A scribe may write a deed of sale for the seller of property at the seller’s request, even if the buyer is not with him when he presents his request, as the deed obligates only the seller. In this case, once this one, the buyer, has taken possession of the land, the deed is acquired, wherever it is. And this is as it is stated in the mishna that we learned (Kiddushin 26a): Property that does not serve as a guarantee can be acquired together with the property that serves as a guarantee by means of money, by means of a deed, or by taking possession of it. One can learn from this that a deed is included in the term: Property that does not serve as a guarantee.

An animal is called property, as we learned in a mishna (Shekalim 12a): In a case of one who consecrated his property, and on the property there were animals fit to be sacrificed upon the altar, male animals are sacrificed as burnt-offerings, and female animals are sold for the purpose of being sacrificed as peace-offerings. Birds are called property, as we learned in a mishna (Shekalim 12a): In a case of one who consecrated his property, and on the property there were items that were fit to be sacrificed upon the altar, e.g., wines, oils, and birds, Rabbi Eliezer says: They are sold for the needs of that kind of item, i.e., to individuals who will use them as such.

Phylacteries are called property, as we learned in a mishna (Arakhin 23b): With regard to one who consecrates his property, the value of his phylacteries is assessed for him and he redeems them by paying their value to the Temple treasury. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to a Torah scroll, what is the halakha? Is it considered property or not? Does one say that since it is not sold, as it is prohibited to sell a Torah scroll, it is therefore not considered property? Or perhaps one says that since it may be sold in order to enable one to study Torah or to marry a woman, it is considered property. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

§ The Gemara presents a mnemonic for the series of incidents stated below: Zutra, the mother, of Amram, from two sisters, Rav Tovi, and Rav Dimi and Rav Yosef.

The mother of Rav Zutra bar Toviyya wrote a deed granting her property to Rav Zutra bar Toviyya, explaining that she was doing so because she wanted to get married to Rav Zevid, and she did not want him to acquire her property. She married Rav Zevid, and he divorced her. She came before Rav Beivai bar Abaye to claim her property from her son. Rav Beivai said: She transferred her property because she wanted to get married, and she married. Since her intentions were fulfilled, even though she subsequently was divorced, the gift is a valid gift.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rav Beivai: Is it because you come from a line of truncated [mula’ei] people, from the house of the High Priest Eli, whose descendants were condemned to premature death (see I Samuel 2:31), that you say truncated [mulyata] and unsound matters? Even according to the one who says that the deed of a woman who shelters her property from her intended husband effects acquisition, and the woman cannot reclaim the property, this matter applies where she did not reveal her intentions in transferring ownership of her property. But here, she revealed her intentions that she transferred the property because she wanted to marry; and she married, but was divorced. Therefore, since she is no longer married, she can reclaim the property.

The mother of Rami bar Ḥama wrote a deed in the evening granting her property to Rami bar Ḥama. In the morning of the following day, she wrote a deed granting her property to his brother, Rav Ukva bar Ḥama. Rami bar Ḥama came before Rav Sheshet, who established him as the owner of the property, as the deed transferring the property to him preceded the gift to his brother. Rav Ukva bar Ḥama came before Rav Naḥman, who established him as the owner of the property.

Rav Sheshet came before Rav Naḥman and said to him: What is the reason that the Master established Rav Ukva bar Ḥama as the owner of the property? If it is because she retracted her gift, but didn’t she die? Since the gift of a person on his deathbed is considered valid, Rami bar Ḥama already acquired the property in the evening. Rav Naḥman said to Rav Sheshet: This is what Shmuel says: With regard to the gift of a person on his deathbed, in any case where he could retract his gift if he were to recover, i.e., if he transferred ownership of all of his property, even if he does not recover, he can retract his gift.

Rav Sheshet responded: Say that Shmuel said that he can retract his gift if he wants to retain the property for himself, but if he wants to retract his gift in order to give it to another, did he also say that he can do so? Rav Naḥman said to Rav Sheshet: Shmuel explicitly said that he can retract his gift both in order to retain the property for himself and to grant it to another.

The mother of Rav Amram the Pious had a bundle [meloga] of promissory notes. When she was dying, she said: Let these promissory notes be for Amram, my son. His brothers came before Rav Naḥman. They said to Rav Naḥman: But Rav Amram did not pull the bundle of documents, and since an act of acquisition was not performed he did not acquire them. Rav Naḥman said to them: An act of acquisition was not required, because the statement of a person on his deathbed is considered as written and as though the documents were delivered to the recipient.

The sister of Rav Tovi bar Rav Mattana wrote a deed in the morning granting her property to Rav Tovi bar Rav Mattana. In the evening another brother, Rav Aḥadvoi bar Rav Mattana, came and cried to her. Rav Aḥadvoi said to her: Now people will say that you gave your property to Rav Tovi because this Master, Rav Tovi, is a Torah scholar, and that Master, Rav Aḥadvoi, is not a Torah scholar. She wrote a deed granting the property to him. Rav Tovi came before Rav Naḥman. Rav Naḥman said to Rav Tovi: This is what Shmuel says: With regard to the gift of a person on his deathbed, in any case where he could retract his gift if he were to recover, even if he does not recover, he can retract his gift, and therefore the property belongs to Rav Aḥadvoi.

The sister of Rav Dimi bar Yosef had a tract of land in an orchard. Whenever she was sick and thought that she was dying, she would transfer ownership of the orchard to Rav Dimi,