and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi established it in the mishna in his name. When he was studying, they called him ben Zakkai, in the manner that they would call a student sitting before his teacher, and when he was teaching others they called him Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai. In terms of the baraita and the mishna, when they called him ben Zakkai in the Mishna, that was based on the name that he was called initially. And when they called him Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai in the other baraita, that was based on the name that he was called now.

§ The mishna teaches: An incident occurred, and ben Zakkai examined the witnesses about the stems of figs. What is the difference between interrogations and examinations? In the case of interrogations, if one of the witnesses says: I do not know the answer, their testimony is void immediately. In the case of examinations, if one says: I do not know the answer, and even if two witnesses say: We do not know the answer, their testimony still stands. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: Even if two say? Isn’t it obvious? The mishna already stated that when one witness says: I do not know, their testimony stands, indicating that knowledge of the answers to these types of questions is not required. Accordingly, when two witnesses say that they do not know, their testimony stands as well. What is the novelty of this ruling?

Rav Sheshet said: This clause is referring to the first clause of the mishna, and this is what it is saying: With regard to the interrogations, even if two witnesses say: We know, and one additional witness says: I do not know, their testimony is void. In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna written? In accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who compares in all court proceedings three witnesses to two, holding that just as two witnesses must testify a fully valid testimony, so it is with three. Therefore, if the third witness does not know the answer to an interrogation, the testimony of all three is void.

Rava says: But the mishna teaches: Their testimony stands, not: Their testimony is void. Rather, Rava said: This is what the mishna is saying: Even with regard to the interrogations, if two witnesses say: We know, and one witness says: I do not know, their testimony stands, as the court accepts the testimony of the two. In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna written? Not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

The Gemara relates: Rav Kahana and Rav Safra studied tractate Sanhedrin in the school of Rabba. Rami bar Ḥama encountered them. Rami bar Ḥama said to them: What do you say concerning tractate Sanhedrin that you learned in the school of Rabba? Rav Kahana and Rav Safra said to him: And what do we say concerning the regular tractate Sanhedrin? And what is difficult for you? Do you have a specific difficulty you would like answered?

Rami bar Ḥama said to them: I have a difficulty from that which is taught in the mishna: What is the difference between interrogations and examinations? In the case of interrogations, if one of the witnesses says: I do not know the answer, their testimony is void immediately. In the case of examinations, if one says: I do not know the answer, and even if two say: We do not know the answer, their testimony still stands. Rami bar Ḥama asks: After all, this type of question and that type of question are required by Torah law; what is different about interrogations and what is different about examinations? Why is there a difference in halakha between the two?

Rav Kahana and Rav Safra said to him: How can these cases be compared? With regard to the interrogations, if one witness says: I do not know, their testimony is void, as it is testimony that you cannot render conspiratory testimony. If the witnesses do not state a specific time and place, there is no way for other witnesses to claim that the first witnesses had been with them elsewhere at the time they claim the event occurred. By contrast, with regard to the examinations, if one of the witnesses says: I do not know, their testimony stands, as it is testimony that you can render conspiratory testimony.

Rami bar Ḥama said to them: If you said an incisive statement like this about this tractate, you said much about it. Rav Kahana and Rav Safra said to him: Due to the Master’s goodness, that is, due to your good will and desire to accept our answer to your question, we said much about it. But with the Master’s rebuke and challenge we would not say even one answer about it, i.e., if you had wished to criticize this answer you could have refuted it, and it would be as if we did not say any answer.

§ The mishna teaches that if one witness says the event occurred on the second of the month and one witness says that the event occurred on the third of the month, their testimony stands, since it is possible to say that one witness knows of the addition of a day to the previous month, while the other witness does not know of it. Their testimony is considered congruent. The Gemara asks: Until how many days into the month does the court assume that one of the witnesses does not know when the month began? Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina says that Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Until the majority of the month has passed.

Rava says: We learn this in the mishna as well, as it teaches: If one witness says the event occurred on the third of the month and one witness says the event occurred on the fifth of the month, their testimony is void. But why is it void? Let us say that it not a contradiction, as this witness knows of two additions, i.e., that a day was added to the two previous months, and that witness does not know of the two additions. Rather, is it not void because once the majority of the month passed a witness knows what day it is, so that an error of two days cannot occur?

The Gemara rejects this proof: Actually, I could say to you that a witness may not know the day even once the majority of the month has passed. The reason for the ruling of the mishna is that he knows about the shofar [ubeshipura], which the court would blow at the New Moon. It is possible that with regard to one blast of the shofar it could be said that he erred and was not aware of it. With regard to two blasts of the shofar it cannot be said that he erred. By contrast, in the case of the mishna here, perhaps as long as the witnesses are testifying about two consecutive days within one month, the error of one of them persisted throughout the month.

§ Having cited a statement of Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina, citing Rabbi Asi, citing Rabbi Yoḥanan, the Gemara cites another statement in his name: Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina says that Rav Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Until how many days into a new month may one recite a blessing on the month, i.e., Birkat HaLevana? Until the flaw of the moon is filled, when it no longer appears deficient. And until how many days is that? Rav Ya’akov bar Idi says that Rav Yehuda says: Until seven days of the month have passed. The Sages of Neharde’a say: Until sixteen days of the month have passed.