in a case where there is uncertainty whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Zeira. As Rabbi Zeira says that Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba says that Shmuel says: Wherever the Sages said with regard to a woman that there is uncertainty whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced, her husband is still obligated with regard to her sustenance. One might have thought that since she still has some right to her husband’s property, insofar as he still has an obligation with regard to her sustenance he would not lodge a protest if she used his land without his authorization. It is therefore necessary to clarify that this is not so, and she has the ability to establish the presumption of ownership in her husband’s property.

§ Rav Naḥman said: Rav Huna said to me that with regard to all of the types of people who do not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership, when they bring proof by means of a document or witnesses that a field belongs to them, their proof is a valid proof and the court places the field in their possession. But if there is a robber who brings proof that a field is his, his proof is not a valid proof, and the court does not place the field in his possession. This is due to a concern that the proof was obtained through illegitimate means.

The Gemara asks: What is this teaching us? We already learned in a mishna (Gittin 55b): If one purchased land from a Sicarius [Sikarikon], a violent gentile who had extorted the field from its owner with threats, and afterward one returned and purchased the same field from the prior owner, his purchase is void, as the owner of the field can say that he did not actually intend to sell him the field. This teaches that a purchase following a robbery is invalid, despite the existence of documents or testimony, rendering the statement of Rav Huna superfluous.

The Gemara answers: Rav Huna’s statement serves to exclude that which Rav says, as Rav says: They taught that the purchase of a field from the prior owner after one purchased it from a Sicarius is void only when the prior owner said to the buyer at the time of the sale: Go take possession and thereby acquire the field, but did not write a document. But if the transaction was performed along with a document being given, the buyer acquired the field.

Therefore, Rav Huna teaches us that he rules in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, as Shmuel says: He does not acquire the field even if the transaction was performed along with a document being given, until the owner of the field writes a property guarantee, i.e., a document that states that if the property is seized by the seller’s creditor, the seller will reimburse the buyer for his loss. Writing such a document indicates that it is a sincere transaction.

And Rav Beivai concludes that discussion of the statement of Rav Huna, that a robber does not retain possession of the field even if he brings proof of the transaction, with a comment in the name of Rav Naḥman: The robber does not have rights to the land, but he does have rights to the money that he paid for the land, and the owner has to reimburse him. In what case is this statement that the robber is reimbursed said? It is specifically where the witnesses said: The robber counted out the money for the owner and gave it to him in our presence; but if the witnesses said: The owner admitted to the robber in our presence that he received payment, then the robber is not reimbursed, as the admission may have been made under duress. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Kahana, who says: If the owner would not have admitted to the robber that he received payment, the robber would have brought him and his donkey to the taskmaster.

§ Apropos transactions performed under duress, the Gemara cites that which Rav Huna says: If one was suspended, e.g., from a tree, and thereby coerced to sell a certain item, and he sold it, his sale is valid. What is the reason? The Gemara suggests that it is because whatever a person sells, were it not for the fact that he is compelled by his need for money, he would not sell it, and even so, his sale is valid. This indicates that a transaction performed under duress is valid. The Gemara rejects this: But perhaps duress that results from his own needs, such as his need for money, is different from duress that results from another, as in this case. Rather, the basis for Rav Huna’s ruling is as it is taught in a baraita: