he gives him his wage; if he is a contractor, he gives him his contracted payment?

The Gemara explains: Whose opinion does this baraita follow? If we say it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, why does the baraita rule that he receives his full payment specifically in a case when the laborer heard that a relative of his died, or if he was gripped with fever, where he was unable to work due to circumstances beyond his control? When he is not compelled by circumstances beyond his control to stop working, this should also be the halakha. After all, the Rabbis said that the laborer is at an advantage. Rather, is it not correct to say that this baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Dosa? And one can learn from it that Rabbi Dosa does not differentiate between hired work and contracted work in this regard.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The ruling of this baraita is stated with regard to a matter that involves financial loss if the work is not completed. Consequently, the employer is at an advantage, unless the laborer is compelled to stop working due to circumstances beyond his control, in which case everyone agrees that he receives his full wages.

We learned in the mishna: Whoever changes the terms accepted by both parties is at a disadvantage, and whoever reneges on an agreement is at a disadvantage. The Gemara asks: Granted, with regard to the statement: Whoever changes is at a disadvantage, one can understand this, as the tanna taught us an unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, indicating that this is the halakha. But concerning the clause: Whoever reneges is at a disadvantage, what does it serve to add? Does it not serve to add the halakha of a laborer, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Dosa, who holds that workers may not renege?

Evidently, Rav’s ruling does not accord with the opinion of Rabbi Dosa. Rather, Rabbi Dosa is saying two halakhot, and Rav holds in accordance with his opinion in one matter and disagrees with his opinion in one matter. Rav does not agree with Rabbi Dosa’s ruling that laborers are at a disadvantage, but he does agree with him with regard to the manner of calculating wages.

If you wish, say a different interpretation of the mishna. The phrase: Whoever reneges is at a disadvantage, is not discussing employment arrangements, but is referring to that which is taught in a baraita: Whoever reneges is at a disadvantage; how so? If one sold a field to another for one thousand dinars, and the buyer gave him two hundred dinars as a down payment, and then one of them reneged, when the seller reneges on his commitment, the buyer is at an advantage.

Consequently, if the buyer desires, he may say to him: Give me back my money that I gave you as a down payment, or give me land corresponding to the value of my money. If you will not give me all the land as per our agreement, I should at least receive land in proportion to the money I already paid you. From which type of land does the seller give the buyer? From superior-quality land. And when the buyer reneges, the seller is at an advantage: If he desires, the seller says to him: Take your money, and if he desires, he says to him: Take land corresponding to the value of your money that you already paid. From which type of land does the seller give the buyer? Even from inferior-quality land.

The baraita continues: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: We teach them from the outset not to renege, so that the agreement will not be canceled and end in conflict. How so? The seller writes for him a bill of sale that states: I, so-and-so, son of so-and-so, sold such and such a field to so-and-so for one thousand dinars, and of them he gave me two hundred dinars. And therefore, now he owes me eight hundred dinars. In this manner, the buyer acquires the entire field, and the buyer returns the remaining eight hundred dinars to the seller even after several years. The remainder of the payment for the field has been transformed into a standard written loan.

The Master said in the baraita: From which type of land does the seller give the buyer? From superior-quality land. It may enter your mind to say that this means from the most superior-quality land of all of the seller’s property. The Gemara asks: But even if the buyer is considered to be like only a regular creditor, we learned in a mishna (Gittin 48b) that a creditor has the right only to intermediate-quality land, not superior-quality land. And furthermore, there is this specific plot of land, for which the buyer paid money. Why should he receive superior-quality land?

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: When the baraita refers to the type of land that may be claimed after the buyer or seller reneges, it means from the most superior-quality land that is in the agreed-upon plot of land, or from the most inferior-quality land that is in it.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said: You may even say that the baraita means from the most superior-quality land of all of the seller’s property, as there is a specific reason why that should be the case here: Ordinarily, one who buys land for one thousand dinars will not have such a large sum on hand to carry out the transaction. Rather, he will significantly reduce the price of his possessions and sell them at a loss, so as to obtain the money. If the seller reneges and the buyer does not acquire this large plot of land, he will have suffered a significant loss, and he will be like an injured party, and we learned the same mishna: The court appraises superior-quality land for payment to injured parties. Therefore, in this case too, the seller must provide land of the highest quality.

§ It is further stated in the baraita that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: We teach them not to renege. How so? He writes for him: I, so-and-so, son of so-and-so, sold such and such a field to so-and-so for one thousand dinars, and of them he gave me two hundred dinars. And therefore, now he owes me eight hundred dinars. This effects acquisition of the field for the buyer immediately. The Gemara asks: The reason they cannot renege is that the seller wrote this for the buyer in the contract. Evidently, if not for this being specified in a document the buyer does not acquire the field immediately.

The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: With regard to one who gives a down payment to another, and says to him: If I renege, my down payment is forfeited to you, and the other person says to him: If I renege, I will double your down payment for you, the conditions are in effect; i.e., the court will enforce the conditions stipulated between them in this contract. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei.

The Gemara comments: Rabbi Yosei conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as he says: A transaction with inconclusive consent [asmakhta] effects acquisition. Even though it is a commitment that he undertook based on his certainty that he would never be forced to fulfill the condition, it is considered a full-fledged commitment.

The Gemara continues its discussion of the baraita. Rabbi Yehuda says: It is sufficient that the down payment effects acquisition of merchandise commensurate with the amount of his down payment. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: In what case is this statement said? It is when the buyer said to the seller: My down payment will effect acquisition of the merchandise. But if one sold another a field for one thousand dinars, and the buyer paid him five hundred dinars of that sum, he has acquired the entire field, and he returns the rest of the money to the seller even after several years have passed. Evidently, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel maintains that even if they do not have an explicit contract, the buyer’s first payment finalizes the sale, rendering the remaining payment a standard loan. If so, why does the previous baraita state that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that this contract must be in writing?

The Gemara responds: This is not difficult. This ruling, that the down payment serves to effect acquisition only if they specified in writing that the remaining payment would be considered a loan, is stated with regard to a case where the seller goes in and goes out for money, i.e., demonstrates that he is in need of cash. Therefore, unless the acquisition was stated in writing, the buyer acquires the entire field only when he pays the entire sum. That ruling, that the down payment effects full acquisition regardless of whether or not it is written in a contract, is stated with regard to a case where he does not go in and go out for money.

This is as Rava says: With regard to one who sells an item to another and then goes in and goes out for money, the buyer has not acquired it, as it is clear that the seller sold it only because he needed the money immediately. Since the seller did not receive the money he wanted right away, the transaction is null. If he does not go in and go out for money, the buyer has acquired it, and the rest of the payment is considered like a loan that must be repaid in the future.

And Rava says: With regard to one who lent one hundred dinars to another and the borrower paid it back one dinar at a time, this is a valid repayment. But the lender has grounds for a grievance against him for repaying him in this manner, as he can say to him: You have caused me to lose out, as it is easier to use a lump sum than a few coins at a time.

§ The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who sold his donkey to another, and one dinar was still owed to him, and the seller went in and went out for his dinar. Rav Ashi sat and examined this situation, asking: In a case like this, what is the halakha? Has he acquired the donkey or has he not acquired it? Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: This is what Avimi of Hagronya said in the name of Rava: One dinar is considered to be like multiple dinars, and therefore he has not acquired it.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Yosef, said to Rav Ashi: But we say in the name of Rava that in this case he has acquired it. Rav Ashi said to him, in resolution of the apparent contradiction between these two versions of Rava’s ruling: Interpret your halakha with regard to one who sells his field