in taking the oath, he granted significance to the non-kosher food, and that is why his eating forbidden items is considered to be eating. But here, where he took an oath not to eat and then ate non-kosher food, did he thereby give significance to it? For this reason, no conclusive proof can be cited from the last case in the mishna.

Rabbi Yoḥanan understands the mishna as referring to a case in which the oath takes effect because it is a more inclusive prohibition than the prohibition against eating non-kosher food, in that it adds additional prohibitions for the same individual. In this context, Rava says: What is the reasoning of the one who holds that a more inclusive prohibition takes effect where there already is a prohibition in place?

Rava answers his own question: It is just as it is in the case of an expanded prohibition, which incorporates additional people into the list of those for whom the original item is forbidden. An expanded prohibition also takes effect despite the fact that there is already a prohibition in place.

And with regard to the one who exempts another from liability in the case of a more inclusive prohibition, as he does not hold that it takes effect, why does he hold that an expanded prohibition does take effect? When he says that an expanded prohibition takes effect, that is with regard to a single piece, i.e., that the number of people who are prohibited from eating the same piece of meat is expanded. With regard to two distinct pieces, i.e., a case where the new prohibition expands the scope of prohibited items, as in an inclusive prohibition, we do not say that it takes effect.

§ And Rava says: According to the one who holds that a more inclusive prohibition takes effect where another prohibition is already in place, the halakha should be as follows: When a person says: On my oath I will not eat figs, and then says: On my oath I will not eat figs and grapes, since the last oath takes effect with regard to the grapes, it also takes effect with regard to the figs, even though they were already forbidden by his previous oath.

The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious?

The Gemara answers: Lest you say that we say that a more inclusive prohibition takes effect only with regard to a prohibition that occurs on its own, like the prohibition against eating non-kosher food, but with regard to a prohibition that occurs by the act of a person himself we do not say that the more inclusive prohibition takes effect, Rava teaches us that there is no difference.

Rava, son of Rabba, raises an objection from a mishna (Karetot 13b): It is possible for a person to perform one act of eating for which he is liable to bring four sin-offerings and one guilt-offering. And these are the prohibitions one can violate in this manner: A ritually impure person who ate forbidden fat that is the leftover from one of the sacrificial animals on Yom Kippur. If he did this and was unaware of the relevant prohibitions he is liable to bring four sin-offerings, as well as a guilt-offering for deriving benefit from the misuse of consecrated property.

Rabbi Meir says: Also, if it was Shabbat and he transferred the item from one domain to another in his mouth, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for performing labor on Shabbat as well. The Rabbis said to him: This is not a prohibition of the same type, since in the case of Rabbi Meir’s additional prohibition he does not violate it by eating.

Rava, son of Rabba, explains the objection that arises from the mishna: And if it is so that a more inclusive prohibition takes effect, then you find a case where one is liable for the violation of five prohibitions in one act of eating, such as where one says in the aforementioned situation: On my oath I will not eat dates and forbidden fat. Since the oath takes effect with regard to the dates, it also takes effect with regard to the forbidden fat. The fact that the mishna fails to mention such an oath indicates that a more inclusive prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition is already in place.

The Gemara answers: The absence of an oath with a more inclusive prohibition in the mishna does not indicate anything. When the tanna teaches the scenario above, he lists only the potential prohibitions that occur on their own in one act of eating, but he does not teach prohibitions that occur by the act of the person himself.

The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the mishna include in its list the prohibition against deriving benefit from consecrated property, which does not occur on its own but only when an item is consecrated?

The Gemara answers: The case in the mishna is that of a first-born animal, whose sanctity is from the womb, i.e., begins automatically at birth.

If you wish, say instead, in response to the question, that when the tanna of the mishna teaches it, he includes only matters to which presenting a request for dissolution do not apply. An oath, to which a request for dissolution applies, is not taught.

The Gemara asks: Doesn’t the mishna include in its list the prohibition against deriving benefit from consecrated property? Consecration can be dissolved by a Sage.

The Gemara answers: Didn’t we already establish that the case in the mishna is that of a firstborn animal, whose sanctity cannot be dissolved?

If you wish, say instead that when he teaches that case, he lists only those prohibitions for which one is liable to bring a fixed sin-offering. If one breaks his oath he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, and the tanna of the mishna does not teach about the liability to bring other offerings.

The Gemara asks: Doesn’t the mishna list the transgression of an impure person who ate consecrated items, i.e., the sacrificial animals mentioned in the mishna, which is a prohibition for which one brings a sliding-scale offering?

The Gemara answers: The mishna is referring to a king who eats the leftover of a sacrificial animal while impure, and the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says: A ritually impure king who ate consecrated items brings a male goat as a sin-offering, rather than the sliding-scale offering brought by a commoner.

Rav Ashi said there is a different answer: When the tanna teaches this case, he lists only matters that apply when one eats the measure of an olive-bulk, whereas the case of an oath, which applies to eating even less than the standard measure, is not taught in the mishna.

The Gemara asks: Doesn’t the mishna include in its list the prohibition against deriving benefit from the misuse of consecrated property, which applies to eating even less than an olive-bulk?

The Gemara answers: We require that one derive the value of one peruta of benefit in order to be liable, so that is also a prohibition to which standard measures apply.

And Rav Ashi of Avireya said that Rabbi Zeira said: When the tanna teaches this case, he lists only prohibitions for which intentional violation of them renders one liable to receive karet, and he does not teach prohibitions for which intentional violation of them renders one liable to receive lashes.

The Gemara asks: But isn’t the guilt-offering for the misuse of consecrated property, which is listed in the mishna, a prohibition for which intentional violation of it renders one liable to receive only lashes, not karet? And nevertheless the tanna of the mishna teaches it.