demonstrates that there is no difference if one expresses his intention using the language of: Consumption on the altar, and there is no difference if one expresses his intention using the language of: Burning on the altar. Therefore, if the priest removed the handful from the meal offering while expressing the intention that it should be burned on the altar on the following day, whether this intention was phrased as: Consumed on the altar, or: Burned on the altar, the offering is piggul.

Alternatively, the doubled expression serves to teach that just as one renders the offering piggul only when one’s intention involves the consumption of an olive-bulk, as this is the minimal measure for an act to be considered eating, so too, one renders the offering piggul only when one’s intention involves the burning of an olive-bulk. But actually, the expression for consumption found in the verse indicates consuming it in the usual manner, and therefore an offering is rendered unfit only if one’s improper intention involved consuming an item that is usually consumed, or burning an item that is usually burned.

And what would Rabbi Eliezer respond? He would say that if that were so, that the verse intends to teach only that halakha, let the Merciful One write either: If he’akhol he’akhol, or: If ye’akhel ye’akhel, repeating the same form of the word twice. What is the reason that the verse states “he’akhol ye’akhel,” employing both repetition and variation? Learn from this formulation two halakhot. One, as the Rabbis explain, is that the offering is rendered unfit whether one uses an expression of consumption or an expression of burning, provided that one’s intention is with regard to at least an olive-bulk. The second is that the offering is rendered unfit if one intends to burn on the altar an item that is usually consumed by a person, or to consume an item that is usually burned on the altar.

Rabbi Zeira said to Rav Asi: But if the reasoning of Rabbi Eliezer is due to that derivation, and he understands that the verse equates the improper intent to consume an item that is usually consumed with the improper intent to consume an item that is usually burned, then let one also be liable to receive karet for consuming an offering brought with intention to consume, after its designated time, the part of the offering that is burned, or for intention to burn, after its designated time, an item that is usually consumed. Why does Rabbi Eliezer state only that the offering is rendered unfit? And if you would say that indeed, Rabbi Eliezer does hold that one who consumes such an offering is liable to receive karet, that is difficult: But aren’t you the one who said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Rabbi Eliezer concedes that doing so is not punishable by karet?

Rav Asi said to him: It is a dispute between tanna’im as to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. There is one who says that Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering to be unfit by Torah law and one is liable to receive karet. It was in accordance with this opinion that Rabbi Yoḥanan cited the proof from the verse. And there is one who says that Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering to be unfit by rabbinic law, and it was in accordance with this opinion that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that according to Rabbi Eliezer there is no punishment of karet for this transgression.

As it is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who slaughters the offering with the intention to drink some of its blood, which is designated to be presented on the altar, on the next day, or to burn some of its meat, which is meant to be eaten, on the next day, or to eat some of its sacrificial portions, which are designated to be burned on the altar, on the next day, the offering is fit, as his intention is either to eat an item that is usually sacrificed on the altar, or to burn on the altar an item that is usually eaten. But Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering unfit. If one slaughters the offering with the intention to leave some of its blood for the next day, but not to present it or consume it, Rabbi Yehuda deems the offering unfit. Rabbi Elazar said: Even in this case Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering unfit, and the Rabbis deem it fit.

The Gemara clarifies: In accordance with whose opinion is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda that the offering is unfit even if he intends only to leave the blood for the next day, but not present it or consume it? If we say it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, now consider: And if there, where the priest expresses his intention using the language of consumption, the Rabbis nevertheless deem the offering fit, despite the fact that if he had used this expression with regard to the portion burned on the altar, the offering would be piggul, is it not all the more so the case that here, when he intends only to leave the blood until the next day, the offering should be fit?

Rather, it must be that Rabbi Yehuda’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. And yet the baraita continues: Rabbi Elazar said: Even in this case Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering unfit, and the Rabbis deem it fit. If Rabbi Yehuda’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, then the explanation of Rabbi Elazar of Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion is identical to that of Rabbi Yehuda, and there does not appear to be any disagreement between the two.

Rather, is it not so that the difference between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yehuda is with regard to liability for karet? The difference lies in that Rabbi Yehuda holds that if one’s intention is to leave the blood for the next day, then according to Rabbi Eliezer the offering is only rendered unfit, whereas in those cases listed in the mishna, such as where one’s intention is to eat the sacrificial portions on the next day, he would be liable to receive karet as well. And Rabbi Elazar comes to say that according to Rabbi Eliezer, both in this case and in that case, the offering is unfit but there is no liability to receive karet for it.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, it may be that everyone agrees that according to Rabbi Eliezer in a case where one’s intention is to eat, after its designated time, an item that is usually burned, or to burn an item that is usually eaten, there is no liability to receive karet. And here there are three disputes with regard to the matter. The first tanna holds that the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer disagree only in those cases, with regard to whether the offering is rendered unfit due to the intention to eat an item that is usually burned or to burn an item that is usually eaten. But with regard to leaving of its blood until the next day, everyone agrees that the offering is fit.