that just as the sixty days are all continuous, so too, the six days are all continuous. Whose opinion is this? If we say it is the opinion of the Rabbis, that cannot be correct, as are the Rabbis of the opinion that it is possible for a woman who gave birth to count dispersed days? Didn’t the Rabbis say that she counts for the second offspring?

Rather, is it not the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? And therefore, may one conclude from it that Rabbi Yehuda is of the opinion that the second offspring is considered extant only where a stringency results; but where a leniency results, he is not of the opinion that the second offspring is considered to have existed? The Gemara rules: Indeed, conclude from it that this is the case.

MISHNA: These are the five situations mentioned in the mishna (9a) in which one brings a sliding-scale offering: For hearing the voice of an oath, i.e., where one took a false oath that he does not have any testimony to provide on a given issue; and for the utterance of the lips, which is a case where one took a false oath about a different matter; and for the defiling of the Temple, by entering it while ritually impure, or defiling its sacrificial foods, by partaking of them while ritually impure; and a woman after childbirth; and a leper at the end of his purification process.

GEMARA: The Sages taught a baraita with regard to the nature of a sliding-scale offering, which varies depending on the owner’s financial status: There is a case in which one brings the offering in one of two possible states, either a bird offering if the individual is in a state of poverty or an animal offering if he is in a state of wealth; and there is a case in which one brings the offering in one of three possible states, of wealth, of poverty, or of extreme poverty.

The Gemara elaborates: A woman after childbirth brings a sliding-scale offering either in poverty, i.e., two doves or two pigeons, one as a burnt offering and one as a sin offering, or in wealth, i.e., a lamb as a burnt offering and a dove or a pigeon as a sin offering (see Leviticus 12:1–8). A leper brings the offering either in poverty in the form of a lamb for a guilt offering, and two doves or two pigeons, one as a sin offering and one as a burnt offering, or in wealth in the form of a lamb for a guilt offering, a lamb as a burnt offering, and a female lamb as a sin offering (see Leviticus 14:10–22). For the hearing of the voice, i.e., taking a false oath that one cannot provide testimony, or the utterance of the lips, or the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, one brings an offering either in wealth, i.e., a female lamb or goat as a sin offering, or in poverty, i.e., two doves or two pigeons, one as a sin offering and one as a burnt offering, or in extreme poverty, i.e., a meal offering.

It is taught in another baraita: When offerings are brought in poverty rather than wealth, there is a case in which one brings one offering instead of a different one; there is a case in which one brings two offerings instead of two other offerings; there is a case in which one brings two offerings instead of one offering; and there is a case in which one brings one offering instead of two offerings. From here you may derive that the offering of one-tenth of an ephah may be worth as little as one peruta.

A woman after childbirth brings one offering instead of one offering: One young bird, as a sin offering that she would bring even in wealth, and another bird as a burnt offering instead of the lamb. A leper brings two young birds instead of two lambs. For the hearing of the voice and the utterance of the lips and the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, one brings two young birds instead of one female lamb, and in a case of extreme poverty one brings one meal offering of one-tenth of an ephah instead of two young birds.

The baraita teaches: From here you may derive that the offering of one-tenth of an ephah may be worth as little as one peruta. The Gemara asks: From where do we learn this halakha? The Gemara answers that it is as the Sages taught in a baraita: In the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring an offering worth one sela to the altar, he brings a lamb, as there is nothing that is sacrificed upon the altar that is worth one sela other than a lamb.

From where is this halakha derived? It is derived from the fact that the Merciful One states in the Torah that the ram brought in its second year as a guilt offering must be “according to your valuation in silver by shekels” (Leviticus 5:15), i.e., it must be worth two sela. It may therefore be understood by inference that a lamb, i.e., a young ram, in its first year is worth one sela. And it is known that a lamb is brought when it is within its first year, as it is written: “A lamb of the first year” (Leviticus 12:6). And we learned in a mishna (8a): The price of nests, i.e., pairs of birds brought by an impoverished person instead of a lamb, stood that day at one-quarter of a silver dinar. A quarter-dinar is one-sixteenth of a sela, the price of a lamb.

And from the fact that the Merciful One has mercy upon one who brings an offering in poverty, in that He permits him to bring an offering that is worth one-sixteenth of the value of the lamb that is brought in wealth, it may be inferred that the Merciful One takes pity upon one who brings an offering in extreme poverty, and consequently He permits him to bring an offering which is worth one-sixteenth of the value of the offering brought in moderate poverty. Accordingly, the offering brought in extreme poverty may be equal to a two hundred fifty-sixth part of the value of a sela.

The Gemara examines the mathematics necessary to determine that the value of the offering brought in extreme poverty is equal to one peruta: If so, how much is the offering brought in poverty worth? It is worth one-quarter of a dinar. And how many perutot are in one-quarter of a dinar? Forty-eight perutot. Accordingly, how many perutot are in the offering brought in extreme poverty, which is worth one-sixteenth of the offering brought in poverty? Three perutot.

The Gemara objects: But with regard to that which the baraita teaches: From here you may derive that the offering of one-tenth of an ephah may be worth as little as one peruta, why did the baraita teach that it may be worth one peruta, rather than three perutot? Didn’t you say that one-tenth of an ephah is brought in extreme poverty, and you also said that this offering should be worth one-sixteenth of the offering brought in poverty, which we calculated to be three perutot?

The Gemara answers: The tanna derives the cost of an offering brought in poverty from the case of a woman after childbirth, who brings one bird instead of a lamb, as a bird is worth one thirty-second of the value of a lamb. The Gemara asks: But until now, how much was the offering brought in extreme poverty calculated to be worth? One-sixteenth of the value of the offering brought in poverty. And from where is this derived? It is derived from the value of the lamb and the ram, as explained earlier. If so, until now, the calculations lead to the conclusion that the offering brought in extreme poverty is worth one and one-half perutot, as one thirty-second of the value of a lamb is equal to one-eighth of a silver dinar rather than one-quarter, which means that the offering brought in poverty is worth twenty-four perutot, one-sixteenth of which is equal to one and one-half perutot.

Rather, Rava said a different answer: The entire matter is derived from the offering brought by a woman after childbirth, and this is what the tanna is saying: It is derived from the fact that the Merciful One has mercy upon one who brings an offering in poverty, in that he may bring an offering which is worth one thirty-second of the value of the offering brought in wealth. Rava adds parenthetically: And from what case is this principle derived? From the case of a woman after childbirth. So too, the Merciful One has mercy upon one who brings an offering in extreme poverty, in that he may bring an offering that is worth one thirty-second of the value of the offering brought in moderate poverty.

The Gemara objects: If so, the value should be one peruta minus one-quarter, i.e., three-quarters of a peruta. The Gemara explains: Indeed that is so, but it is not proper conduct to bring an offering worth less than one peruta before God.

MISHNA: What are the differences between an espoused maidservant and all those others with whom relations are forbidden? The difference is that the status of the maidservant is not equal to their status, neither with regard to punishment nor with regard to an offering, as one who unwittingly engages in intercourse with any of those with whom relations are forbidden is liable to bring a sin offering, and by contrast, one who unwittingly engages in intercourse with an espoused maidservant is liable to bring a guilt offering. One who unwittingly engages in intercourse with any of those with whom relations are forbidden brings a female animal, and one who unwittingly engages in intercourse with an espoused maidservant brings a male animal, as a sin offering is a female and a guilt offering is a male.

Furthermore, with regard to engaging in intercourse with any of those with whom relations are forbidden, both the man and the woman are equal with regard to liability to receive lashes if they were forewarned, and with regard to liability to bring an offering if they did so unwittingly. And in the case of one who engages in intercourse with a maidservant, the Torah did not equate the man with the woman with regard to lashes, as she alone is flogged, as will be explained, and the Torah did not equate the woman with the man with regard to bringing an offering, as she does not bring an offering.

With regard to intercourse with any of those with whom relations are forbidden, the Torah rendered the halakhic status of one who engages in the initial stage of intercourse [hame’areh] to be like that of one who completes the act, and one is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every act of intercourse that he performs unwittingly. By contrast, in the case of relations with an espoused maidservant, one is liable only for completing the act of intercourse, and the man brings a single offering for several transgressions.

This is a stringency that the Torah imposed with regard to the maidservant relative to other individuals with whom relations are forbidden: