And we maintain, as the Gemara concludes below, that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi means that the halakha that applies to a thief is like the halakha that applies to a robber according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that the owner despairs of recovering his item once it is stolen by a robber.

§ The Gemara examines the matter itself. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: I say that the halakha that applies to a thief is like the halakha that applies to a robber. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Was Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi saying that the halakha that applies to a thief is like the halakha that applies to a robber according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that the owners do not despair of recovering their item, and a thief therefore does not acquire the items he steals? Or perhaps he was saying that the halakha that applies to a thief is like the halakha that applies to a robber according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that the owners despair of recovering their property, and a thief therefore acquires the stolen items.

The Gemara attempts to resolve the dilemma. Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If customs collectors took one’s donkey and gave him a different donkey that was taken from another Jew in its stead, or if bandits took his garment and gave him a different garment that was taken from a Jew in its stead, these items are now his because the owners despaired of retrieving them when they were stolen. It is therefore apparent that despair is assumed both in the case of a robber, i.e., the customs collector, and in the case of a thief, i.e., the bandits.

The Gemara clarifies: Whose opinion is expressed in this mishna? If it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who assume that the owners despair only in the case of a thief, it is difficult because the mishna assumes that the victim of a robber also despairs of retrieving his property. And if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who assumes that the owners despair only in the case of a robber, it is difficult because the mishna assumes that the victim of a thief also despairs of retrieving his property.

The Gemara presents the proof: Granted, if you say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was saying that the halakha that applies to a thief is like the halakha that applies to a robber according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that the owners despair of recovering their property, and a thief therefore acquires the stolen items, in accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and it is due to that reason that a thief acquires the stolen goods.

But if you say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was saying that the halakha that applies to a thief is like the halakha that applies to a robber according to the opinion of the Rabbis, and a thief therefore does not acquire the stolen goods, in accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? Since the mishna rules that the owners have presumably despaired with regard to both a thief and a robber, it is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and it is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, and it is not in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.

The Gemara responds: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with an armed bandit, who is considered a robber because he steals using force and aggression, and the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that despair is assumed in the case of a robber. The Gemara asks: If so, this is identical to the case of a robber, i.e., the mishna’s first case of the customs collector, and there is no reason for the mishna to teach the same halakha twice. The Gemara answers: The mishna wishes to teach the halakha with regard to two different types of robbers.

Come and hear a different proof based upon the aforementioned baraita: With regard to a thief, a robber, and one who forces another to sell him something, their consecrated items are considered consecrated, and their teruma, the portion of the produce designated for the priest, is considered teruma, and their tithes are considered tithes.

Whose opinion is expressed in this baraita? If it is in accordance with the Rabbis, it is difficult because the baraita assumes that the victim of a robber also despairs of retrieving his property, and therefore the robber’s act of consecration or separation of teruma or tithes is valid. Conversely, if it is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, it is difficult because the baraita assumes that the victim of a thief despairs of retrieving his property.

Granted, if you say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was saying that the halakha that applies to a thief is like the halakha that applies to a robber according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that the owner despairs of recovering his property, it is due to that reason that a thief therefore acquires the stolen items. But if you say that the halakha that applies to a thief is like the halakha that applies to a robber according to the opinion of the Rabbis, in accordance with whose opinion is this baraita written?

The Gemara responds: When the baraita refers to a thief, it is actually referring to an armed bandit, who is legally considered a robber, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that victims of a robber despair of recovering their property. The Gemara asks: If so, this is identical to the case of a robber that is mentioned in the baraita. The Gemara answers: The baraita wishes to teach the halakha with regard to two different types of robbers.

Rav Ashi said to Rabba: Come and hear a proof from Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s own interpretation of the mishna (111b) that states that children who inherit an item that was stolen by their father are obligated to return it to the owner if it is something that serves as a legal guarantee of a loan, e.g., land. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would teach Rabbi Shimon, his son, that the mishna is not referring only to something that may actually serve as a legal guarantee, i.e., land. Rather, it is referring even to a cow that he plows with, or a donkey that he drives by directing it from behind, which the heirs are obligated to return because of the honor of their father.

The Gemara infers: The reason that the heirs must return the stolen item is due to the honor of their father. But if it were not for the honor of their father, they would not be required to return it. Conclude from it that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was saying that the halakha that applies to a thief is like the halakha that applies to a robber according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that this is so.

§ The mishna teaches: And so too, with regard to a swarm of bees, if the owners despaired of retrieving the bees, they belong to the one who found them. The Gemara inquires: What is the reason that the mishna includes the case of the bees, which begins with the term: And so too?

The Gemara explains: This is what it is saying: The halakha stated by the mishna applies even to a swarm of bees, which is the property of the owners via a rabbinic form of acquisition due to the fact that one cannot effect a legal acquisition of bees by Torah law. It might enter your mind to say that in this case, since one acquires the swarm of bees only by rabbinic law, even where the owners’ response is unspecified it can be assumed that they despair of recovering the bees, and the finder may keep them. To counter this, the mishna teaches us that if it is known that the owners of the bees despaired of recovering them, yes, the finder may keep the bees; if they did not despair, no, he may not keep them.

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka said: A woman or a minor is deemed credible to say: It was from here that this swarm emerged, and it therefore belongs to a certain individual.

The Gemara asks: Are a woman and a minor eligible for testimony? The halakha is that women and minors cannot present testimony in court, so how can Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka rule that they are deemed credible? The Gemara explains that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Here, we are dealing with a case where the owners were pursuing the bees, and the woman and the minor were speaking offhandedly and saying: It was from here that this swarm emerged. In this context, it can be assumed that the individual identified as the owner is the real owner of the bees, even in the absence of formal testimony in court.

Having mentioned a case of offhand remarks, the Gemara states that Rav Ashi says: Information gleaned from one who speaks offhandedly is valid only with regard to testimony enabling a woman to remarry, as the Sages were lenient and decreed that the incidental remarks of certain individuals who are not eligible to serve as witnesses may be relied upon in such a case.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: And is it so that one does not rely upon offhand remarks in other situations? But the case in the mishna of a swarm of bees is a case of one who speaks offhandedly, and the halakha is that he is deemed credible. Rav Ashi answered: A swarm of bees is different, as it is the property of its owners via a rabbinic form of acquisition. Consequently, the Sages relied on offhand remarks.

The Gemara asks: And is there no case where offhand remarks expressed by those who are ineligible to testify in court would be accepted by Torah law? But doesn’t Rav Yehuda say that Shmuel says: There was an incident involving a certain person who was speaking offhandedly and saying: I remember when I was a child and I would still ride on father’s shoulder. And they took me from school, and removed my tunic, and immersed me in a ritual bath so that I would be able to partake of teruma that evening.

And Rabbi Ḥanina would conclude his retelling of the incident as follows: That individual then went on to say: And my friends would separate themselves from me, and they would call me: Yoḥanan, eater of ḥallot, a reference to the portion of dough given to the priests, which has the same status as teruma. And after hearing this anecdote, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi elevated him to the priesthood and granted him the right to partake of teruma based on his statement. Since it is prohibited for non-priests to consume teruma by Torah law, it is apparent that offhand remarks may be relied upon even with regard to Torah law, even in cases unrelated to enabling a woman to remarry.

Rav Ashi answers: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi granted him the right to partake of produce that is teruma only by rabbinic law, as he holds that the requirement to separate teruma after the destruction of the Temple is by rabbinic law. One can still posit that offhand remarks made by individuals who are ineligible to testify in court are not deemed credible with regard to Torah law.

The Gemara asks: And still, is there no other case where offhand remarks made by those who are ineligible to testify in court would be accepted by Torah law? But when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael, didn’t he say that Rav Ḥana of Carthage [Kartigna], and some say that it was Rav Aḥa of Carthage, related: An incident came before Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, and some say that this incident came before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, with regard to a certain child who was speaking offhandedly and said: My mother and I were captured and held among the gentiles. When I would go out to draw water, my mind was on my mother, and when I would go out to gather wood, my mind was on my mother. Since the child was always conscious of his mother, he was aware that she was not violated by her captors.

The Gemara concludes the statement of Rav Dimi and explains the challenge: And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi married her to a priest based on his statement. Since it is prohibited by Torah law for a priest to marry a woman who has engaged in sexual intercourse with a man forbidden to her by Torah law and with whom she cannot establish a marital bond, e.g., a gentile, it is clear that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi relied on an offhand remark even with regard to a prohibition by Torah law.

The Gemara answers: The Sages were lenient with regard to a captured woman. By Torah law, a woman taken captive may be presumed to remain permitted to a priest, and it is the Sages who decreed that she is forbidden due to the concern that she was raped. It is this rabbinic decree that may be disregarded on the basis of offhand remarks.

§ The mishna teaches: But if the bees settled on a branch of a tree, he may not cut off the other’s branch in order to take the bees, even on the condition that he will later give him the money for it. It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says: It is a stipulation of the court, which takes effect even without being confirmed by individuals, that one will be permitted to enter another’s field and cut off another’s branch in order to salvage his own swarm of bees. And the owner of the field then collects the value of his branch from his fellow’s swarm.

And it is also a stipulation of the court that one who sees another’s honey barrel break should pour out his own wine and then use the empty wine barrel to salvage the other’s honey, which is more expensive than wine. And the owner of the wine then collects the value of his wine from the other’s honey. And it is also a stipulation of the court that one who sees that another’s donkey has fallen should unload his own wood from his own donkey and load the other’s flax, which is more expensive than wood, in its place. And the owner of the wood then collects the value of his wood from the other’s flax. These stipulations take effect as it was on this condition that Joshua apportioned Eretz Yisrael to the Jewish people.

MISHNA: In a case of one who recognizes his stolen vessels and scrolls in another’s possession, and a rumor had spread in the city that the former had been the victim of theft, the purchaser, i.e., the one in possession of these items, must take an oath to the victim as to how much money he spent on the purchase, and he then takes that sum of money in exchange for returning the items. And if no such rumor had spread, it is not in the purported victim’s power to assert that the items were stolen, and he is not entitled to demand their return, as I could say: The items were never stolen; rather, the purported victim sold them to another, and this individual who currently possesses the item purchased them from that other person.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: And if a rumor spread in the city that he had been the victim of theft, what of it? Let us suspect that perhaps he sold the items and he himself is spreading the rumor that they were stolen so that he will be able to buy them back.

The Gemara answers that Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The mishna is discussing a case where people, i.e., guests, came into his house, and he arose at night and shouted [vehifgin], and said: My vessels have been stolen, in which case it seems clear that he was the victim of theft. The Gemara rejects this rationale: On the contrary, the suspicion that he is lying should apply all the more so, as he has found a pretext for claiming that his property was stolen, and it should be suspected that he is taking advantage of the situation dishonestly.

Rav Kahana would conclude this halakha by stating in the name of Rav: The mishna is discussing a case where a group of people spent the night in his house. And there was a tunnel that had been burrowed into his house, and the people that stayed overnight as guests in his house left with bundles of vessels on their shoulders, and everyone says: So-and-so’s vessels were stolen. In such a case, there is clear evidence that the homeowner was the victim of theft.

The Gemara questions this explanation: But perhaps only vessels were stolen but scrolls were not. Why must the purchaser return the scrolls as well as the vessels? The Gemara answers that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The mishna is discussing a case where everyone is saying that scrolls were also stolen.

The Gemara asks: But let us suspect that perhaps only small scrolls were taken, while he is claiming that large scrolls were stolen. If this is the case, he is claiming scrolls that do not belong to him. The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: The mishna is discussing a case where people are saying: Such and such a scroll and such and such a scroll were stolen, i.e., it is known which scrolls were taken from the homeowner.

The Gemara questions this as well: But perhaps the scrolls that were stolen were old and had therefore depreciated in value, while he is claiming that new scrolls were taken. If so, he is claiming scrolls that do not belong to him. Rav said: The mishna is discussing a case where people say explicitly: These are so-and-so’s vessels and these are so-and-so’s scrolls. In this case it is known exactly which items were stolen.

The Gemara asks: And did Rav actually say this? But doesn’t Rav himself say that a burglar who came in and took vessels and left is exempt from paying for those items? What is the reason for this exemption? It is because he purchases them with his blood. Since a homeowner is allowed to kill a burglar, a burglar is exempt from returning the stolen items, based on the principle: One receives the greater punishment. Consequently, if the burglar himself is exempt, how can one who purchases an item from the burglar be required to return it?

The Gemara explains: This matter, that one who steals acquires what he stole, applies only to a burglar, as he initially subjected himself to be killed when he broke into the house. But concerning these thieves, who stayed overnight as guests of the homeowner, since they did not break into the house and thereby subject themselves to being killed, they are not exempt from returning the stolen item.

The Gemara notes that Rava says: We taught that all of these conditions must be met before the purchaser can be forced to return the item only with regard to a homeowner who is wont to sell his vessels, but with regard to a homeowner who is not wont to sell his vessels,