The Gemara answers: Here, we are dealing with a case where he slaughtered the firstborn donkey in order to teach himself how to properly slaughter an animal, and not in order to eat it. In this case, Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis disagree whether the prohibition against a Jew’s consuming it serves as intent that it be treated as food. And they disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Nimos and Rabbi Eliezer.

As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei says: Nimos, the brother of Rabbi Yehoshua HaGarsi, once related to me that in the case of one who slaughters a crow in order to teach himself how to slaughter a bird properly, its blood renders other foods susceptible to impurity, as blood is one of the seven liquids that is capable of rendering foods susceptible to impurity. Rabbi Eliezer says: The blood that comes from the slaughter of an animal always renders food susceptible to impurity.

The Gemara asks: Isn’t this statement of Rabbi Eliezer identical to the statement of the first tanna, i.e., Nimos? Both hold that the blood of slaughter renders food susceptible to impurity. Rather, isn’t the difference between them with regard to whether concerning the crow its prohibition serves as its intent that it should be used as food?

Accordingly, the first tanna holds that the prohibition against consuming a crow does not render it a food. Therefore, its blood renders foods in general susceptible to impurity, but to render the crow itself a food, intent to eat it is also required, as people do not generally consume the meat of crows.

And Rabbi Eliezer comes to say that the blood of slaughter always renders other foods susceptible to impurity, and even with regard to the crow itself, intent to consume it is not required, as he holds that its prohibition serves as intent to consume it. Likewise, Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis disagree with regard to a firstborn donkey in a case where it is slaughtered only in order to teach oneself how to slaughter properly. According to Rabbi Shimon, intent to eat it is required in order to render it susceptible to the impurity of food, while according to the Rabbis the prohibition to eat it in this case serves as intent for it to be used as food.

The Gemara responds: From where is it inferred that the dispute between Nimos and Rabbi Eliezer is with regard to this issue? Perhaps the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer there is that a crow is different, since it has some indicators of a kosher bird, and is therefore considered food. By contrast, with regard to a donkey, which has no indicators of a kosher animal, slaughtering it in order to learn how to slaughter properly does not render it food.

The Gemara presents support for this explanation: And from where do we derive that indicators of a kosher animal are considered a significant matter concerning the impurity of food? As a baraita teaches with regard to the mishna cited on 10a that Rabbi Shimon says: What is the reason that the meat of the camel, hare, rock-badger, and pig are automatically susceptible to impurity of food without any other conditions? It is because they have some indicators of kosher animals.

And if you would say that if the meat of the crow is susceptible to the impurity of food because of its kosher indicators, why do Rabbi Eliezer and Nimos specifically disagree in the case where it was slaughtered in order to teach oneself how to slaughter properly? Even if the one who slaughtered it acted unawares, Rabbi Eliezer should hold that its flesh should be suceptible to impurity. The response would be that yes, this is indeed so according to Rabbi Eliezer, and they disagreed in this case only because of the opinion of Nimos, who holds that even where one slaughtered the crow intentionally, if he slaughtered it in order to teach himself how to slaughter properly the crow is not susceptible to impurity.

§ The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita to the opinion of Rabba, who holds that even according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon it is prohibited to derive benefit from a firstborn donkey following the breaking of its neck: If one does not want to redeem his firstborn donkey with a lamb, he breaks the donkey’s neck from behind with a cleaver and buries the donkey, and it is prohibited to derive benefit from the donkey; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And Rabbi Shimon deems it permitted for one to derive benefit from the donkey.

The Gemara responds: Say the baraita means: And while the donkey is still alive it is prohibited to derive benefit from it; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And Rabbi Shimon deems it permitted. Perhaps Rabbi Shimon agrees that following the breaking of its neck, it is prohibited to derive benefit from it.

The Gemara challenges: But from the fact that the latter clause of the baraita is referring to the prohibition to derive benefit while the donkey is alive it is apparent that the first clause, due to which this objection was raised, is not referring to deriving benefit while it is still alive.

As the latter clause teaches: One may not kill the firstborn donkey with a reed, nor with a sickle, nor with an ax, nor with a saw; nor may one put it in a room and close the door so that it will die from starvation. These are not the manners of killing the animal mandated by the Torah, which requires one to break its neck. And shearing the donkey or using it for labor is prohibited; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And Rabbi Shimon deems it permitted to shear it and to perform labor with it. Since the latter clause mentions the prohibition against shearing and working the animal, which applies only when the animal is still alive, the first clause must be referring to a case where the animal was already dead.

The Gemara responds: The first clause and the latter clause are both referring to a case where the animal is alive, but the first clause is referring to the prohibition against deriving benefit from its value by renting or selling it, while the latter clause is referring to deriving benefit from the animal itself by shearing it or performing labor with it.

And it is necessary to state the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon in both cases, as had the tanna taught only the case of deriving benefit from its value one would think that in that case Rabbi Shimon deems deriving benefit permitted; but in the case of deriving benefit from the donkey itself, say that Rabbi Shimon concedes to Rabbi Yehuda that it is forbidden. And had the tanna taught only the case of deriving benefit from the animal itself one would think that in that case Rabbi Yehuda deems deriving benefit forbidden; but in the case of deriving benefit from its value, say that he concedes to Rabbi Shimon. Therefore, it is necessary to teach the dispute in both instances.

The Gemara cites an additional amora who agrees with Rabba: And similarly, Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: Rabbi Shimon concedes that after breaking the donkey’s neck it is prohibited to derive benefit from it.

And Rav Naḥman said: From where do I say it? As it is taught in a baraita that the Torah states: “And if you do not redeem it, then you shall break its neck” (Exodus 13:13). The expression of breaking the neck is stated here, and the expression of breaking the neck is stated there with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken (see Deuteronomy 21:4). Just as there, in the case of the heifer whose neck is broken, it is prohibited to derive benefit from it following the ceremony, so too here, it is prohibited to derive benefit from a firstborn donkey following the breaking of its neck.

The Gemara clarifies: Who is the tanna cited in this baraita? If we say that it is Rabbi Yehuda, that is difficult, as he holds that it is already prohibited to derive benefit from a firstborn donkey while it is still alive. Why, then, would the verse need to forbid it again following the breaking of its neck? Rather, is it not the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, indicating that he concedes that deriving benefit from the donkey is prohibited following the breaking of its neck?

Rav Sheshet said to Rav Naḥman: Safra, your colleague, interpreted it as follows: Actually, Rabbi Yehuda is the tanna cited, and it was necessary for the verse to prohibit deriving benefit after the donkey’s death as well, as it might enter your mind to say that breaking the neck stands in place of redeeming the donkey, as it is stated: “And if you do not redeem it, then you shall break its neck” (Exodus 13:13). Therefore, it could be claimed that just as redemption permits one to derive benefit from the firstborn donkey, so too, breaking the neck permits one to derive benefit from it. Therefore, the verse teaches us that breaking the neck does not permit one to derive benefit from it.

Rav Naḥman said: From where do I say that Rabbi Shimon holds it is prohibited to derive benefit from a firstborn donkey following the breaking of its neck? I say it from that which Levi teaches in a baraita with regard to the reason the Torah commands that the donkey’s neck be broken: He, the owner, caused a loss of the money of a priest by not giving him a lamb in exchange for the donkey. Therefore, his money shall also be lost.

The Gemara clarifies: Whose opinion is followed in this baraita? If we say it is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, the donkey’s monetary value is already lost, as it was already prohibited to derive benefit from it while it was alive. Rather, is it not the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? This indicates that breaking the neck of the donkey renders deriving benefit from it prohibited.

The Gemara responds: If you wish, say the baraita follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and if you wish, say instead that it follows the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, even if he holds that it is permitted to derive benefit from a firstborn donkey after its neck is broken.

The Gemara explains: If you wish, say the baraita follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and it is referring to the loss of the difference between the value of the donkey while it is alive and the value of the lamb given as redemption to the priest, which is less than that of the donkey. This value, which the owner would have gained had he redeemed the donkey, is lost once the donkey is not redeemed.

And if you wish, say instead that it is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, and although he permits deriving benefit from the donkey after the breaking of its neck, there is nevertheless a depreciation of value caused by the death of the animal, as a dead donkey is worth less than a live one.

The Gemara comments: And Reish Lakish similarly says that Rabbi Shimon concedes that deriving benefit from a firstborn donkey after the breaking of its neck is prohibited, in accordance with the statements of Rabba and Rav Naḥman. But Rabbi Yoḥanan, and some say Rabbi Elazar, says: The matter is still subject to dispute, i.e., Rabbi Shimon disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda even after the death of the firstborn donkey, and permits deriving benefit from it even then.

There are those who teach that which Rav Naḥman said concerning the opinion of Rabbi Shimon with regard to this, i.e., the mishna in Kiddushin (56b): In the case of one who betroths a woman with a firstborn donkey, the woman is not betrothed, as it is prohibited to derive benefit from the donkey. Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as he holds that one is permitted to derive benefit from a firstborn donkey. Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: It is referring to a case of betrothal after the breaking of the donkey’s neck, and all agree, even Rabbi Shimon, that it is prohibited to derive benefit from it at that stage.

There are those who say that the discussion with regard to the mishna proceeded as follows: In accordance with whose opinion is this? Ostensibly, it is neither the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda nor that of Rabbi Shimon. If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who permits deriving benefit from a firstborn donkey, the woman should be betrothed with the entire value. If it follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, she should be betrothed with that difference between the value of the donkey after being redeemed, which remains hers, and the value of the lamb that must be given to the priest in exchange for the donkey.

Rabba bar Avuh says that Rav says: Actually, it follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and is referring to a case where the firstborn donkey is worth only a shekel, the same value as a lamb suitable for redemption, in which case there is no difference between the value of the donkey and that of the lamb. And Rabbi Yehuda holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda that one may not redeem a firstborn donkey with a lamb that is less than the value of a shekel, as it is taught in a baraita: When the Torah states: “You shall redeem,” with regard to a firstborn donkey, it teaches that you shall redeem it immediately, and you shall redeem it for any amount. Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: There is no redemption for less than a shekel.

The Gemara analyzes the baraita: The Master said that the verse: “You shall redeem,” teaches that you shall redeem it immediately, and you shall redeem it for any amount. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious? Why is it necessary to derive these halakhot from the verse?

The Gemara answers: It was necessary, as it might enter your mind to say that since the mitzva of redeeming a firstborn donkey is juxtaposed with that of redeeming a woman’s firstborn son in the verse: “Yet you shall redeem the firstborn of man, and the firstborn of non-kosher animals you shall redeem” (Numbers 18:15), it should be inferred that just as a woman’s firstborn son is redeemed after the baby is thirty days old and involves giving the monetary value of five sela to a priest, as stated in the next verse: “And their redemption-money, from a month old you shall redeem them, it shall be, according to your valuation, five shekels of silver” (Numbers 18:16), this firstborn donkey too should be redeemed after it is thirty days old, and a lamb whose value is at least five sela should be given to the priest.

Therefore, the baraita teaches us: “You shall redeem,” indicating that the redemption of the donkey must be done immediately after its birth, and that you shall redeem it for any amount.

The baraita also states that Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: There is no redemption for less than a shekel. The Gemara asks: Whichever way you look at it, this statement is difficult: If Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda holds that the verse compares a firstborn donkey to a woman’s firstborn son, he should require a lamb worth five sela, and if the verse does not compare them, from where does Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda derive that a lamb worth a shekel is necessary?

The Gemara answers: Actually, the verse does not compare them, and the reason a lamb worth a shekel is required is due to that which Rava says: The verse states with regard to redemption of consecrated property: “And all your valuations shall be with the shekel of the Sanctuary” (Leviticus 27:25), which indicates that all valuations that you assess should not be less than the value of a shekel.

And the Rabbis who disagree with him hold that that verse