And the law is likewise in a winepress with respect to tithes. As long as one’s head and most of his body is in the winepress, he may drink from the wine without first separating tithes because drinking wine in a winepress is considered incidental drinking, which does not require tithing. The activity of harvesting and ingathering grapes is not considered completed as long as the grapes are in the winepress, since the grapes are still intended for making wine. Consequently, at this stage one may consume the produce in a casual, incidental manner. Once the work has been completed, however, one must tithe the produce before consuming any of it.

The Gemara clarifies several laws related to this issue: With regard to a person, it was said in connection to these laws that it is necessary that his head and most of his body be inside the domain from which he is drinking. However, a question may be raised with regard to a cow standing in a public domain and drinking from a private domain, or vice versa: Is it necessary that its head and most of its body be inside the domain from which it is drinking, or not?

The Gemara clarifies: Wherever one holds the bucket from which the cow is drinking but does not hold the animal, there should not be a dilemma for you, for it is certainly necessary for its head and most of its body to be inside, as the cow might move backward and pull the bucket with it, causing him to carry it from one domain to the other. Where there should be a dilemma for you is where he holds the bucket and also holds the animal. What is the law in such a case?

He said to him: We already learned a resolution to this dilemma, for we have learned in the mishna: It is permitted to bring the upright boards closer to the well, provided that the enclosed area is large enough for a cow to stand in, with its head and most of its body inside the partitioned space and drink. Does this not refer even to a case where one holds the cow and also holds the bucket? The Gemara rejects this argument: No, this may refer exclusively to the case where he holds the bucket but does not hold the animal.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: And where he holds the bucket but does not hold the animal, is it permitted to give his animal to drink in such a fashion? Wasn’t it taught in the following baraita: A person may not fill a bucket with water and hold it before his animal on Shabbat; but he may fill it and pour it out into a trough, and it, i.e., the animal, drinks of its own accord? Consequently, we see that it is prohibited to give an animal to drink from a bucket if he does not hold the animal.

The Gemara refutes this: Wasn’t it stated with regard to this baraita that Abaye said: Here we are dealing with a cow standing inside a house with windows open to the public domain, eating from a manger or trough that stands in the public domain that is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, i.e., it constitutes a private domain, and one end of this manger interposes into the area between the upright boards surrounding a well?

In such a case, it is prohibited to fill a bucket with water in the area enclosed by the upright boards and hold it before his animal, unless the animal is within the enclosed area. This is a rabbinical decree, lest one see that the manger was damaged on the side in the public domain and go to fix it, and he might take the bucket with him, thereby carrying it from the private domain to the public domain. Rather, he must pour out the water into the manger, so that it reaches the animal on its own.

The Gemara asks: Even if he carried the bucket into the public domain, would he be liable in such a case? Didn’t Rav Safra say that Rabbi Ami said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to one who transfers objects from corner to corner in a house, and changed his mind about them while carrying them and carried them out to the public domain, he is exempt because the lifting at the first moment was not for that purpose of carrying out to a different domain; when he picked them up, he intended merely to move them around his house. Here too, then, one should not be liable, since when he picked up the bucket he did not intend from the outset to carry it into the public domain; accordingly, there is no room for such a decree.

Rather, say that the decree is due to a different concern, that at times one would fix the manger and then bring the bucket back in again, thereby carrying from the public domain into the private domain. In this case one picks up the bucket from the outset with the intention of carrying it from a public domain into a private domain.

Some say a different version of the previous discussion. With regard to a person, we said that it is sufficient if his head and most of his body are inside the domain from which he is drinking. But a question may be raised with regard to a cow standing in a public domain and drinking from a private domain, or vice versa: Is it sufficient if its head and most of its body are inside the domain from which it is drinking, or not? Perhaps all of the cow must be in that domain.

The Gemara clarifies the question. The case where one holds the bucket from which the cow is drinking and also holds the animal should not be a dilemma for you, as it is certainly enough if its head and most of its body are in the domain. Rather, the case where there should be a dilemma for you is where he holds the bucket but does not hold the animal. What is the halakha in such a case?

He said to him: We already learned a resolution to this dilemma in the mishna: It is permitted to bring the upright boards closer to the well, provided that the enclosed area is large enough for a cow to stand in, with its head and most of its body inside the partitioned space, and drink. Doesn’t this refer even to a case where one holds the bucket but does not hold the animal? The Gemara rejects this argument: No, this may refer only to the case where he holds the bucket and also holds the animal.

The Gemara comments: So too, it is reasonable to say this, for if one holds the bucket but does not hold the animal, is it in fact permitted to give his animal to drink in such a fashion? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: A person may not fill a bucket with water and hold it before his animal on Shabbat. But he may fill it and pour it out into a trough, and the animal drinks of its own accord.

The Gemara refutes this argument: Wasn’t it stated with regard to this baraita that Abaye said: Here, we are dealing with a manger that stands in the public domain, and it is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, i.e., it constitutes a private domain, and one end of the manger interposes into the area between the upright boards surrounding a well, and the animal is standing at the other end in the public domain. In such a case, it is prohibited to fill a bucket with water in the area enclosed by the boards and hold it before his animal, unless the animal is within the enclosed area. This is a rabbinical decree, lest at times one see that the manger was damaged on the side in the public domain and go to fix it and take the bucket with him, thereby carrying it from the private domain into the public domain.

The Gemara asks: But would he be liable in such a case? Didn’t Rav Safra say that Rabbi Ami said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to one who transfers objects from corner to corner in a house, and changed his mind about them while carrying them and took them out to the public domain, he is exempt because the lifting at the first moment was not for that purpose of carrying out to a different domain; when he picked them up, he intended merely to move them around his house. Here too, then, he should not be liable, since when he picked up the bucket he did not intend from the outset to carry it into the public domain; accordingly, there is no room for such a decree.

Rather, we must say that the decree is due to a different concern, that at times one would fix the manger and then bring the bucket back in again, carrying from the public domain into the private domain. In this case, he picks up the bucket with the intention of carrying it from a public domain into a private domain. In any case, no proof can be brought from this source.

The Gemara cites a different proof. Come and hear the following baraita: A camel whose head and most of its body are inside a private domain may be force-fed from inside the private domain. Now, force-feeding is like the case where he holds the bucket and also holds the animal, as one cannot force-feed an animal without holding it by its neck, and nonetheless we require that its head and most of its body be inside the domain where it is eating.

Rav Aḥa bar Rav Huna said that Rav Sheshet said: A camel is different, as since its neck is long, its head and most of its body must be inside; otherwise it could stretch its neck into the public domain, and the one feeding it might come to carry the bucket from the private domain into the public domain. In the case of other animals, however, there is no reason for such stringency.

The Gemara attempts to cite yet another proof. Come and hear the following baraita: An animal whose head and most of its body were inside a private domain may be force-fed from inside the private domain. Now, as stated above, force-feeding is like the case where he holds the bucket and also holds the animal, and nonetheless we require that its head and most of its body be inside the domain where it is eating. The Gemara refutes this argument: What is this animal that is taught in this baraita? It is also a camel.

The Gemara objects: Wasn’t it taught as animal in one baraita, and wasn’t it taught as camel in the other baraita? The implication is that this law applies not only to camels, but to other animals as well.

The Gemara answers: Were these two baraitot taught next to each other? Had both of these baraitot been taught together, we would indeed expect the tanna not to teach the same law using different formulations. However, since these two baraitot come from different sources, it is possible that one of the tanna’im referred to a camel with the generic term animal, and hence no proof can be brought from here. This same idea that a camel is different was also taught in another baraita: Rabbi Eliezer prohibits this in the case of a camel, since its neck is long.

Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Adda said: Upright boards surrounding wells were only permitted to Festival pilgrims. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that boards surrounding wells were permitted only for cattle? The Gemara answers: What is the cattle mentioned here? It means the cattle of festival pilgrims. However, a person