And if their dispute is referring to a field and a tree, why does Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, reverse his opinion? Rather, Rabba’s statement must be adjusted, and this is what Rabba said: This dispute between the first tanna and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, applies only in the cases of a cistern and a dovecote. But in the cases of a field and a tree, everyone agrees that one is liable for misuse of consecrated property if one derives benefit from them or their contents.

The Gemara asks: And in the cases of a cistern and a dovecote, where the cistern and the dovecote are empty, with regard to what matter do they disagree? And similarly, where the cistern and the dovecote are full, with regard to what do they disagree? The Gemara answers: In the cases of a cistern and a dovecote that are empty, they disagree with regard to the matter that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis.

The first tanna and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, disagree because the first tanna holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who say: A person cannot transfer ownership of an object that has not yet come into the world, i.e., that one does not currently own. Therefore, one cannot consecrate water or doves that will enter the cistern or dovecote only in the future. And Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says: A person can transfer ownership of an object that has not yet come into the world.

The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to this answer: You can say that you heard Rabbi Meir express this opinion in a case such as the fruit of palm trees, which are likely to come into existence, as the trees naturally produce fruit. But with regard to these doves and water, who can say that they will come? Rava said: You can find cases where one consecrates water or doves that are likely to arrive, e.g., in the case of water that comes by way of his courtyard into the cistern when it rains, so that he does not need to fill the cistern. And similarly with regard to doves that come by way of his other, full dovecote into this empty dovecote.

The Gemara asks: And in cases where the cistern and the dovecote are full, with regard to what matter do they disagree? Rava said: This dispute concerns a case where he consecrated a cistern without specification. And Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds in accordance with the opinion of his father, who says: One infers the halakha of consecration to the Most High from the halakha of transactions between one ordinary person [hedyot] and another.

The Gemara elaborates: Just as the halakha with regard to transactions between one ordinary person and another is that one can say: I sold you the cistern but I did not sell you the water it contains, so too, the halakha in the case of consecration to the Most High is that one can say: I consecrated the cistern but I did not consecrate the water within it. And the first tanna holds that one does not infer the halakha of consecration to the Most High from the halakha of transactions between one ordinary person and another. Rather, one who consecrates property does so generously, i.e., the most expansive meaning is assumed for his vow of consecration, and therefore even if he did not say so explicitly, he consecrated the water together with the cistern.

The Gemara asks: And does the halakha concerning a transaction with an ordinary person say that one does not sell the water along with the cistern? But didn’t we learn in the mishna (78b) that one who sold a cistern has sold its water? Rava said: The ruling in the mishna is an individual opinion, as it is taught in a baraita: One who sold a cistern has not sold its water. Rabbi Natan says: One who sold a cistern has sold its water.