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Steinsaltz

This is what it is saying: You shall not eat a being that comes from one of those animals that chew their cud and have split hooves if it itself does not have the signs of being kosher. To counter this, the continuation of the verse states: “The camel…is impure for you” (Leviticus 11:4). This indicates that a camel itself is non-kosher, but a non-kosher animal that is born from a kosher animal is not non-kosher; rather, it is kosher.

Rabbi Shimon says it is stated: “Camel” (Leviticus 11:4), “camel” (Deuteronomy 14:7), teaching the term two times with regard to the prohibition of consumption. This teaches that both a camel that is born from a camel and a camel that is born from a cow are non-kosher. According to Rabbi Shimon, a non-kosher animal born to a kosher animal is forbidden for consumption, in contrast to the ruling in the mishna.

The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis in the baraita, who disagree with Rabbi Shimon, what do they do with this repetition of “camel,” “camel”? The Gemara answers that one of the verses is written to prohibit the camel itself and one is written to prohibit the female camel’s milk. The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Shimon, from where does he derive that a camel’s milk is forbidden? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the phrase “the camel [et hagamal].” The verse could have stated just the term “hagamal.” The addition of the word “et” teaches that the prohibition applies also to its milk. And the Rabbis do not interpret instances of “et as a means to derive new halakhot; they consider it to be an ordinary part of the sentence structure and not a source for exegetical exposition.

As it is taught in a baraita: Shimon HaAmasoni would interpret each and every occurrence of the word et” in the Torah, deriving additional halakhot with regard to the particular subject matter. Once he reached the verse: “You shall fear the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 6:13), which is written with the added word “et,” he withdrew from this method of exposition, as whose fear could be an extension of the fear of God? His students said to him: Our teacher, what will be with all the occurrences of et” that you interpreted until now? Shimon HaAmasoni said to them: Just as I received reward for the exposition, so I receive reward for my withdrawal from using this method of exposition.

The word “et” in this verse was not explained until Rabbi Akiva came and taught: “You shall fear the Lord your God”; the word “et” in the verse serves to include Torah scholars, i.e., that one is commanded to fear them just as one fears God. In any event, Shimon HaAmasoni no longer derived additional halakhot from “et.” The Rabbis follow the conclusion of Shimon HaAmasoni that “et” is not expounded.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: If that is so, that the reason of the Rabbis for the halakha that a camel’s milk is forbidden is that it is derived from the words “camel,” “camel,” written twice, and Rabbi Shimon derives it from “the camel [et hagamal],” then could it be reasoned that if not for this derivation I would say that milk of a non-kosher animal is permitted?

In what way is this case different from that which is taught in a baraita: The Torah states with regard to the prohibition against eating creeping animals: “These are they that are impure [hateme’im] to you among all the creeping animals” (Leviticus 11:31). The Sages interpret the letter heh in the term “that are impure [hateme’im]” to prohibit their juice that oozes from their body and their gravy that is produced when they are cooked, and sediments of their flesh that congeal at the bottom of the dish when cooked. Evidently, any liquid that emerges from a non-kosher animal is forbidden.

Rav Ashi responded: The additional exposition to derive that camel’s milk is forbidden was necessary, because it might enter your mind to say it may be permitted, since the permissibility of consumption of the milk of a kosher animal is also a novelty. The milk originates from the blood, which is forbidden for consumption, as the Master said that the reason a nursing woman does not experience menstruation is because the blood is spoiled and becomes milk. Since it is a novelty that the Torah permits milk despite its origins, it might enter your mind to say that with regard to a non-kosher animal it should also be permitted. Therefore, the verse teaches us that it is forbidden.

The Gemara challenges: This works out well according to the one who says that a nursing woman does not menstruate because the blood is spoiled and becomes milk. But according to the one who says that the milk does not originate from blood, but rather the reason she does not menstruate is because her limbs become disjointed and her soul, i.e., her health, does not return to her until twenty-four months later, what is there to say? Why does the Torah employ a verse to render forbidden the milk of a non-kosher animal?

The Gemara answers: It was necessary, because it might enter your mind to say it may be permitted; since generally speaking there is nothing that comes from a living animal that the Merciful One permits, and yet this milk of a kosher animal is similar to a limb severed from the living and is nevertheless permitted, the permissibility of milk is a novelty of the Torah. And consequently it might enter your mind to say that even the milk of a non-kosher animalshould be permitted in line with that novelty. Therefore, the verse teaches us that it is forbidden.

§ The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that the milk of a kosher animal is in fact permitted? If we say that it is derived from the fact that the Merciful One prohibits eating meat that was cooked in milk, indicating that milk by itself is permitted, one can reject this proof and say that milk alone is forbidden only for consumption but permitted with regard to deriving benefit from it. By contrast, meat that was cooked in milk is forbidden with regard to deriving benefit from it as well.

And according to Rabbi Shimon, who deems meat that was cooked in milk permitted with regard to deriving benefit from it, you find a reason for the Torah to mention the prohibition of meat and milk together, even if milk alone is forbidden as well, and that is in order to render one liable to receive lashes for cooking them together, which would not apply to cooking milk alone.

Rather, one can prove that milk is permitted for consumption since the Merciful One revealed that with regard to disqualified consecrated animals that were redeemed: “You may slaughter and eat meat” (Deuteronomy 12:15). This verse is interpreted in the following manner: “You may slaughter,” but you may not use its wool from shearing. You may eat its “meat,” but you may not consume its milk. It can be inferred from here that milk of non-sacred kosher animals is permitted.

The Gemara rejects this proof: But one could say the distinction between non-sacred milk and milk from sacrificial animals is not with regard to the permissibility of consumption. Rather, milk of non-sacred animals is forbidden for consumption but is permitted with regard to deriving benefit from it, but the milk of sacrificial animals is forbidden with regard to deriving benefit as well.

Rather, proof may be brought that milk is permitted from the fact that it is written: “And there will be goats’ milk enough for your food, for the food of your household, and maintenance for your maidens” (Proverbs 27:27). According to the verse, goats’ milk serves as food, and therefore must be kosher.

The Gemara rejects the proof: But perhaps the verse is referring to selling the milk as merchandise and using the money to buy food, and not to consuming the milk itself. Rather, proof may be brought from the fact that it is written with regard to Jesse’s instructions to his son David upon sending him with provisions for his brothers, who were at war against the Philistines: “And these ten cheeses you shall bring to the captain of their thousand” (I Samuel 17:18), which indicates they ate dairy products.

The Gemara rejects this proof as well: But perhaps this verse too means the captain can sell the cheese as merchandise. The Gemara responds: Is that to say that it is the norm during war to engage in commerce? Clearly the cheese was meant for consumption, which proves it is permitted to eat dairy products.

And if you wish, say instead that proof may be brought from here: The Torah praises Eretz Yisrael as: “A land flowing with milk and honey” (Exodus 3:17), and if milk was not permitted, would the verse praise the land to us with an item that is not suitable for consumption? And if you wish, say instead a proof from here: “Come, buy, and eat; and come, buy wine and milk without money and without price” (Isaiah 55:1).

§ The Gemara returns to the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis, who interpret the repetition of the word “camel” as indicating the prohibitions against eating a camel born from a cow and consuming its milk, respectively, and asks: But if that is so, that the repetition indicates these halakhot, then with regard to the words: “Hare,” “hare,” “rock badger,” “rock badger,” “swine,” “swine” (see Leviticus 11:5–7; Deuteronomy 14:7–8), which are all mentioned twice as being forbidden, do these words come to teach these halakhot as well?

The Gemara explains: They are necessary only for that which is taught in a baraita: Why were all of the non-kosher animals and birds repeated in Deuteronomy (14:7–20), after having been mentioned already in Leviticus (11:10–20)? With regard to the animals, it is because of the shesua (see Deuteronomy 14:7), an animal with two backs and two spines, which is not mentioned in Leviticus, and with regard to the birds, it is because of the ra’a (see Deuteronomy 14:13).

The Gemara challenges: If so, then the double reference of “camel,” “camel,” also comes for this purpose of teaching about the shesua, and not to teach a separate halakha about the camel. The Gemara explains: Nevertheless, anywhere that it is possible to interpret the verse as teaching an additional halakha, we interpret it in that manner. Only where there is no possibility of such an interpretation is the concept of repeating the passage merely to introduce one additional detail invoked.

§ The Gemara discusses an additional source that cites the opinion of Rabbi Shimon: The Sages taught in a baraita that in the case of a ewe that gave birth to a goat of sorts and a goat that gave birth to a ewe of sorts, in each case the mother is exempt from its offspring being counted a firstborn. And if it has some of the characteristics of its mother, the mother is obligated, i.e., subject to accounting its offspring a firstborn. Rabbi Shimon says: The offspring does not have firstborn status unless its head and the majority of its body are similar to the appearance of its mother.

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to the permissibility of eating a non-kosher animal that was born to a kosher animal, does Rabbi Shimon require its head and most of its body to resemble its mother, or not, and possessing some of the characteristics of its mother suffices?

The Gemara explains: With regard to the halakha of firstborn status, it is written: “But the firstborn of an ox” (Numbers 18:17), which indicates that it does not have firstborn status unless it is an ox and its firstborn is an ox. If its head and most of its body do not resemble an ox, it does not have firstborn status according to Rabbi Shimon. But with regard to consumption, where Rabbi Shimon holds a camel born to a kosher animal is forbidden, perhaps it is only an ordinary-looking camel that the Merciful One states is forbidden, but if

Talmud - Bavli - The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren No=C3=A9 Talmud
with commentary by Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz Even-Israel (CC-BY-NC 4.0)
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