Here we are dealing with a courtyard belonging to partners, where they are not particular with regard to the mere placing of items in the courtyard, but are particular with regard to the construction of a partition. The presumption of ownership is established only where the lack of a protest indicates that the prior owner concedes that the property is no longer his. The co-owner’s silence in the face of his partner using the courtyard for a temporary purpose does not indicate a concession, but silence in the face of one who constructed a partition is a concession.

The Gemara asks: And are they not particular with regard to the mere placing of items? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Nedarim 45b): Partners who through vows prohibited themselves from deriving benefit from one another are forbidden to enter into a courtyard jointly owned by them, since each one has a portion in it, and it would be considered a violation of one’s vow if one were to benefit from any part of the other’s property? This indicates that partners are particular even with regard to passage through the field; all the more so are they particular with regard to placing animals or vessels in the field.

Rather, Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: Here we are dealing with a fenced-in yard located behind a group of houses that is used to store items not in regular use, where they are not par-ticular with regard to the mere placing of items but are particular with regard to the construction of a partition.

Rav Pappa said: This and that, i.e., the rulings of the mishna in tractate Nedarim as well as the rulings of the mishna here, are stated with regard to a courtyard belonging to partners, and the reason for the difference in the rulings is that there are those who are particular with regard to the other partner placing items in or passing through the courtyard, and there are those who are not particular. Therefore, in the mishna here, which issues a ruling concerning monetary matters, the halakha is to be lenient, and it is assumed that the partner is not particular about placing items in the courtyard, and the presumption of ownership is established. In the mishna in tractate Nedarim, which issues a ruling concerning ritual matters, the halakha is to be stringent, to prevent one from violating a vow.

Ravina said: Actually, partners are not particular about placing items in the courtyard, and in accordance with whose opinion is this mishna in tractate Nedarim? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: Even negligible benefits ordinarily waived are forbidden in the case of one prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another. In other words, one prohibited by a vow may not derive any benefit from the other, even a benefit that people commonly are not particular about and allow others to enjoy without first receiving permission. Therefore, although people are ordinarily not particular about others passing through their property, according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, one who is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from his partner is prohibited from walking on the property.

Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Bena’a: Partners may prevent each other from using their courtyard for any purpose except for washing laundry. This is because it is not the way of Jewish women to be degraded over washing laundry by laundering their clothing in a public area. Therefore, they must be allowed to launder in the courtyard.

In connection with the matter of laundry being washed in public, the Gemara quotes the homiletic interpretation of a verse: “He that walks righteously, and speaks uprightly; he that despises the gain of oppressions, that shakes his hands from holding of bribes, that stops his ears from hearing of blood, and shuts his eyes from looking upon evil” (Isaiah 33:15). Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says: This is referring to one who does not gaze at women while they are standing over the laundry, as it was common for them to stand in the water and raise the hems of their garments while laundering their clothing.

The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances? If it is referring to a case where there is another way by which the one walking could reach his destination, then one who walks past the women, consequently placing himself in a situation where he will be tempted to gaze at them, is wicked. Alternatively, if it is referring to a case where there is no other way by which he can reach his destination, then he is a victim of circumstance, so why is he required to shut his eyes? The Gemara explains: Actually, it is referring to a case where there is no other way by which he can reach his destination, and even so, he is required to compel himself to avoid gazing at the women.

§ The Gemara quotes additional matters that Rabbi Yoḥanan learned from Rabbi Bena’a. Rabbi Yoḥanan asked Rabbi Bena’a: How should the garment of a Torah scholar worn under his clothes be fashioned? He replied: He can wear any garment long enough that his flesh is not visible from beneath it. Rabbi Yoḥanan asked: How should the cloak of a Torah scholar be fashioned? He replied: He can wear any garment long enough that a handbreadth of his garment worn under his clothes is not visible from beneath it. Rabbi Yoḥanan asked: How should the table of a Torah scholar appear? He replied: Two-thirds of the table is covered with a cloth, and one-third is uncovered, and upon that third are dishes and vegetables. And its ring, used to hang the table, should be positioned on the outside, not on the side that faces the one who is eating.

The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that its ring should be positioned on the inside? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This baraita, which states that its ring should be positioned on the outside, is referring to a case where there is a child who may play with the ring and overturn the table, while that baraita, which states that its ring should be positioned on the inside, is referring to a case where there is no child present.

And if you wish, say instead that both this and that refer to a case where there is no child present, and this is not difficult: This baraita, which states that its ring should be positioned on the inside, is referring to a case where there is an attendant who may bump into the ring, while that baraita, which states that its ring should be positioned on the outside, is referring to a case where there is no attendant.

And if you wish, say instead that both this and that refer to a case where there is an attendant, and this is not difficult: This baraita, which states that its ring should be positioned on the outside, is referring to when the meal is eaten during the day, when the attendant can see the ring and avoid it, while that baraita, which states that its ring should be positioned on the inside, is referring to when the meal is eaten during the night.

The Gemara continues: All of the above is referring to the table of a Torah scholar, but the table of an ignoramus is similar