others will inherit their portion in their stead, then regardless of whether he said: Give them a shekel, or whether he said: Do not give them more than a shekel, the court gives his children only a shekel per week, so as not to reduce the share of the others, as their father clearly stated that he wishes to give his children only a specific stipend, and that he intends to leave the bulk of his property to others.

Rav Sheshet concludes: And isn’t the case here like a case of two fields and two people, as the father gave part of his property to his sons as a gift, and the rest to others as an inheritance? But it is taught that the others acquire the property, although he employed only the terminology of inheritance concerning them.

Rav Sheshet raised the objection and he resolved it: The term others is referring to those who are fit to inherit from him; and the ruling of the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, who holds that one can bequeath his property to anyone who is fit to inherit from him. Therefore it is unnecessary for the bequest to be phrased as a gift.

Rav Ashi said: Come and hear a proof for the opinion of Rav Sheshet from a baraita (Tosefta 8:4): If one states: My property will go to you after my death for your use during your lifetime, and after you die, so-and-so will inherit the property, and after the one who inherits after you dies, so-and-so will inherit the property, then in this case, when the first recipient dies, the second acquires it, and when the second dies, the third acquires it. And if the second dies during the lifetime of the first, the property returns after his death to the heirs of the first, and does not go to the third designated recipient, as his right was to inherit it from the second one, who never received it.

Rav Ashi states his proof: And here it is a case like that of two fields and two people, as the bequest to the first recipient was phrased as a gift, and to the second one it was phrased as inheritance; and yet the baraita teaches that the second recipient acquires the property after the death of the first.

And if you would say that here, too, the baraita is referring to a case where the recipient is fit to inherit from him, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, if so, why does it state that when the second dies, the third acquires it?

Rav Ashi explains his previous comment: Didn’t Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Avya, send the following ruling in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka? If a person on his deathbed said: My property is given to you, and after you to so-and-so, and the first recipient was fit to inherit from him, the second gets nothing in place of the first, i.e., he does not receive the property after the first one dies, as this formulation employed by the owner was not one of a gift; rather, it was a formulation of inheritance, and inheritance has no end, i.e., it cannot be stopped. Therefore, since the first recipient acquired it as inheritance, his heirs inherit it from him, and it cannot be taken by the second one. Therefore, the baraita is irreconcilable with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka.

The Gemara affirms: The refutation of the opinions of all the Sages who disagree with the opinion of Rav Sheshet that even if one uses the two terms with regard to two fields and two people his gift to both people is effective, is a conclusive refutation.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that it is also a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Reish Lakish, who maintains that giving must be mentioned with regard to both recipients and both fields. The Gemara asks: And how can you understand this? But didn’t Rava say that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish with regard to these three issues: Acquisition of land for the rights to its produce, ḥalitza of a pregnant woman, and the matter of bequeathal phrased both as a gift and as inheritance?

The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. Here, in the case where giving can be mentioned concerning one of the recipients and inheritance with regard to the other, it is a case where the two bequests were stated within the time required for speaking a short phrase, i.e., the time it takes to greet one’s teacher. According to the halakha, within this time a speaker can retract his statement. Therefore both bequests are considered to be part of one statement. There, in the case where Reish Lakish maintains that giving must be mentioned with regard to both people for it to take effect, it is a case where the final part of the statement, where he said: And they will inherit it, was after the time required for speaking a short phrase.

And the halakha is that the legal status of any statement interrupted or retracted within the time required for speaking a short phrase is like that of continuous speech. This is the halakha in all cases, apart from idol worship, as one who accepts an idol as his god is liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment even if he retracts his statement within the time required for speaking a short phrase,