The Gemara answers: The difference is with regard to the prayer of the High Priest, who would pray on Yom Kippur for beneficial weather, and this knowledge enabled him to formulate his prayers accordingly.

The Gemara resumes the discussion with regard to the gifts of a person on his deathbed: And Rava says that Rav Naḥman says: The halakha that the gift of a person on his deathbed does not require an act of acquisition is merely by rabbinic law, and it is instituted lest he see that his will is not being carried out and he lose control of his mind due to his grief, exacerbating his physical state.

The Gemara asks: And did Rav Naḥman actually say this? But doesn’t Rav Naḥman say: Even though Shmuel says that with regard to one who sells a promissory note to another and then forgives the debt, the debt is forgiven and the note is nullified, and even the heir of the creditor can forgive the debt, Shmuel concedes that if the creditor gave the promissory note as the gift of a person on his deathbed, his heir cannot forgive the debt?

Granted, if you say that the gift of a person on his deathbed is valid by Torah law without an act of acquisition, due to that reason the heir cannot forgive the debt, as the debt was acquired by another. But if you say that it is valid by rabbinic law, why is the heir unable to forgive the debt? The Gemara replies: Rav Naḥman maintains that although this gift is not effective by Torah law, nevertheless, the Sages made it a halakha with the force of Torah law.

Rava says that Rav Naḥman says: With regard to a person on his deathbed who says: So-and-so shall reside in this house, or who says: So-and-so shall eat the fruit of this palm tree, he has not said anything, as one cannot give that which is not tangible, such as the right to use property, or the right to consume fruit that has not yet grown. His statement is ineffective until he says: Give this house to so-and-so and he shall reside there, or: Give this palm tree to so-and-so and he shall eat its fruit.

The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Rav Naḥman maintains that only a matter that can be conferred as a gift by a healthy person with an act of acquisition can be conferred as a gift by a person on his deathbed by means of verbal instruction, but a matter that cannot be conferred as a gift by a healthy person cannot be conferred as a gift by a person on his deathbed? Consequently, a person on his deathbed cannot transfer ownership of an intangible right, just as a healthy person cannot do so. But doesn’t Rava say that Rav Naḥman says: