GEMARA: With regard to the main issue, the Gemara asks: After all, throwing is a subcategory of carrying out. Where is the primary category of prohibited labor of carrying out itself written in the Torah? Isn’t it necessary to clarify the primary category before discussing the subcategory? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: As the verse said: “And Moses commanded, and they passed a proclamation throughout the camp saying: Neither man nor woman should perform any more work to contribute to the Sanctuary; and the people stopped bringing” (Exodus 36:6). According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, Moses commanded the people to cease bringing contributions in order to prevent them from bringing their contributions on Shabbat. He then explains: Where was Moses sitting? He was in the camp of the Levites, and the Levites’ camp was the public domain. And he said to Israel: Do not carry out and bring objects from the private domain, your camp, to the public domain, the camp of the Levites.

The Gemara asks: And how do you know that he was standing and commanding the people on Shabbat? Perhaps he was standing during the week, and Moses commanded the cessation of contributions because the labor of the Tabernacle was completed, since all the necessary material was already donated, as it is written: “And the work was sufficient for them for all of the work to perform it, and there was extra” (Exodus 36:7). Rather, derive this by means of a verbal analogy between passing mentioned in this context and passing mentioned with regard to Yom Kippur.

It is written here, with regard to the Tabernacle: “And they passed a proclamation throughout the camp,” and it is written there, with regard to Yom Kippur: “And you shall pass a blast of a shofar on the tenth day of the seventh month, on Yom Kippur you shall sound a shofar throughout your land” (Leviticus 25:9). Just as there, with regard to the shofar of the Jubilee Year, passing is on a day on which it is prohibited to perform labor, so too, here passing is on a day on which it is prohibited to perform labor.

The Gemara asks: We found a source prohibiting carrying out from a private domain into the camp of the Levites. From where do we derive that carrying in is also considered a prohibited labor? The Gemara answers: It is a logical inference. After all, carrying is from one domain to another, so what difference is there to me whether it is carrying out or carrying in? Carrying from one domain to another is prohibited; the direction in which the object is carried makes no difference. However, carrying out is a primary category, while carrying in is a subcategory, as it is not stated explicitly in the biblical text.

The Gemara now questions the distinction between primary categories and subcategories of labor. After all, one is liable for this, carrying out, and one is liable for that, carrying in. Why is this called a primary category, and why is this called a subcategory? What is the point of the distinction?

The Gemara answers: The practical ramification is that if one performs two different primary categories together, or alternatively, if one performs two subcategories of two different primary categories together, he is liable to bring two sin-offerings. And if one performs a primary category of labor together with its own subcategory, he is liable to bring only one sin-offering.

The Gemara further asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who renders one liable for the performance of a subcategory of prohibited labor when performed together with a primary category, why is this called a primary category, and why is this called a subcategory? The Gemara answers: According to him, that which was a significant labor in the Tabernacle is called a primary category; that which was not a significant labor in the Tabernacle is not called a primary category. Alternatively, perhaps that which is written explicitly in the Torah is called a primary category, and that which is not written explicitly in the Torah is called a subcategory.

And as for the halakha that we learned in a mishna: With regard to one who throws an object on Shabbat a distance of four cubits in the public domain and it lands on a wall, if the wall was higher than ten handbreadths, it is as if he threw it into the air, and he is exempt. If the wall was lower than ten handbreadths, it is as if he threw it onto the ground, and one who throws an object a distance of four cubits onto the ground in the public domain is liable.

The Gemara asks: If one threw an object four cubits in the public domain, and it did not go from one domain to another, from where do we derive that he is liable? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoshiya said: Because the weavers of the tapestries in the Tabernacle throw their needles to each other when they need to borrow the other’s needle. Throwing was a labor performed in the Tabernacle; therefore, one is liable for performing it. The Gemara wonders: Why do weavers need needles? Rather, emend the statement to say: Because those who sewed the tapestries throw their needles to each other.

The Gemara asks: Is it clear that they had to throw needles to each other? Perhaps they sat next to each other. The Gemara answers: It is clear that they kept their distance from each other. If they sat too close, they would reach each other and hurt one another with their needles. The Gemara asks: Perhaps, even though they kept their distance, they sat within four cubits of each other, and they would not throw the needles farther than that. In the absence of proof of their sitting arrangement, this halakha cannot be derived from those who sewed the tapestries.

Rather, Rav Ḥisda said: Throwing an object four cubits in the public domain is prohibited because the weavers of the tapestries in the Tabernacle threw the shuttle, to which the thread of the warp was tied on the tapestry. Weaving entails throwing the thread of the warp through the threads of the woof. The Gemara asks: That is not actually throwing, as didn’t the weaver hold the end of the thread in his hand? One is not liable for throwing an object when part of it remains in his hand. Rather, this must be referring to the final throw, when the weaving was finished and the weaver released the thread from his hand.

The Gemara asks: Doesn’t the shuttle go in an exempt domain? The tapestry was less than four handbreadths wide, rendering it an exempt domain even though it is four cubits long. One who throws in an exempt domain is exempt. Rather, it is because the weavers of tapestries throw the shuttle to those who seek to borrow it from them. The Gemara asks: But perhaps they sat next to each other? The Gemara answers: That is impossible because they would reach one another and disturb one another when tightening the thread at the end of the tapestry.

The Gemara asks: And perhaps they were not in a straight line but staggered. That would enable the weavers to sit adjacent to each other without disturbing each other’s work. And furthermore, did they borrow from each another? Wasn’t the following taught in a baraita of the Sage Luda? The verse states: “And all the wise men who performed all of the work of the Sanctuary came, each one from the work he was doing” (Exodus 36:4). From that verse it is derived: Each performed the labor from his own work, and they would not perform the labor from their friends’ work. Each person had his own tools and did not need to borrow from others.

And furthermore, the Gemara asks: Even if the halakha of throwing was derived from here, from where do we derive that one who carries an object four cubits in the public domain is liable? Rather, apparently, this halakha is not derived from the labor performed in the construction of the Tabernacle. Rather, all the halakhot related to carrying four cubits in the public domain are learned through tradition and not derived from the text.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The wood gatherer who was sentenced to death for desecrating Shabbat (see Numbers 15:33–36) was one who carried four cubits in the public domain. He was stoned for performing the prohibited labor of carrying. It was taught in a baraita: He was one who detached still-growing branches. He was stoned for performing the prohibited labor of detaching. Rav Aḥa, son of Rabbi Ya’akov, said: He was one who gathered sticks together into a pile.

The Gemara asks: What is the practical ramification of determining precisely which prohibited labor the wood gatherer performed? The Gemara answers: The ramification is with regard to the statement of Rav, as Rav said: I found a hidden scroll in the house of Rabbi Ḥiyya. And in it, it is written that Isi ben Yehuda says: The number of primary categories of labor prohibited on Shabbat is forty-less-one. And if one performed all of them in the course of one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring only one sin-offering. The Gemara asks: One and no more? We learned in a mishna: The number of primary categories of prohibited labors on Shabbat is forty-less-one, which the mishna proceeds to list. And we discussed this mishna: Why do I need this tally of forty-less-one? And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The tally was included to teach that if one performed all the prohibited labors in the course of one lapse of awareness, during which he was unaware of the prohibition involved, he is liable for each and every one.

This citation from the hidden scroll cannot be accurate. Rather, emend this statement in the hidden scroll and say that one is not liable for one of them. There is a primary category of labor among the thirty-nine primary categories of prohibited labor whose violation does not incur the death penalty. The identity of this category that is not punishable by death was not specified.

It is obvious to Rav Yehuda that one who carries four cubits in the public domain is liable to receive the death penalty. And it is obvious to the baraita that one who detaches is liable to receive the death penalty. And it is obvious to Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov that one who gathers is liable to receive the death penalty. In other words, this Master maintains: With regard to this labor, in any case, there is no uncertainty. And this Master maintains: With regard to that labor, in any case, there is no uncertainty. Each Sage maintains that the prohibited labor that he attributed to the wood gatherer incurs the death penalty and is certainly not the labor referred to in the hidden scroll.

On the topic of the wood gatherer, the Gemara cites that which the Sages taught in a baraita: The wood gatherer mentioned in the Torah was Zelophehad, and it says: “And the children of Israel were in the desert and they found a man gathering wood on the day of Shabbat” (Numbers 15:32), and below, in the appeal of the daughters of Zelophehad, it is stated: “Our father died in the desert and he was not among the company of them that gathered themselves together against the Lord in the company of Korah, but he died in his own sin, and he had no sons” (Numbers 27:3). Just as below the man in the desert is Zelophehad, so too, here, in the case of the wood gatherer, the unnamed man in the desert is Zelophehad; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.

Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira said to him: Akiva, in either case you will be judged in the future for this teaching. If the truth is in accordance with your statement that the wood gatherer was Zelophehad, the Torah concealed his identity, and you reveal it. And if it the truth is not in accordance with your statement, you are unjustly slandering that righteous man.