If animals consecrated for the altar became pregnant and then became blemished and gave birth after redemption, their offspring and their milk are forbidden after their redemption. And one who slaughters them outside the Temple courtyard is liable to receive karet. And the Temple treasurer does not give compensation to craftsmen from money designated for purchasing animals consecrated for the altar. And in all these instances, that is not so with regard to money consecrated for Temple maintenance.

There are elements that apply to items consecrated for Temple maintenance that do not apply to animals consecrated for the altar, in that unspecified consecrations are designated for Temple maintenance; consecration for Temple maintenance takes effect on all items; and one is liable to bring a guilt offering and pay an additional payment of one-fifth for misuse of consecrated property, not only for the items themselves, but for their by-products, e.g., milk of a consecrated animal or eggs of a consecrated chicken; and there is no benefit for the owner from items consecrated for Temple maintenance, in contrast to some animals consecrated for the altar, e.g., a peace offering, from which there is benefit for the owner.

GEMARA: The Gemara questions the statement of the mishna that an item consecrated for the altar renders an animal exchanged for it a substitute: And is it an established principle that anything consecrated for the altar renders an animal exchanged for it a substitute? But there are offerings brought from birds, i.e., doves and pigeons, which are consecrated for the altar, and yet they do not render an animal exchanged for them a substitute, as we learned in a mishna (Temura 13a): Meal offerings and bird offerings do not render an animal exchanged for them a substitute. The Gemara responds: When this halakha of the mishna was taught, it was taught only with regard to animal offerings.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But there is the offspring of an animal consecrated for the altar, which is consecrated for the altar, and yet we learned in a mishna (Temura 12a): The offspring of an animal consecrated for the altar does not render an animal exchanged for it a substitute. The Gemara responds: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna here (31a)? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: The offspring of an animal consecrated for the altar renders an animal exchanged for it a substitute.

The Gemara objects: But there is the case of a substitute itself, which is consecrated for the altar, and yet we learned in that mishna (12a): A substitute does not render an animal exchanged for it a substitute. The Gemara responds: When this principle, that all animals consecrated for the altar render an animal exchanged for them a substitute, was taught in the mishna, it was taught only with regard to the principal offering, i.e., an animal initially consecrated as an offering, not an animal consecrated by extension, e.g., a substitute.

The Gemara comments: Now that you have arrived at this qualification of the established principle, one does not need to resolve the difficulty from the case of offspring of consecrated animals by saying that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Rather, you may even say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who maintain that the offspring of an animal does not render an animal exchanged for it a substitute, since when this principle was taught in the mishna it was taught only with regard to the principal offering.

§ The mishna teaches that the Temple treasurer does not give craftsmen compensation from money designated for purchasing animals consecrated for the altar. The Gemara asks: It may be inferred from the mishna that consecrations for Temple maintenance are given to craftsmen. From where is this halakha derived? Rabbi Abbahu said: It is derived from a verse, as the verse states, with regard to the mitzva to build the Tabernacle: “And let them make Me a sanctuary, that I may dwell among them” (Exodus 25:8). The verse indicates that the Tabernacle can be constructed from that which is Mine, i.e., consecrated property. Consequently, consecrated property may be used to pay the wages of a craftsman for work performed in the service of the Tabernacle.

§ The mishna teaches that there are elements that apply to items consecrated for Temple maintenance that do not apply to animals consecrated for the altar, as unspecified consecrations are designated for Temple maintenance rather than for the altar. Additionally, consecration for Temple maintenance takes effect on all items, but not all items may be consecrated for the altar. The Gemara discusses these halakhot: The Master said in the mishna that unspecified consecrations are designated for Temple maintenance, and consecration for Temple maintenance takes effect on all items. Who is the tanna whose ruling is stated in this mishna? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua.

This is as it is taught in a mishna (Shekalim 4:7): In the case of one who consecrates his possessions without specification, and among the consecrated property there was an animal suitable for sacrifice upon the altar, male or female, what should be done with it? Rabbi Eliezer says: Males that are suitable to be brought as a burnt offerings should be sold for the needs of burnt offerings, i.e., to individuals obligated to bring a burnt offering. And females should be sold for the purpose of being used for peace offerings. And the money received from their sale is allocated with the rest of his property for Temple maintenance.

Rabbi Yehoshua says: The males are not sold; rather, they themselves should be sacrificed as burnt offerings, and the females should be sold for the purpose of being used for peace offerings and they will be offered as such, and one should purchase and bring burnt offerings with the money received from their sale. And the rest of the property, which is unsuitable for sacrificial use, is allocated for Temple maintenance. Evidently, Rabbi Yehoshua maintains that unspecified consecrations are not necessarily designated for Temple maintenance.

The Gemara notes: And this explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua, stated by Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan, disagrees with the explanation of Rav Adda bar Ahava. As Rav Adda bar Ahava says that Rav says: With regard to a herd that is entirely male, even Rabbi Eliezer concedes that suitable animals are brought as burnt offerings, as a person does not set aside his ability to consecrate to the altar an animal fit to be consecrated for the altar and instead consecrate it for Temple maintenance. Even if the owner consecrated these animals without specification, it is presumed that he consecrated them for sacrifice upon the altar.

Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree only with regard to a case where one consecrates a herd that has one-half males and one-half females. And their dispute is as follows: Rabbi Eliezer holds that one does not divide his vow, i.e., state a single vow that must be fulfilled in different ways, and therefore, from the fact that the females are not consecrated as burnt offerings, as burnt offerings must be male, it must be that the males are also not consecrated as burnt offerings.

And Rabbi Yehoshua holds that a person does divide his vow. Accordingly, the males, which are fit to be brought as burnt offerings, are consecrated for the altar, whereas the females are sold to those who must bring peace offerings, and the money from their sale is used to purchase burnt offerings. According to this interpretation, Rabbi Eliezer concedes that one does not consecrate for Temple maintenance an animal fit for the altar. Consequently, the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer either.

The Gemara adds: Some say another version of the explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua. Rav Adda bar Ahava says that Rav says: In a case where one consecrated without specification only the type of animal that is suitable as an offering, even Rabbi Eliezer concedes that all the animals are consecrated for the altar. Accordingly, the males are brought as burnt offerings, and the females are sold to those who require peace offerings, and the money from their sale is used to purchase burnt offerings. The reason is that a person does not set aside his ability to consecrate for the altar an animal fit to be consecrated for the altar and instead consecrate it for Temple maintenance.

They disagree only with regard to a case where there is other property that was consecrated with the animals. And their dispute is as follows: Rabbi Eliezer holds that a person does not divide his vow. Consequently, from the fact that the other property is not consecrated for the altar, as it is not fit for sacrifice, it must be that the animals are also not consecrated for the altar. And Rabbi Yehoshua holds that a person divides his vow. Accordingly, the animals are consecrated for the altar, while the other property is consecrated for Temple maintenance. According to this explanation as well, the mishna is not in accordance with the opinions of either Rabbi Yehoshua or Rabbi Eliezer.

The Gemara discusses the two versions of the explanation of Rav Adda bar Ahava, in light of the statement of Rabbi Eliezer in the mishna cited above in Shekalim (4:7): And the money from their sale is allocated with the rest of his property for Temple maintenance. The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the latter version, that Rabbi Eliezer maintains that when one consecrates animals and other property he does not divide his vow, and as some of his property is unfit for the altar, all of his property is consecrated for Temple maintenance, this explanation is consistent with that which Rabbi Eliezer teaches: The money from their sale is allocated with the rest of his property for Temple maintenance, i.e., the money from their sale is consecrated for Temple maintenance due to the consecration of his other property.

But according to the first version, that Rabbi Eliezer maintains that one does not divide his vow even when he consecrates only animals, i.e., he does not consecrate some as burnt offerings and others as peace offerings, let the mishna teach: The money from their sale is allocated for Temple maintenance, without mentioning the rest of his property. The Gemara responds: Indeed, the mishna should be taught in such a manner, and this is also taught in a baraita: And the money from their sale is allocated for Temple maintenance.

§ The mishna teaches that consecration for Temple maintenance takes effect on all items. This emphasis indicates that it takes effect even on items that one might otherwise have thought are not consecrated. The Gemara asks: What does the mishna mean to add by this emphasis? Ravina said: It means to add shavings and fallen leaves of a tree that was consecrated for Temple maintenance.

The mishna further teaches that one is liable for misuse of items consecrated for Temple maintenance and for their by-products, but one is not liable for misuse of by-products of animals consecrated for the altar. The Gemara elaborates: When the mishna states that one is not liable for misuse of by-products of animals consecrated for the altar, this serves to add what? Rav Pappa said: It serves to add that one is not liable for misuse of by-products of animals consecrated for the altar, such as milk from sacrificial animals and eggs of pigeons.

This is as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to milk of sacrificial animals and eggs of pigeons, one may not derive benefit from them ab initio, but if one derived benefit from them, he is not liable for misuse. In what case is this statement said? It is said with regard to milk and eggs of animals consecrated for the altar. But with regard to animals consecrated for Temple maintenance, e.g., if one consecrated a chicken for Temple maintenance, one is liable for misusing its eggs, or if one consecrated a female donkey for Temple maintenance, one is liable for misusing its milk.

And even according to the one who said that one is liable for misusing by-products of animals consecrated for the altar, this statement applies only to by-products that are fit for the altar, but with regard to by-products that are not fit for the altar, e.g., eggs and milk, one is not liable for misusing them.