because a liquid whose smell is vinegar and its flavor is wine is considered vinegar, and the wine, when it spilled into the barrel of vinegar, took on the smell of vinegar from the moment it reached the airspace of the barrel, and it has therefore become a type of food mixed with food of its own type. And any type of forbidden food mixed with food of its own type renders the mixture forbidden by any amount.

Rava says that the mixture is forbidden only in a case where the wine imparts flavor to the vinegar, because a liquid whose smell is vinegar and its flavor is wine is considered wine, and it has therefore become a type of food mixed with food not of its own type. And any type of forbidden food mixed with food not of its own type renders the mixture forbidden only in a case where it imparts flavor to the mixture.

§ With regard to this bunghole [bat tiha], the hole in a barrel through which one can smell the wine, if a gentile smells a Jew’s wine through it, the wine is permitted, but for a Jew to smell a gentile’s wine through it, Abaye says that it is prohibited, whereas Rava says that it is permitted. Abaye says that it is prohibited because he holds that a smell is a substantial matter, a significant form of pleasure, and it is not permitted to derive benefit from a gentile’s wine. Rava says it is permitted because he holds that a smell is nothing; it is insignificant.

Rava says: From where do I say that a smell is nothing? It is as we learned in a mishna (Terumot 10:4): With regard to an oven that one lit with cumin stalks of teruma and baked bread in it, the bread is permitted because it has not absorbed the flavor of the cumin stalks but only the smell of the cumin stalks. This indicates that smell alone does not render a food forbidden. And how does Abaye explain this? He answers that it is different there, as the forbidden substance was burned. The smell of the forbidden cumin stalks entered the bread after the cumin stalks themselves were consumed by the fire, and a smell that is not from an extant substance is not forbidden. By contrast, in a case where the smell is from an extant source, it is forbidden.

Rav Mari said: This dispute between Abaye and Rava is paral-lel to a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a mishna (Terumot 10:3): With regard to one who detached a hot loaf of bread from the oven and placed it on the opening of a barrel of wine of teruma, the portion of the produce designated for the priest, Rabbi Meir deems the bread forbidden to non-priests, as in his opinion the smell of the wine renders the bread forbidden to them, and Rabbi Yehuda deems it permitted. Rabbi Yosei deems it permitted in a case of wheat bread but deems it forbidden in a case of barley bread, because the barley draws out the fumes of the wine. Rav Mari explains: What, is it not with regard to this matter that the Sages in the mishna disagree: That one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that a smell is a substantial matter, and one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds that a smell is nothing?

The Gemara remarks: According to the opinion of Rava, the dispute between him and Abaye is certainly parallel to a dispute between tanna’im, as he must concede that Rabbi Meir holds that a smell is a substantial matter. But according to the opinion of Abaye, shall we say that it is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im?

The Gemara answers: Abaye could say to you that Rabbi Yehuda also holds that a smell is a substantial matter. Wasn’t it stated with regard to that mishna that Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Reish Lakish says: In the case of a hot loaf of bread and an open barrel,