unless they constructed a partition around it that is ten handbreadths high. Everything within the partition is then considered a private domain, and one standing within the partition may draw water from the pit. And similarly, one may only drink water from the pit on Shabbat if he inserts his head and most of his body into the well. And a pit and its bank join together to constitute the total of ten handbreadths, as stated by Rabbi Yoḥanan.

Rav Mordekhai raised a dilemma before Rava: In a case where there is a column in the public domain that is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, and one threw an object and it landed atop the column, what is the ruling? The two sides of the dilemma are: Do we say that the lifting from the public domain was performed in a prohibited manner and the placing in the private domain was performed in a prohibited manner, and therefore one is liable? Or perhaps, we say that since the object comes from an exempt domain, the one who threw the object would not be liable. Prior to landing on the column, the object traveled through the airspace above the public domain. The airspace of a public domain extends ten handbreadths from the ground. Beyond that point the airspace is an exempt domain.

Rava said to Rav Mordekhai: It is our mishna that states that one who places an object atop a boulder that is more than ten handbreadths high is liable. Rav Mordekhai came and asked Rav Yosef about the same dilemma: Rav Yosef said to him: It is our mishna. Rav Mordekhai came and asked Abaye. He said to him: It is our mishna. Rav Mordekhai said to them: You are all spewing the same spittle. None of you taught anything new. You repeat the same unsatisfactory answer.

They said to Rav Mordekhai: And do you not hold this to be correct? Didn’t we learn explicitly in the mishna: One who takes an object from them, and one who places an object atop them is liable? He said to them: Perhaps the mishna is referring to a needle that can be placed atop the column without passing through the exempt area above ten handbreadths, since it is so small and hardly takes up any space.

They said to him: With regard to a needle, too, it is still impossible that it will not be raised somewhat above the public domain. He answered them: It is possible that the boulder has a protrusion below ten handbreadths from the ground. Since the protrusion is not significant in and of itself, it has the legal status of a hole in the wall of a private domain. One who throws an object into it is liable, just like one who throws into the private domain itself. Alternatively, it is possible that the needle is placed in a groove that is below ten handbreadths from the ground. The needle did not enter the groove from above ten handbreadths. It passed directly into the groove, which is a private domain. Therefore, Rav Mordekhai’s dilemma is not resolved from the mishna.

Rav Meyasha said that Rabbi Yoḥanan raised a dilemma: There is a wall in the public domain that is ten handbreadths high and is not quite four handbreadths wide, and it surrounds a karmelit and renders the area that it encloses the private domain. The wall serves as a partition of this private domain. And if one threw an object from the public domain and it landed atop the wall, what is the ruling? Do we say: Since it is not four handbreadths wide it is an exempt domain, and the one who threw the object is exempt? Or perhaps we say that since it rendered the karmelit the private domain, the wall together with the private domain is considered to be filled. Therefore, the object is considered to have landed on an area that is four handbreadths wide, and the one who threw the object is liable.

Ulla said: The fact that it is considered a private domain is derived by means of an a fortiori inference: If this wall creates a partition that renders other areas surrounded by the wall a private domain, all the more so does it render itself a private domain. It was also stated that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said, and so too, Rabbi Yitzḥak said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to a wall in the public domain that is ten handbreadths high and is not quite four handbreadths wide, and it surrounds a karmelit and renders the area that it surrounds the private domain, if one threw an object from the public domain and it landed atop the wall, he is liable. If this wall creates a partition that renders other areas a private domain, all the more so does it render itself a private domain.

Rabbi Yoḥanan raised a dilemma: In a case where there is a pit that is nine handbreadths deep, and one dug out a segment of earth from the bottom of the pit and thereby completed the depth of the pit to ten handbreadths, and then he proceeded to throw the earth into the public domain, what is the ruling? The two sides to the dilemma are: Is it that the lifting of the object and establishment of the ten-handbreadth partition came about simultaneously, and he is liable? Or perhaps he is not liable. And if you say: Since the partition was not ten handbreadths deep initially, he is not liable, then in a case where there is a pit that is ten handbreadths deep, and one placed a segment of earth into the pit and thereby minimized its depth to less than ten handbreadths, nullifying its status as a private domain, what is the ruling? The two sides of the question are: Is it that placement of the object and the elimination of the ten-handbreadth partition came about simultaneously, and he is liable? Or perhaps, he is not liable because the partition was not intact throughout the performance of the action.

The Gemara suggests: Resolve Rabbi Yoḥanan’s dilemma from his own statement, as we learned in a mishna: With regard to one who throws an object four cubits in the public domain and it hits the wall above ten handbreadths from the ground, which is an exempt domain, it is as if he threw it in the air, and he is exempt. If it was below ten handbreadths from the ground, it is as if he threw it and it landed on the ground, and one who throws an object four cubits and it lands on the ground is liable. And we discussed it: How could he be liable for carrying in that case? The object did not come to rest on the wall and there was no placement.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is with regard to the case of a juicy cake of figs that sticks to the wall when thrown against it that we learned in the mishna. The Gemara asks: And why is one liable in that case? When the cake of figs sticks to the wall, it reduces the distance the figs traveled from the measure of four cubits that determines liability. If one threw the cake of figs at a distance of exactly four cubits from the wall, and, based on Rabbi Yoḥanan, the object becomes part of the wall, the distance that the cake of figs traveled is slightly less than four cubits, and therefore he should be exempt. Since Rabbi Yoḥanan did not take this into account, apparently, in his opinion, when the placement of the object and the elimination of the partition are simultaneous, one is liable.

The Gemara rejects this and says: The cases are not similar because there, in the case of the cake of figs, the one who threw it does not nullify its independent existence vis-à-vis the wall, as the food will eventually be removed from the wall. Here, in the case of the dirt in the pit, one nullifies its independent existence vis-à-vis the pit, and it eliminates the ten-handbreadth partition.

Rava raised a similar dilemma: In a case where one threw a board and it landed on top of stakes that are ten handbreadths high but not four handbreadths wide, what is the ruling? Once the board lands, the surface is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide. The Gemara asks: What is his dilemma? Does his dilemma pertain to the ruling in a case where the placement of the object and the establishment of the partition came about simultaneously? That is precisely the dilemma raised by Rabbi Yoḥanan.

The Gemara answers: The case where Rava raised a dilemma is more complex. His dilemma is with regard to a case where one threw a board and there was an object resting atop the board. In that case, what is the ruling? The two sides of the dilemma are: Since the board and the object come simultaneously, the legal status is similar to a case where the placement of the object and the establishment of the partition came about simultaneously. The object and the board are a single unit that creates a partition when it lands, and therefore one is exempt. Or perhaps we say that since it is impossible, when they land, for the object not to rise slightly and then land because the object and the board are not connected, it is like the case where the establishment of the partition was completed and the placement of the object followed, and therefore one is liable. These dilemmas remain, and therefore let it stand unresolved.

Rava raised an issue related to the previous dilemmas, and before doing so he sought to clarify certain points. Rava said: It is obvious to me that if one poured water onto water that is its placement, and if one did so from one domain to another he is liable. If one placed a nut onto water,