The Gemara responds: No, the agent of the court is considered like the creditor, who must wait outside for the debtor to deliver his collateral.

The Gemara attempts a further proof. Come and hear that which the Sages taught: The verse states: “If you take as collateral your neighbor’s garment, you shall restore it to him until the sun goes down” (Exodus 22:25). The verse is speaking of an agent of the court. Do you say that the verse is speaking of an agent of the court, or perhaps it is referring only to a creditor? When it says: “You shall not go into his house to take his collateral” (Deuteronomy 24:10), the case of a creditor is thereby stated. How then do I realize the meaning of the verse: “If you take as collateral your neighbor’s garment”? The verse is speaking of an agent of the court. This indicates that an agent of the court has permission to take collateral.

The Gemara responds: This issue is a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: An agent of the court who comes to take collateral from a debtor may not enter his house to take the collateral from him. Rather, the agent stands outside and the other, i.e., the debtor, brings out the collateral to him, as it is stated: “You shall stand outside, and the man to whom you lend shall bring forth the collateral” (Deuteronomy 24:11). According to this tanna, the agent of the court has the same status as the creditor.

And it is taught in another baraita: A creditor who comes to take collateral from the debtor may not enter his house to take his collateral. Rather, he stands outside, and the other, i.e., the debtor, enters and brings out the collateral to him, as it is stated: “You shall stand outside, and the man to whom you lend shall bring forth the collateral” (Deuteronomy 24:11). But as for an agent of the court who comes to take collateral from the debtor, this agent may enter his house and take his collateral.

The baraita continues: The agent of the court may not take as collateral from the debtor items that people use in the preparation of food, as the debtor needs such items, and the Torah explicitly forbade their removal. And the agent gives, i.e., leaves behind, a bed, and a second bed, and blankets, for a wealthy person; and a bed, and a second bed, and a mat, for a poor person. These items are left for the debtor himself, but not for his wife, and not for his sons or for his daughters, as the Torah did not obligate the creditor to care for the debtor’s family.

The tanna adds: In the manner that arrangements are made for a debtor to be left with certain necessary utensils, so arrangements are made for one obligated to give money to the Temple treasury resulting from a vow in the category of valuations. If one vowed to give a certain valuation to the Sanctuary as specified in the Torah (see Leviticus 27) but does not have sufficient money to pay that sum immediately, a similar arrangement is made for him. The Gemara is puzzled by this last clause: Isn’t it the opposite? The primary discussion of arrangements is stated in the Torah with regard to valuations, from which the halakha of other debts is derived. Rather, say that in the manner that arrangements are made for valuations as explained by the Torah, so arrangements are made for a debtor.

§ The Master said above: He gives a bed, and a second bed, and blankets, for a wealthy person; and a bed, and a second bed, and a mat, for a poor person. The Gemara asks: For whom is this extra bed? If we say it is for his wife, for his sons, or for his daughters, didn’t you expressly say that these items are left for him, but not for his wife, for his sons, or for his daughters? Rather, both this bed and that bed are for him.

The Gemara asks: Why does the debtor need two beds when one should suffice for all his needs? The Gemara answers: One is for him to eat on it and one is for him to sleep on it, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. As Shmuel, who was a doctor by profession, said: With regard to all items that cause illness, I know their cure, apart from these three: One who eats a bitter date [ahina] on an empty stomach, one who girds a wet linen belt around his loins, and one who eats bread and does not walk four cubits afterward. It is for this reason that one requires two beds, so that he should not eat and sleep on the same bed without having to walk a little distance between them after his meal.

§ A tanna taught a baraita before Rav Naḥman: In the manner in which arrangements are made for valuations, so arrangements are made for a debtor. Rav Naḥman said to him: Now that it states in the mishna that we sell his collateral, do we arrange for him to keep part of it? The Gemara asks: And do we sell it? But didn’t we learn in the mishna that he returns a pillow at night and a plow by day, which demonstrates that such items are not sold?

The Gemara answers: The tanna taught the baraita before him in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and this is what Rav Naḥman was saying to him: Now, since according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel we sell the collateral, do we make arrangements for him to keep it? As we learned in the mishna: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even to the debtor himself he needs to return the collateral each day only until thirty days have passed, and from that point onward, the creditor can sell them in court, with the proceeds going toward payment of the debt.

The Gemara asks: And from where is it known that when Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said that he sells the collateral, he was saying that there may be a complete sale? Perhaps this is what he is saying: Until thirty days, the creditor returns it to the debtor as is; from that point onward, the creditor returns to him that which is fit for him, and we sell what is not fit for him.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: If it enters your mind that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel maintains this reasoning, there is nothing that is unfit for him. As Abaye said: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva all hold that all Israel are the children of kings. In other words, a Jew is never deemed unfit to use a certain item, even if it is a luxury item.

The Gemara cites the cases in which the tanna’im apply the above principle. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel applies this principle, as we learned in a mishna (Shabbat 126b): One may not move either raw arum or raw mustard on Shabbat, as these are unfit for consumption when they are raw, and are therefore set-aside [muktze]. In the case of arum, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel permits moving it because it is considered food for ravens, which wealthy Jews would breed for purposes of ornamentation and amusement. As Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel permits all people to carry arum, not only the rich, it is evident that he maintains that all Jews are considered wealthy in this regard.

Rabbi Shimon applies this principle as we learned in a mishna (Shabbat 111a): Princes may smear rose oil on their wounds on Shabbat, even though most people use this oil for medicinal purposes, and healing oneself using oil is prohibited on Shabbat. The reason is that it is the usual manner of princes to smear rose oil on themselves for pleasure during the week. Rabbi Shimon says: All of the Jewish people are princes, and it is permitted for them to smear rose oil on themselves on Shabbat.

Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva also hold this opinion, as it is taught in a baraita: If creditors were claiming one thousand dinars from someone, and he was wearing a cloak [itztela] worth ten thousand dinars, the court strips it from him and sells it for his debt, and dresses him in a cloak appropriate for him, as one who is in debt does not have the right to withhold payment while possessing such an expensive garment. And it was taught in the name of Rabbi Yishmael, and it was similarly taught in the name of Rabbi Akiva: All of the Jewish people are fit for that cloak. One’s clothing is not sold to pay a debt, and since all Jews are worthy of wearing the finest garments, this halakha applies to an expansive cloak as well.

The Gemara returns to the issue at hand: And with regard to what entered our minds initially, that according to the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, the creditor returns to him that which is fit for him and we sell what is not fit for him, there is a difficulty, as the examples given in the mishna are bedding and a plow. Granted, this is understandable with regard to a pillow or cushion, as it can mean that the court sells these items only if the difference in cost between the ones he has and less expensive ones that are also fit for him suffices to repay the debt. But for what is a plow fit? In other words, how can there be a difference in price in this case? Rava bar Rabba said: This is referring to a silver plow, which is an ornament and not used for work.

Rav Ḥagga objects to this entire opinion concerning the arrangement made for a debtor: Let the creditor say to the debtor: Your needs are not cast upon me. In other words, why should I, who lent you money, make allowances for your livelihood? Abaye said to him: