the produce is not in the category of: “But when water is placed [khi yuttan] upon the seed,” and the produce is not susceptible to contracting ritual impurity.

What is the reason that if the produce dried, the fact that the owner is glad does not render it susceptible to ritual impurity? Is it not due to the fact that we do not say: Since the matter was revealed that he is amenable to the moisture now, he was also amenable from the outset? The same should be true with regard to despair that is not conscious. The fact that when he becomes aware of his loss he despairs of its recovery does not indicate that he despaired from the outset, contrary to the opinion of Rava. The Gemara rejects the proof: It is different there, as although the phrase is vocalized to mean: “When it is placed,” it is written: When one places [ki yitten], from which it is derived that the produce is rendered susceptible to ritual impurity only if the owner places the liquid on the produce.

The Gemara asks: If so, in the first clause of the baraita, too, the produce should not be rendered susceptible to contracting impurity, because the dew fell on the produce and was not placed there by the owner. The Gemara answers: There, the explanation is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa, as Rav Pappa raised a contradiction: The verse states: “But when water is placed [vekhi yuttan] upon the seed, and any part of a carcass falls thereon, it is ritually impure unto you” (Leviticus 11:38). The word “yuttan” is written in the defective form, as if it says “ki yitten.” Accordingly, this would mean that one must actively place the water on the produce. Yet, we read it, based on the tradition as to its correct pronunciation, as if it is written “ki yuttan,” which includes any situation where the produce becomes wet. How so? How can the way the verse is written and the way it is read be reconciled?

Rav Pappa explains that we require that the situation described by the words “when water is placed [ki yuttan]” be similar to the situation described by the words: When one places [dekhi yitten]: Just as the term places [yitten] indicates that it is with the knowledge of the owner that the produce becomes wet, as he himself is placing the water, so too, the term “is placed [yuttan]” means that it is with his knowledge that the produce becomes wet, despite the fact that he did not place the water himself. Therefore, no proof may be cited with regard to the matter of despair, where there is no Torah derivation requiring awareness from the outset.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from that which Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Yishmael ben Yehotzadak: From where is it derived with regard to a lost item that the river swept away that it is permitted for its finder to keep it? It is derived from this verse, as it is written: “And so shall you do with his donkey; and so shall you do with his garment; and so shall you do with every lost item of your brother, which shall be lost from him, and you have found it” (Deuteronomy 22:3). The verse states that one must return that which is lost from him, the owner, but is available to be found by any person. Excluded from that obligation is that which is lost from him and is not available to be found by any person; it is ownerless property and anyone who finds it may keep it.

And the prohibition written in the verse against keeping an item that is lost only to its owner is similar to the allowance to keep an item lost to all people that is inferred from the verse; just as in the case of the allowance, whether there is a distinguishing mark and whether there is no distinguishing mark, it is permitted for the finder to keep it, so too in the case of the prohibition, whether there is a distinguishing mark and whether there is no distinguishing mark, it is prohibited for the finder to keep it, until there is proof that the owner despaired of its recovery. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rava is indeed a conclusive refutation.

And although in disputes between Abaye and Rava, the halakha is typically ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rava, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye in the disputes represented by the mnemonic: Yod, ayin, lamed; kuf, gimmel, mem.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: And now that the opinion of Rava was conclusively refuted, and the halakha is that despair that is not conscious is not considered despair, if those dates are blown off the tree by the wind, how do we eat them? Perhaps their owner did not despair of their recovery. Rav Ashi said to him: Since there are repugnant creatures and creeping animals that eat the dates after they fall, the owner despairs of their recovery from the outset. Therefore, one who finds the dates may keep them.

Rav Aḥa asked: Perhaps the tree belonged to minor orphans who, because they are not capable of relinquishing property, cannot despair of recovering the dates from the outset. Accordingly, what is the justification for eating found dates? Rav Ashi said to him: We do not presume a valley to be land belonging to orphans, and therefore that is not a concern.

Rav Aḥa asked: If the presumptive status of the trees was previously established as belonging to orphans, what is the halakha? If the trees are surrounded by fences that prevent repugnant creatures and creeping animals from gaining access, what is the halakha? Rav Ashi said to him: The dates are forbidden in those cases.

§ The mishna teaches that if one found bundles of grain in a public area, these belong to him. Rabba says with regard to this ruling: And this is the halakha even with regard to an item on which there is a distinguishing mark. The Gemara comments: Apparently, Rabba holds that the legal status of a distinguishing mark that is prone to be trampled is not that of a distinguishing mark. Since the owner of the lost item knows that the mark is prone to be trampled, he does not rely on it and he despairs of recovering the item. Rava said: The Sages taught this halakha only with regard to an item on which there is no distinguishing mark, but with regard to an item on which there is a distinguishing mark, the one who finds it is obligated to proclaim his find. The Gemara comments: Apparently, Rava holds that the legal status of a distinguishing mark that is prone to be trampled is that of a distinguishing mark.

And there are those who teach the dispute with regard to this halakha independent of the mishna. With regard to the legal status of a distinguishing mark that is prone to be trampled, Rabba says: It is not a distinguishing mark. And Rava says: It is a distinguishing mark.

The Gemara cites proof from that which we learned in a baraita: If one finds bundles of grain in a public area, these belong to him; if he finds them in a secluded area, the finder takes them and proclaims his find. What are the circumstances? If it is a case where there is no distinguishing mark on the bundles, when one finds them in a secluded area, what does he proclaim? Rather, is it not a case where there is a distinguishing mark on the bundles, and there is then a reason for him to proclaim his find. And yet, it is taught in the baraita that if he finds the bundles in a public area those bundles belong to him. Apparently, a distinguishing mark that is prone to be trampled is not a distinguishing mark. This is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rava.

Rava could have said to you: Actually, it is a case where there is no distinguishing mark on the bundles. And with regard to that which you said: When one finds them in a secluded area, what does he proclaim? He proclaims that the owner should provide the location where he lost the bundles and thereby recover his bundles. And Rabba said: The location, provided by the owner, is not a distinguishing mark that would enable the return of an item to its owner. As it was stated that the amora’im disputed this matter: With regard to location, Rabba says: It is not a distinguishing mark, and Rava says: It is a distinguishing mark.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: If one finds bundles of grain in a public area, these belong to him; if he finds them in a secluded area, the finder takes them and proclaims his find. And with regard to the sheaves, i.e., large bundles, whether he finds them in a public area or whether he finds them in a secluded area, the finder takes them and proclaims his find. How does Rabba explain the baraita, and how does Rava explain the baraita? Rabba explains, according to his line of reasoning, that the baraita is referring to bundles with a distinguishing mark. And Rava explains, according to his line of reasoning, that the baraita is referring to bundles whose location is their distinguishing mark.

The Gemara elaborates. Rabba explains, according to his line of reasoning, that the baraita is referring to bundles with a distinguishing mark: If one finds bundles of grain in a public area, these belong to him due to the fact