It is a case where he came to them in a roundabout way, such that they would not know from where he might appear, and they would be afraid to tamper with the goods because he might catch them in the act. The Gemara objects: If that is so, this can apply to the latter clause also. The Gemara answers: In the case of the latter clause, since he said to them: Go and I will come after you, their minds are at ease that he will not surprise them.

§ The mishna teaches similar cases, including the case of one who left a gentile in his shop, and the case of one who placed his wine in a wagon or on a ship. The Gemara explains: And it is necessary for the mishna to cite all these cases, even though they appear similar, as, had the mishna taught only the case of the gentile transporting a Jew’s barrels, one might assume that the reason there is no concern that the gentile used the wine in that case is because he thinks that perhaps the owner will come and see him. But in a wagon or on a ship, one might say that he can take his ship far off and do what he desires in such a way that the owner cannot see him.

And had the mishna taught only the case where the Jew placed his wine in a wagon or on a ship, one might assume that the concern there is because the gentile thinks: Perhaps he will come on a different road or stand on the bank of the river and see me. But in the case of a gentile in his shop, one might say that he can hold the door closed and do whatever he desires with no concern of being seen. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that in all of these cases the same ruling applies, and there is no concern unless the Jew informed the gentile that he is going a great distance away.

§ There is a dispute in the mishna with regard to the length of time that causes the wine to be rendered forbidden if the owner notified the gentile that he is going off some distance. Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The dispute is only with regard to the case of a stopper made of lime plaster, in which a hole can be sealed without being detected; but with regard to the case of a stopper made of clay, in which a patch would be detected, everyone agrees that the wine is forbidden only if there was enough time for the gentile to open the barrel by removing the stopper entirely, stop it again with a new stopper, and for the new stopper to dry.

The Gemara raises an objection to this explanation of the dispute from a baraita: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said to the Rabbis: But isn’t the sealing of the hole noticeable both from above and from below, and therefore the gentile will be wary of doing so?

The Gemara explains the objection: Granted, if you say that the dispute is also with regard to a stopper made of clay, this explanation is consistent with that which the baraita teaches as to the response of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: Its sealing is noticeable both from above and from below. But if you say that the dispute is with regard to a stopper made of lime plaster, granted, the location of the sealing is noticeable from below, as it is impossible to fill the entire hole with lime plaster, and an empty space remains below it; but the resealing is not noticeable from above.

The Gemara answers: It was Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel who did not know what the Rabbis were saying, and this is what he is saying to them: If you are speaking of a stopper made of clay, its sealing is noticeable both from above and from below. And if you are speaking of a stopper made of lime plaster, granted, it is not noticeable from above, but it is noticeable, in any event, from below. And how would the Rabbis respond to this claim? They maintain that since it is not noticeable from above that there is a patch, it does not occur to the gentile that the owner will turn the stopper over and see the patch. Alternatively, the Rabbis could answer that sometimes it seals firmly and is not detectable.

Rava says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, since we learned an unattributed mishna in accordance with his opinion.

This is as we learned in the last clause of the mishna: If a Jew was eating with a gentile at the table, and left jugs of wine on the table and a jug on the side table, and he left it and went out, what is on the table is forbidden, as it is likely that the gentile handled it, whereas what is on the side table is permitted. But if the Jew said to the gentile: Mix water with the wine and drink, even the jug that is on the side table is forbidden. Similarly, open barrels are forbidden, but sealed barrels are permitted unless the Jew was out of the room for sufficient time for the gentile to open the barrel by removing the stopper, stop it again by making a new stopper, and for the new stopper to dry.

The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious? This ruling is stated explicitly in the mishna. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel teaches the entire clause, and this is the continuation of his previous statement and not an unattributed statement of the mishna, Rava teaches us that this is not so.

The Gemara asks: And since we maintain that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who is not concerned about a bored hole in the barrel, and even though there is a concern that the gentile may have opened and replaced the stopper the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who is not concerned with forgery of the seal, because excessive effort is required to forge a seal (see 31a), therefore, nowadays, what is the reason we do not place wine in sealed barrels in the possession of gentiles? The Gemara answers: It is because of the bunghole, the hole in a barrel through which one smells the wine, which the gentile might widen a bit to drink from it.

§ Rava says: In the case of a gentile prostitute, where Jews are dining at her table, the wine at the table is permitted. Granted, their passion for the sin of harlotry overwhelms their judgment,