the fetus requires its own slaughter to permit its consumption, and it is subject to the obligation to give the foreleg and the jaw and the maw to a priest, as is required for a non-sacred animal that is slaughtered. But nevertheless, if it dies, the fact that its mother was slaughtered serves to render it pure with regard to imparting impurity to people through their carrying of it, as it does not impart the impurity of a carcass.

Rava said to Rav Ḥisda: Your ruling is inconsistent. When you say it requires slaughter, in accordance with whose opinion is that? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, that a live nine-month-old fetus is not permitted by virtue of its mother’s slaughter. But when you say that if it dies, it is pure with regard to imparting impurity through carrying, in accordance with whose opinion is that? It is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.

Rav Ḥisda replied: And according to your reasoning, the same difficulty arises with that which Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches in a baraita: With regard to one who slaughtered an animal that is a tereifa and found inside it a live nine-month-old fetus, it requires its own slaughter, and it is subject to the obligation to give the foreleg and the jaw and the maw to a priest. But nevertheless, if it dies, it is pure with regard to imparting impurity through carrying. When he says that it requires slaughter, in accordance with whose opinion is that? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. But when he says that if it dies, it is pure with regard to imparting impurity through carrying, it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.

Rava responded: That is not difficult, as it is possible that Rabbi Ḥiyya was speaking about if one found that the fetus had already died inside the mother. In such a case, Rabbi Meir concedes that its mother’s slaughter renders it pure, as stated in the mishna. Accordingly, the baraita is entirely in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. But according to your opinion, that even if it was found alive and died later it is pure from the impurity of a carcass, it is difficult.

Rav Ḥisda said to Rava: According to my opinion also it is not difficult, as I claim that the entire baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and although the slaughter of its mother permits the fetus, its own slaughter can also permit it, as the Merciful One considers four simanim to be fit for slaughter, two of the mother and two of the fetus, the fetus being permitted through the cutting of either pair.

The Gemara relates: When Rabbi Zeira ascended to Eretz Yisrael, Rav Asi found him sitting and saying this halakha of Rav Ḥisda, i.e., that the Merciful One considers four simanim to be fit for slaughter. Rav Asi said to him: That is correct, and so says Rabbi Yoḥanan. Rabbi Zeira asked him: Can I conclude by inference from your statement that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s colleague, disagrees with him?

Rav Asi answered: I do not know, as after Rabbi Yoḥanan made his statement, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish was waiting for him to see if he would retract, and he therefore remained silent about whether or not he disagreed. But it is possible that after I left, he disagreed. And some say that Rav Asi said: At that time, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish was drinking, and that is why he remained silent. Therefore, I do not know whether or not he disagreed.

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: Even if a nine-month-old fetus emerged alive and is now five years old and plowing in the field it does not require slaughter. The Gemara asks: This opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri is identical to that of the first tanna, i.e., the Rabbis. What difference is there between them? Rav Kahana said: The difference between them is a case where the fetus stood upon the ground. According to the opinion of the first tanna, once the fetus walks on the ground there is a rabbinic decree requiring that it be slaughtered before it is consumed, lest people mistakenly permit other animals without slaughter. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri disagrees and holds that it does not require slaughter.

Rav Mesharshiyya said: According to the statement of the one who says that when defining the status of an animal one needs to be concerned with its paternity, if a ben pekua copulated with a full-fledged animal, the offspring has no rectification. Although when the mother and father are each a ben pekua the offspring is permitted without ritual slaughter, if the father is a ben pekua but the mother is not, the offspring is simultaneously defined as requiring slaughter, based on the mother, and being excluded from the requirement for slaughter, based on the father. Therefore, no act of slaughter can permit it.

Abaye says: Everyone, i.e., even the first tanna, who requires the slaughter of a ben pekua that stood upon the ground, agrees with regard to a ben pekua with non-cloven hooves that was found inside a kosher animal, that it is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of its mother. What is the reason for this? It is that people remember any bizarre matter, and there is no concern that if it is permitted without slaughter, people will mistakenly permit regular animals without slaughter. Some say that Abaye said: Everyone agrees with regard to a ben pekua with non-cloven hooves found inside an animal with non-cloven hooves that was itself born to a kosher animal, that the fetus is permitted without slaughter even if it stood on the ground. What is the reason? It is that people remember two bizarre matters.

Ze’eiri says that Rabbi Ḥanina says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Shezuri that a ben pekua is permitted without slaughter even if it stood upon the ground. And similarly, Rabbi Shimon Shezuri would permit without slaughter the offspring of a ben pekua and the offspring of its offspring, and so on to the end of all future generations. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It, the ben pekua itself, is permitted, but its offspring is prohibited unless it is slaughtered.

The Gemara relates: Adda bar Ḥavu had a ben pekua that was attacked by a bear and was about to die. He came before Rav Ashi to inquire what to do. Rav Ashi said to him: Go and slaughter it before it dies so that you can eat it, in accordance with the opinion of the first tanna that if a ben pekua stood upon the ground it requires slaughter. Adda bar Ḥavu said to Rav Ashi: But doesn’t Ze’eiri say that Rabbi Ḥanina says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri that a ben pekua is permitted without slaughter even if it stood upon the ground, and similarly, Rabbi Shimon Shezuri would permit without slaughter the offspring of a ben pekua and the offspring of its offspring, and so on to the end of all future generations? And even Rabbi Yoḥanan, who disagreed, said his dissenting opinion only with regard to its offspring, but with regard to a ben pekua itself, he did not disagree that it is permitted.

Rav Ashi said to Adda bar Ḥavu: Rabbi Yoḥanan was speaking according to the statement of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri, i.e., he said that even Rabbi Shimon Shezuri permits only a ben pekua itself, but not its offspring. But Rabbi Yoḥanan himself agrees with the first tanna that a ben pekua that stood upon the ground is prohibited without slaughter.

Adda bar Ḥavu persisted: But didn’t Ravin bar Ḥanina say that Ulla says that Rabbi Ḥanina says with regard to a different issue: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri; and moreover, not only is the halakha in accordance with his opinion with regard to this matter, but in any place where Rabbi Shimon Shezuri taught a halakha in our Mishna, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion?

Rav Ashi said to Adda bar Ḥavu: I hold in accordance with this statement of Rabbi Yonatan, as Rabbi Yonatan says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri in the case of one who is dangerously ill, and in the case of teruma of the tithe of doubtfully tithed produce [demai], but not in other cases, e.g., in the case of his disagreement with the first tanna concerning a ben pekua.

The Gemara now elaborates on these two cases. The case of one who is dangerously ill is as we learned in a mishna (Gittin 65b): Initially, the Sages would say that in the case of one who is taken out in a neck chain [bekolar] to be executed and who said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, these people who hear should write the document and give it to her. Although there was no explicit instruction to give it to her, this is understood to have been his intention, in order to release her from the obligation to perform levirate marriage or the ritual through which she becomes free of her levirate bonds [ḥalitza]. They then said that this halakha applies even to one who sets sail and one who departs in a caravan to a distant place. A bill of divorce is given to his wife under these circumstances even if her husband said only: Write a bill of divorce for my wife. Rabbi Shimon ben Shezuri says: Even in the case of one who is dangerously ill who gives that instruction, they write the bill of divorce and give it to his wife.

The case of teruma of the tithe of demai is as we learned in a mishna (Demai 4:1): With regard to teruma of the tithe of demai, i.e., teruma of the tithe that was separated from the produce of an am ha’aretz, who is suspected of not separating tithes properly, that fell and returned to its original place, becoming mingled with the rest of produce from which it had been separated, Rabbi Shimon ben Shezuri says: Even on a weekday one may ask the am ha’aretz whether or not he separated the necessary tithes and then eat based on his statement.