But the mishna teaches these cases similar to the different shades of leprous marks, which indicates that just as there, all four of them are shades for which there is liability to bring an offering, so too here, with regard to oaths and the cases of one’s awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, all four of them are cases for which there is liability to bring an offering.

The Gemara suggests a different resolution: Actually, the mishna expresses the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. And while Rabbi Yishmael does not deem one liable for oaths pertaining to the past, that is only with regard to liability to bring an offering; but he does deem one liable to be administered lashes.

And this is in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava says: The Torah explicitly amplifies the prohibition of taking a false oath to be similar to the prohibition of an oath taken in vain, to teach that one is flogged for its violation. It follows that just as an oath taken in vain pertains to the past and renders one liable to receive lashes, so too, taking a false oath that pertains to the past renders one liable to receive lashes.

The Gemara asks: Granted that one who stated: On my oath I ate, but in fact he did not eat, or one who stated: On my oath I did not eat, but in fact he ate, is liable to receive lashes, as this is in accordance with the statement of Rava. And also if one stated: On my oath I will not eat, and he ate in violation of his oath, he is liable to receive lashes, as it is a prohibition that involves an action, and, in general, such prohibitions are punishable by flogging. But if one stated: On my oath I will eat, and in violation of his oath he did not eat, why should he be liable to receive lashes? It is a prohibition that does not involve an action. The generally accepted principle is that one is not liable to receive lashes for violating a prohibition without performing an action.

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yishmael disagrees with the generally accepted principle and holds that one is flogged for the violation of a prohibition that does not involve an action.

The Gemara challenges: If so, then a difficulty arises between one statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan and another statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan.

As Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The halakha is always in accordance with the ruling of an unattributed mishna. Since the mishna here is unattributed and assumes that one is flogged for taking a false oath, Rabbi Yoḥanan should rule that this is the halakha.

And an amoraic dispute was stated with regard to one who said: On my oath I will eat this loaf today, and the day passed and he did not eat it. Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both say: He is not flogged for taking a false oath. They disagree with regard to the reason that he is not flogged. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is not flogged due to the fact that it is a prohibition that does not involve an action, as he violates the oath by failing to perform an action rather than by performing an action, and the principle is: With regard to any prohibition that does not involve an action, one is not flogged for its violation. And Reish Lakish says: He is not flogged because it is an uncertain forewarning, as one cannot forewarn him before he fails to fulfill the oath because as long as time remains in the day he can still later eat the loaf and fulfill the oath; and an uncertain forewarning is not characterized as forewarning. Evidently, Rabbi Yoḥanan does not rule in accordance with the mishna here.

The Gemara resolves the difficulty: Rabbi Yoḥanan found another unattributed mishna which holds that one is not flogged for a prohibition that does not involve an action, and he rules in accordance with that mishna.

The Gemara asks: Which other unattributed mishna did he find? If we say he found this unattributed mishna, as we learned (Pesaḥim 84a): But one who leaves over some of the meat of a ritually pure Paschal offering until the morning of the fifteenth of Nisan and one who breaks a bone of a ritually impure Paschal offering are not flogged with the forty lashes, that is difficult.

First, the Gemara explains how this mishna demonstrates Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion: Granted that breaking a bone of a impure Paschal offering does not incur lashes, as it is written: “Nor shall you break a bone in it” (Exodus 12:46). The term “in it” indicates that the verse refers only to a valid Paschal offering, but not to a disqualified one, such as one that is impure. But in the case of one who leaves over some of the meat of a pure Paschal offering, what is the reason he is not flogged? Is it not because it is a violation of a prohibition that does not involve an action, and for a violation of any prohibition that does not involve an action one is not flogged?

The Gemara now questions this explanation of the mishna: But from where is it apparent that this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ya’akov, who says that for a violation of a prohibition that does not involve an action, one is not flogged? Perhaps the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and he holds that the reason the mishna rules that one is not flogged is due to the fact that the verse comes to position the positive mitzva of burning the leftover meat after the prohibition of leaving over the meat, and one is not flogged for a prohibition whose violation obligates one in a positive mitzva. But were it not for this, one would be flogged, despite the fact it is a prohibition that does not involve an action. Since the unattributed mishna is not necessarily in accordance with Rabbi Yaakov’s opinion, it cannot be the basis of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling.

The Gemara cites the source of Rabbi Yaakov’s and Rabbi Yehuda’s opinions: As it is taught in a baraita: “And you shall let nothing of it remain until the morning, and that which remains of it until the morning you shall burn in fire” (Exodus 12:10). The verse comes to position the positive mitzva of burning the leftover meat after the prohibition against leaving over the meat, to say that one is not flogged for its violation; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Ya’akov says: This is not for that reason; rather, it is due to the fact that it is a prohibition that does not involve an action, and for a violation of a prohibition that does not involve an action one is not flogged.

Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan found this unattributed mishna, which teaches (27b): If one states: On my oath I will not eat this loaf, and immediately states: On my oath I will not eat it, and then he ate it,