“Whatsoever touches the altar shall be sanctified” (Exodus 29:37), I would derive that this applies to every item, whether it is suited to be an offering, or unsuited to be an offering. The following verse states: “Now this is that which you shall offer upon the altar: Two lambs of the first year day by day continually” (Exodus 29:38); from this I derive: Just as lambs are suited to be offerings, so too, everything that is suited to be an offering is included in this halakha. The baraita continues: Rabbi Akiva says: The offerings discussed in this passage are each referred to as a burnt-offering (see Exodus 29:42). Therefore, I derive: Just as a burnt-offering is suited for the altar, so too, everything that is suited for the altar is included in this halakha.

Rav Pappa explains: And what do the two of them exclude by means of these explanations? Disqualified offerings, teaching that they do not become sanctified if they touch the altar. One Sage, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, brings proof for this halakha from the term “lambs,” and one Sage, Rabbi Akiva, brings proof for this halakha from the term “burnt-offering.” This is an example of one explanation from two different verses.

The Gemara questions this example: But doesn’t Rav Adda bar Ahava say that the difference between them is with regard to a disqualified bird burnt-offering? The one who brings proof for this halakha from the term “lambs” holds that: Lambs, yes, they are included in this halakha, but a bird burnt-offering is not. And the one who brings proof for this halakha from the term “burnt-offering” holds that a bird burnt-offering is also included in this halakha.

Rather, Rav Ashi said: An example of one explanation from two different verses is as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who violates the prohibition against slaughtering an offering outside the Tent of Meeting, the verse states: “Whatever man there be of the house of Israel, that kills an ox, or lamb, or goat, in the camp, or that kills it outside the camp; and to the opening of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it, to sacrifice an offering to the Lord before the Tabernacle of the Lord, blood shall be imputed unto that man; he shed blood; and this man shall be cut off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:3–4). This verse serves to include one who sprinkles the blood of consecrated offerings outside the Tent of Meeting; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.

The baraita continues: Rabbi Akiva says that when the verse states: “Whatever man there be of the house of Israel, or of the strangers that sojourn among them, that offers a burnt-offering or sacrifice” (Leviticus 17:8), it serves to include one who sprinkles blood of consecrated offerings outside the Tent of Meeting. Rav Ashi explains: What do the two tanna’im include by means of these explanations? One who performs sprinkling of the blood outside the Tent of Meeting. One Sage, Rabbi Yishmael, brings proof for this halakha from the phrase “blood shall be imputed,” and one Sage, Rabbi Akiva, brings proof for this halakha from the term “or sacrifice.” This is an example of one explanation from two different verses.

The Gemara questions this example: But doesn’t Rabbi Abbahu say that the difference between them is with regard to one who slaughtered the offering and sprinkled the blood, as according to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael he is liable for only one transgression, and according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva he is liable for two transgressions?

The Gemara responds: Wasn’t it stated with regard to that baraita that Abaye says: Even according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, he is liable for only one transgression, as the verse states: “But in the place that the Lord shall choose in one of your tribes, there you shall offer your burnt-offerings, and there you shall do all that I command you” (Deuteronomy 12:14). The Merciful One combined all the actions with regard to offerings as one transgression. According to the explanation of Abaye, there is in fact no practical dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva with regard to this matter, and it serves as an example of one explanation from two different verses.

§ The mishna teaches: In cases of monetary law, the court judges during the daytime, and may conclude the deliberations and issue their ruling even at night. Before discussing this ruling, the Gemara cites a mnemonic for three of the forthcoming discussions: Judgment, answer, incline. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters concerning the time of the deliberations derived? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Pappa says: As the verse states: “And let them judge the people at all times” (Exodus 18:22), indicating that the judgment can be during the day or at night.

The Gemara challenges this explanation: If that is so that this is the source of the halakha, the court should be able to conduct the initial stage of the trial at night, as well. The Gemara explains: It is possible to resolve the matter in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava raises a contradiction between two verses: It is written in one verse: “And let them judge the people at all times,” indicating that the judgment can be during the day or at night, and it is written in another verse: “Then it shall be on the day that he causes his sons to inherit that which he has” (Deuteronomy 21:16), indicating that cases of inheritance are judged only during the day. Rava explains: How can these texts be reconciled? The verse referring to the day is stated with regard to the initial stage of the trial, and the verse that includes the night is stated with regard to the verdict.

The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Meir would say: What is the meaning when the verse states with regard to the priests: “According to their word shall every dispute and every leprous sore be” (Deuteronomy 21:5)? And what do disputes have to do with leprous sores?

The baraita continues: Rather, the verse juxtaposes disputes to leprous sores, teaching that just as leprous sores are viewed by a priest only in the daytime, as it is written: “And on the day when raw flesh appears in him he shall be impure” (Leviticus 13:14), so too disputes are judged only in the daytime. And just as leprous sores are viewed by a priest who can see, but not by blind priests, as it is written: “As far as appears to the priest” (Leviticus 13:12), so too disputes are judged by sighted judges, not by blind judges. And the verse juxtaposes leprous sores to disputes, teaching that just as disputes are judged by independent judges, not by judges who are relatives of the litigants, so too leprous sores are viewed by a priest who is not a relative of the afflicted person.

The baraita continues: If these two matters are juxtaposed, why not say that just as disputes are judged specifically by three judges, so too leprous sores are viewed by three priests? And this would be supported by a logical inference: If a case involving one’s money is judged by three judges, is it not clear all the more so that the person himself should be viewed by three priests? To counter this, the verse states: “And he shall be brought to Aaron the priest or to one of his sons, the priests” (Leviticus 13:2). From this you have learned that even one priest views leprous sores. In any event, as opposed to the mishna, Rabbi Meir holds that disputes are judged only during the day.

The Gemara relates: There was a certain blind man who was living in the neighborhood of Rabbi Yoḥanan who would serve as a judge, and Rabbi Yoḥanan did not say anything to him. The Gemara asks: How did he do this, i.e., allow the blind man to judge? But didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan himself say: The halakha is in accordance with the ruling of an unattributed mishna, and we learned in an unattributed mishna (Nidda 49b): Anyone who is fit to judge is fit to testify, but there are those who are fit to testify but not fit to judge. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The latter clause serves to include one who is blind in one of his eyes, who is fit to testify but is not fit to judge. All the more so Rabbi Yoḥanan would agree that the unattributed mishna holds that one blind in both eyes is disqualified from serving as a judge.

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoḥanan found another unattributed mishna, i.e., the mishna here, which indicates that a blind man can serve as a judge: In cases of monetary law, the court judges during the daytime and may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even at night. Accordingly, judging cases of monetary law is not compared to viewing leprous sores, which is the source for disqualifying a blind judge.

The Gemara asks: In what way is the strength of this unattributed mishna greater than the strength of that unattributed mishna? Why would Rabbi Yoḥanan rule in accordance with this one and not that one? The Gemara explains: If you wish, say that an unattributed mishna that records the opinion of many Sages is preferable, as the mishna in tractate Nidda is written in accordance with the individual opinion of Rabbi Meir of the baraita. And if you wish, say it is because this unattributed mishna teaches this halakha in the context of the halakhot of judgment. Since this chapter is the primary source for all halakhot of judgments, the ruling written here carries greater weight.

The Gemara continues its discussion of these opinions. And what does Rabbi Meir interpret from this verse: “And let them judge the people at all times”? Rava said: He interprets that it serves to include a cloudy day, teaching that although a priest does not view a leprous sore on a cloudy day, the court may judge a case on a cloudy day. As we learned in a mishna (Nega’im 2:2): A priest does not view leprous sores during the early morning when the sun is not in full force, and not during the late afternoon, and not in a house, and not on a cloudy day. This is because a dull white sore appears bright, and a bright white sore is deemed ritually impure. And a priest does not view leprous sores at midday, because a bright white spot appears dull and the priest will mistakenly deem it ritually pure. The priest views the leprous sores during the late morning or early afternoon.

And what does Rabbi Meir interpret from this verse: “On the day that he causes his sons to inherit”? He already derived from the juxtaposition to leprous sores that the court cannot issue a verdict at night. The Gemara answers: He requires that verse to teach the halakha that Rabba bar Ḥanina taught in the presence of Rav Naḥman: The verse states: “Then it shall be on the day that he causes his sons to inherit that which he has” (Deuteronomy 21:16). The addition of the term “on the day” teaches that it is specifically during the day that you can distribute inheritances, but you cannot distribute inheritances at night. Rav Naḥman said to him: That cannot be the halakha, as, if that is so, then it ought to be that it is only in the case of one who dies during the day that his children inherit from him but that with regard to one who dies at night, his children do not inherit from him, and this is not the case.

Rav Naḥman suggests: Perhaps you are stating a distinction between day and night with regard to the adjudication of inheritances. A proof for this distinction is as it is taught in a baraita: A verse in the passage concerning inheritance states: “And it shall be for the children of Israel a statute of judgment” (Numbers 27:11), teaching that the entire portion is placed [ure’a] together to be considered a matter of judgment, subject to the procedural rules that apply to a matter of the court.

And this is in accordance with the statement that Rav Yehuda says that Rav says, as Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: In a case where there were three people who entered a room to visit an ill person, and the ill person desires to write a will in order to distribute his property following his death, if the visitors wish to do so, they can write his will and sign it as witnesses, and if they wish, they can act in judgment, i.e., they can act as a court in the matter, since they are three. Therefore, they can determine that the will has the validity of an act of the court and transfer the property to the heirs in their capacity as a court. But if only two came to visit the ill person, they can write the will and sign it as witnesses, but they cannot act in judgment, since three are required to form a court.

And Rav Ḥisda says: This halakha was taught only in a case where the three came to visit him during the day; but if the three of them came at night, they can write the will and sign it as witnesses, but they cannot act in judgment. What is the reason that they cannot act in judgment on the next day? It is because they are already witnesses to the will of the deceased, and there is a principle that a witness cannot become a judge, i.e., one who acts as a witness in a particular matter cannot become a judge with regard to that same matter. Rabba bar Ḥanina said to Rav Naḥman: Yes, it is indeed so that this is what I was saying.

§ The mishna teaches: In cases of capital law, the court judges during the daytime, and concludes the deliberations and issues the ruling in the daytime. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Shimi bar Ḥiyya says: The verse states with regard to Israelites who worshipped the idol of Peor in the wilderness: “And hang [hoka] them unto the Lord, facing the sun” (Numbers 25:4), indicating that capital cases are judged in the face of the sun, i.e., during the day. Rav Ḥisda says: From where is it derived that hoka’a is hanging? Where the Gibeonites requested to be given Saul’s sons, as it is written: “Vehoka’anum unto the Lord in Gibeah of Saul, the chosen of the Lord” (II Samuel 21:6).