From where is this matter that the Sages stated, that there is no prostitution with regard to an animal derived? I.e., from where is it derived that a woman who copulates with an animal is not considered a prostitute, in accordance with the ruling of the mishna that payment for intercourse with an animal is permitted? Rav Ashi said to Rava from Parzakya: There was nothing preventing the verse from writing: You shall not bring the payment of a prostitute or a dog into the House of the Lord your God. Since the verse states: “You shall not bring the payment of a prostitute or the price of a dog,” this indicates that these are two different cases, and there is no prostitution with regard to an animal.

The Gemara adds that this is also taught in a baraita: From where is it derived with regard to the payment of a lamb to another for engaging in intercourse with a dog, or as the price of a prostitute to purchase her as his maidservant, that their sacrifice is permitted? As it is stated: “For even both of them are an abomination to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 23:19), from which it is inferred: Two are prohibited, payment to a prostitute and the price of a dog, and not four, i.e., payment for intercourse with a dog and the price of a prostitute, which are permitted. Furthermore, sacrifice of their offspring is permitted, as it is stated: “Even both of them,” which indicates that it is “them” that are forbidden, and not their offspring.

The Gemara discusses other cases of offspring of animals with regard to sacrifice on the altar. Rava says: The offspring of a female animal that was the object of bestiality when it was pregnant is prohibited to be sacrificed on the altar, like its mother. The reason is that it is considered as though it, the mother, and its offspring both were the object of bestiality. Likewise, if a pregnant cow gores and kills a Jew, its offspring is prohibited to be sacrificed, like its mother, as it is as though it, the mother, and its offspring both gored.

But the offspring of a set-aside animal and an animal worshipped as an idol are permitted to be sacrificed on the altar. What is the reason? It is that only the mother was set aside, and not the offspring. Likewise, they worshipped only its mother, not the offspring. There are those who say a different version of Rava’s statement: The offspring of a set-aside animal and the offspring of an animal worshipped as an idol are prohibited. What is the reason? It is that it is beneficial to the owner if its girth is large, as a pregnant animal is more impressive than an ordinary one. Consequently, its offspring is also considered set-aside and worshipped, and it is therefore prohibited.

Rav Aḥadevoi bar Ami says that Rav says: With regard to one who betroths a woman with the excrement of an ox that is sentenced to be stoned, if the excrement is worth at least one peruta, the woman is betrothed. Although it is not permitted to derive benefit from the ox itself, one may derive benefit from its excrement. But if one betroths her with the excrement of calves that were used for idol worship, she is not betrothed, as even their excrement is prohibited. The Gemara explains: What is the reason for the difference between the excrement of an ox that is stoned and the excrement of calves used for idolatry? If you wish, say that this is learned from a verse; if you wish, say instead that it is derived by means of a logical argument.

The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, say it is derived by means of a logical argument: With regard to calves used for idol worship, a calf’s additional girth due to the excrement stored in its body is beneficial to the owner, as fatter animals are more impressive. Therefore, the excrement is considered part of the offering and is prohibited. By contrast, with regard to an ox that is stoned, its additional girth is not beneficial to him, as he gains nothing from it, and consequently it is not considered part of the animal.

If you wish, say that this is learned from a verse: It is written with regard to an animal used for idol worship: “And you shall not bring an abomination into your house, and be [vehayita] accursed like it” (Deuteronomy 7:26). This teaches that anything that you create [mehayye] from the idol is prohibited like the idol itself. But with regard to an ox that is stoned, it is written: “The ox shall surely be stoned, and its flesh shall not be eaten” (Exodus 21:28). This teaches that only its flesh is forbidden, but its excrement is permitted.

MISHNA: If one gave money to a prostitute as her payment, it is permitted to purchase an offering with that money, as the money itself is not sacrificed. If he paid her with wine, or oil, or flour, or any other item the like of which is sacrificed on the altar, sacrifice of those items is prohibited. If he gave her consecrated items for her services, their sacrifice is permitted. Since they were already consecrated, they do not belong to him, and one cannot prohibit an item that is not his.

If he paid her with non-sacred birds, their sacrifice is prohibited. The mishna elaborates: As, by right, it should be inferred a fortiori: If in the case of consecrated items, which a blemish disqualifies, the prohibition of payment to a prostitute and the price of a dog do not take effect with regard to them; with regard to a bird, which a blemish does not disqualify, is it not right that the prohibition of payment to a prostitute and the price of a dog should not take effect with regard to them? Therefore, the verse states: “You shall not bring the payment of a prostitute, or the price of a dog, into the House of the Lord your God for any vow” (Deuteronomy 23:19). This serves to include the bird in the prohibition.

The mishna adds a principle: With regard to all animals whose sacrifice on the altar is prohibited, sacrifice of their offspring is permitted. Rabbi Eliezer says: The offspring of an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa]shall not be sacrificed on the altar. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: A kosher animal that suckled from a tereifa is disqualified from sacrifice on the altar. With regard to all sacrificial animals that became tereifot, one may not redeem them and render them non-sacred, as their consumption is forbidden and one does not redeem sacrificial animals to feed them to dogs, as this is considered a degradation of sacrificial animals.

GEMARA: The Sages taught: If one gave wheat to a prostitute and she made the wheat into flour, or if he gave her olives and she made them into oil, or if he gave her grapes and she made them into wine, it is taught in one baraita that these products are prohibited to be used as an offering in the Temple, and it is taught in another baraita that they are permitted, as the physical change transforms them into new objects. Rav Yosef said that Guryon of Aspork teaches in a baraita: Beit Shammai prohibit these products and Beit Hillel permit them. If so, the two baraitot cited above reflect a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel.

The Gemara explains that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel both derive their ruling from the verse: “You shall not bring the hire of a harlot, or the price of a dog, into the House of the Lord your God for any vow; for even both of them are an abomination to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 23:19). Beit Hillel, who permit these items after they have undergone a physical change, maintain that the word “them” teaches that this prohibition applies only to the original items, but not to their offspring. Likewise, it applies only to them, i.e., the items in their original form, but not to their changed status.

Beit Shammai maintain that one indeed derives: “Them,” but not their offspring. But they maintain that the word “even” serves to include in the prohibition items in their changed status. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Beit Hillel, isn’t it written “even”? How do they interpret that word? The Gemara responds: The word “even” is in fact difficult according to Beit Hillel.

The Sages taught in a baraita, with regard to the verse: “You shall not bring the hire of a harlot, or the price of a dog, into the House of the Lord your God,” that this excludes a red heifer, which is not brought to the House of the Lord, i.e., the Temple, but is slaughtered outside Jerusalem on the Mount of Olives. This is the statement of Rabbi Elazar. And the Rabbis say: This verse serves to include in the prohibition beaten plates of gold in the Temple, if the gold was used as payment to a prostitute or as the price of a dog.

The Gemara asks: Who are the Rabbis cited here? Rav Ḥisda says: It is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, as it is taught in a baraita: If one gave a prostitute gold as her payment, Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: One may not fashion hanging beaten plates of gold for the Temple from it, even for the area behind the Hall of the Ark Cover, i.e., the eleven cubits of space behind the Holy of Holies up to the wall of the Temple courtyard, which was at the western end of the Sanctuary. Athough this area is of lesser sanctity than the rest of the Temple, one may not place there any gold given as payment to a prostitute.

§ The mishna teaches: If he gave her consecrated items for her services, their sacrifice is permitted, whereas if he paid her with non-sacred birds, their sacrifice is prohibited. The prohibited status of birds is derived from the verse: “You shall not bring the hire of a harlot, or the price of a dog, into the House of the Lord your God for any vow,” despite an a fortiori inference from consecrated animals that indicates they should be permitted.

The Gemara objects: But if these birds are disqualified as sacrifices, let the prohibitions of payment to a prostitute and the price of a dog apply to consecrated animals, by the following a fortiori inference: If in the case of birds, which a blemish does not disqualify, the status of a prostitute’s payment and a dog’s price applies to them, then with regard to consecrated items, which a blemish does disqualify, is it not logical that the status of a prostitute’s payment and a dog’s price should apply to them? Therefore, the verse states: “For any vow.” This serves to exclude those animals that have already been vowed to be sacrificed.

The Gemara objects: The only reason consecrated animals are disqualified is that the verse excludes them, through the word “vow.” But had the verse not excluded them, I would say that if one gives a prostitute sacrificial animals, or gives these animals in exchange for a dog, the prohibition of payment to a prostitute or a dog’s price applies to them. But this conclusion is problematic, as a consecrated animal is not his property, and there is an established principle that one cannot render an item prohibited if it does not belong to him. How then could one render it prohibited by giving it to a prostitute?

Rav Hoshaya says: This is referring to one who registers the prostitute for his Paschal offering (see Pesaḥim 61a), giving her a portion in it as payment for her services, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who maintains that a Paschal offering is considered one’s personal property for the purposes of allowing additional people to register for it. As it is taught in a baraita: The verse states, with regard to the Paschal offering: “And if the household be too little for a lamb, then he and his neighbor next to his house shall take one” (Exodus 12:4). The phrase “if the household be too little” is interpreted to mean that the household cannot afford the basic necessities of the Festival.

Based on this interpretation, the phrase “for a lamb [mihyot miseh]” is interpreted to mean: Sustain him from the lamb [haḥyeihu miseh], i.e., he may use the Paschal offering as a means of supporting himself. He takes money from his neighbor in return for registering that neighbor for a portion of his Paschal offering and uses the money to purchase his needs. This halakha applies only if one lacks sufficient means to purchase food to eat, but not if he lacks merely sufficient means to purchase other items.

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: This lenient halakha applies even if one lacks sufficient means to purchase other necessary items, as, if he does not have sufficient funds he may register others with him for his Paschal offering and for his Festival peace offering. And his money that he receives for registering that person is non-sacred, as it is on this condition of registering others in exchange for the money which he receives from them that the Jewish people consecrate their Paschal offerings.

§ The mishna teaches: With regard to all animals whose sacrifice on the altar is prohibited, sacrifice of their offspring is permitted. Rav says: This ruling that with regard to all animals whose sacrifice on the altar is prohibited, sacrifice of their offspring is permitted, is not unanimous but is the opinion of the Rabbis. And indeed it is taught with regard to this case: And Rabbi Eliezer prohibits their offspring to be sacrificed on the altar.

Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana says that Rav Naḥman says: This dispute applies in a case where the animals became pregnant and then were the objects of bestiality, thereby becoming prohibited to sacrifice on the altar. As Rabbi Eliezer holds that a fetus is considered the thigh of its mother and regarded as part of the animal, and is consequently prohibited like its mother. And the Rabbis hold that a fetus is not considered the thigh of its mother. But if the animals were the objects of bestiality and then became pregnant, everyone agrees that they are permitted.

Rava says: This dispute applies in a case where the animals were the objects of bestiality and then became pregnant, as Rabbi Eliezer holds that when both this permitted factor and that prohibited factor cause a certain situation, the resulting item is prohibited. Since the mother of this offspring is prohibited, the offspring is likewise prohibited, despite the fact that its father is permitted. And the Rabbis hold that when this permitted factor and that prohibited factor cause a result, it, i.e., the offspring, is permitted like its father.

But in a case where the animals became pregnant and then were the object of bestiality, everyone agrees that they are prohibited. And the Gemara adds that Rava conforms to his standard line of reasoning in this regard, as Rava said: The offspring of a female animal that was the object of bestiality when it was pregnant is prohibited to be sacrificed on the altar, as it is considered as though it, the mother, and its offspring were both the object of bestiality. Likewise, the offspring of a pregnant cow that gores and kills a person is prohibited, because it is as though it, the mother, and its offspring both gored.

Some state another version of the previous discussion: Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana says that Rav Naḥman says: This dispute applies in a case where the animals were the object of bestiality when they already had the status of sacrificial animals. As Rabbi Eliezer holds that the offspring are also prohibited to be sacrificed on the altar, as their sacrifice is considered a degradation of consecrated items, and degradation of consecrated items is significant. And the Rabbis hold that the offspring may be sacrificed, as they maintain that this is not considered a degradation of consecrated items. But in a case where the animals were the object of bestiality when they were non-sacred, and were subsequently consecrated, since their status was changed by their consecration, everyone agrees that they are permitted.

In contrast, Rava says that Rav Naḥman says: This dispute applies in a case where the animals were the object of bestiality when they were non-sacred, as Rabbi Eliezer holds that even the sacrifice of this offspring is considered degrading to sacrificial animals, and degradation of sacrificial animals is significant, and therefore they are prohibited. And the Rabbis hold that since their status was changed by their consecration, they are permitted. But in a case where the animals were the object of bestiality when they already had the status of sacrificial animals, everyone agrees that they are prohibited.