if the repeated term “his offering” is not needed to counter the a fortiori inferences, why do I need these three verses? The Gemara explains: One instance of “his offering” teaches that one places hands only on one’s own offering, but not on an offering of another person. Another instance of “his offering” teaches that one places hands only on one’s own offering, but not on an offering of a gentile. The third instance of “his offering” serves to include all the owners of a jointly owned offering in the requirement of placing hands, i.e., they are all required to place their hands on the offering.

§ The mishna states: If the owner of an offering died, then the heir is regarded as the offering’s owner. Therefore, he places his hands on the offering and brings the accompanying libations, and he can substitute a non-sacred animal for it. Although it is prohibited to perform an act of substitution, if the owner of an offering does this, his attempt is successful to the extent that the non-sacred animal is thereby consecrated, even though the original offering also remains sacred.

Rav Ḥananya taught a baraita in the presence of Rava: An heir does not place hands on an offering he inherited, and an heir cannot substitute a non-sacred animal for an offering he inherited. Rava asked: But didn’t we learn in the mishna: The heir places his hands on the offering, and brings the accompanying libations, and he can substitute a non-sacred animal for it and thereby consecrate the non-sacred animal?

Rav Ḥananya said to Rava: Should I reverse the current version of the baraita to have it be in accordance with the mishna? Rava said to him: No, as whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as it is taught in a baraita: An heir places hands, and an heir can effect substitution. Rabbi Yehuda says: An heir does not place hands, and an heir cannot effect substitution.

The Gemara clarifies: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda? He expounds the term “his offering” as teaching that one places hands only on one’s own offering, but not on one’s father’s offering that one inherited. And furthermore, Rabbi Yehuda derives the halakha concerning who can substitute a non-sacred animal for an offering, which is the initial stage of consecration, from the halakha concerning who performs the rite of placing hands on the offering, which is the final stage of consecration: Just as with regard to the final stage of consecration, an heir does not place his hands, so too, with regard to the initial stage of consecration, an heir cannot effect substitution.

And as for the Rabbis, from where do they derive their opinion? The verse states: “If he shall substitute [hamer yamir] animal for animal” (Leviticus 27:10), with the doubled form of hamer yamir serving to include the heir as one capable of effecting substitution. And furthermore, they derive the halakha concerning who performs the rite of placing hands, which is the final stage of consecration, from the halakha concerning who can effect substitution, which is an initial stage of consecration: Just as with regard to the initial stage of consecration, an heir can effect substitution, so too, with regard to the final stage of consecration, an heir places his hands.

The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, what do they do with this term: “His offering”? The Gemara explains how the Rabbis expound each mention of the term. One instance of “his offering” teaches that one places hands only on one’s own offering, but not on an offering of a gentile. Another instance of “his offering” teaches that one places hands only on one’s own offering, but not on an offering of another person. The third instance of “his offering” serves to include all the owners of a jointly owned offering in the requirement of placing hands, i.e., they are all required to place their hands on the offering.

The Gemara clarifies: And Rabbi Yehuda does not hold that one of the mentions serves to include all the owners of a jointly owned offering in the requirement of placing hands, so he is able to expound it to exclude an heir from the requirement. Alternatively, if he holds that one of the mentions serves to include owners of a jointly owned offering, then he must derive that one does not place hands on the offering of a gentile or of another person from the same one mention in the verse, which leaves him two more mentions in the verses. One he expounds to teach that on “his offering” he places hands, but not on his father’s offering that he inherited, and the other mention remains to include all the owners of a jointly owned offering in the requirement of placing hands.

The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Yehuda, what does he do with the use of the doubled form in this verse: “If he shall substitute [hamer yamir]”? The Gemara answers: He requires it to include a woman among those who can effect substitution. As it is taught in a baraita: Since the entire matter of substitution is stated in the Torah only in the masculine form, what is the reason that we ultimately come to include a woman? The verse states: “If he shall substitute [hamer yamir],” using a doubled form.

And as for the Rabbis, they derive that a woman can effect substitution from the term: “And if” (Leviticus 27:10), in the phrase “and if he shall substitute.” And Rabbi Yehuda does not expound the term “and if” at all.

MISHNA: Everyone who brings an animal offering places hands upon its head, except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, a minor, a blind person, a gentile, a Canaanite slave, the agent of the owner of the offering who brings the offering on the owner’s behalf, and a woman.

And the requirement of placing hands is a non-essential mitzva; therefore, failure to place hands does not prevent the owner from achieving atonement.

The rite of placing hands is performed by leaning on the head of the offering with two hands. And in the same location in the Temple that one places hands, one slaughters the animal. And immediately following the rite of placing hands, the slaughter is performed.

GEMARA: The Gemara explains why certain types of people do not place hands on an offering: Granted, a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor do not place their hands on the offering, as they are not mentally competent. The exclusion of a gentile is also understandable, as the verses concerning placing hands are introduced with: “Speak to the children of Israel and say to them” (Leviticus 1:2), which indicates that the children of Israel place hands upon their offerings, but gentiles do not place their hands upon their offerings. But with regard to a blind person, what is the reason that he does not place his hands on his offering?

Rav Ḥisda and Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi disagree as to the source of the exclusion of a blind person. One said that it is derived from a verbal analogy between the mention of placing hands in the passage detailing the general requirement to do so, and the mention of placing hands stated with regard to the bull offering brought for a community-wide violation perpetrated due to an erroneous ruling of the Sanhedrin, which is performed by the Elders of the congregation, i.e., the judges of the Sanhedrin: Just as the judges may not be blind (see Sanhedrin 34b), so too the rite of placing hands is not performed by a blind person.

And the other one said that it is derived from a verbal analogy between the mention of placing hands in the passage detailing the general requirement to do so, and the mention of placing hands stated with regard to the burnt offering of appearance brought by an individual on the pilgrimage Festivals: Just as a blind person is exempt from making the pilgrimage to Jerusalem and bringing the offering (see Ḥagiga 2a), so too he is excluding from the requirement of placing hands.

The Gemara asks: And according to the one who said that the exclusion of a blind person is derived from the burnt offering of appearance, what is the reason that he does not derive this from the placing of hands performed by the Elders of the congregation?