say that the baraita discusses a case involving a minor who has reached a stage in which when others humiliate him he feels humiliation.

MISHNA: One who humiliates a naked person, or one who humiliates a blind person, or one who humiliates a sleeping person is liable, but a sleeping person who humiliates another is exempt. If one fell from the roof onto another person, and thereby caused him damage and humiliated him, then the one who fell is liable for the indemnity of damage, since a person is always considered forewarned, and exempt from the indemnity of humiliation, since a person is not liable for humiliation unless he intends to humiliate the other person.

GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 9:12): If one humiliated another who was naked, he is liable, but the magnitude of humiliation felt when he humiliated him while naked is not comparable to the magnitude of humiliation felt had he humiliated him while clothed, since one who chooses to be naked is less sensitive to humiliation. Similarly, if one humiliated another in a bathhouse, he is liable, but the magnitude of humiliation felt when he humiliated him in a bathhouse is not comparable to the magnitude of humiliation felt had he humiliated him in the marketplace.

The Gemara clarifies the baraita: The Master says: If one humiliated another who was naked, the one who humiliated him is liable. The Gemara asks: Is a naked person subject to humiliation? Is it possible to humiliate him in this state? Rav Pappa said: What does the baraita mean when it says: Naked? It means a case where a gust of wind came and lifted his clothes, and then this one came and raised them higher and humiliated him.

The baraita also teaches: If one humiliated another in a bathhouse, he is liable. The Gemara asks: Is one in a bathhouse subject to humiliation? In a place where people stand naked, can a person be humiliated by having his clothes removed? Rav Pappa said: This is a case where he humiliated him not in an actual bathhouse, but on the bank of the river, which is a place where people behave more discreetly when they undress.

§ Rabbi Abba bar Memel raises a dilemma: If one humiliated another who was asleep, and he died before he awoke, so he never knew of his humiliation, what is the halakha? The Gemara asks: What is his dilemma? Rav Zevid said that this is his dilemma: Is the compensation for humiliation due to embarrassment, i.e., that his feelings suffer because of what he experienced, and this one died and does not have that feeling of embarrassment? Or perhaps the compensation for humiliation is due to disgrace, i.e., lessening of his honor in front of other people, and he disgraced him.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution to the dilemma from a baraita: Rabbi Meir says: A deaf-mute and a minor have the right to receive compensation for humiliation; an imbecile does not have the right to receive compensation for humiliation. The Gemara explains: Granted, if you say that the compensation is due to disgrace, this explanation is consistent with that which the baraita teaches concerning a minor, who can be disgraced; but if you say that the compensation is due to embarrassment, is a minor subject to humiliation?

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Rather, what do you mean by stating that the compensation is due to disgrace? If compensation is granted due to disgrace, then an imbecile should receive compensation as well. The Sages say in response: With regard to an imbecile, you can have no greater humiliation than this. It is impossible to degrade him further.

The Gemara returns to the original suggestion: In any case, resolve from this baraita that the compensation is due to disgrace, as, if it is due to embarrassment, is a minor subject to embarrassment? The Gemara rejects this proof: This is as Rav Pappa said with regard to a different halakha, cited later by the Gemara: The case involves a minor who has reached an age in which when others humiliate him he feels humiliation; here, too, say that this baraita discusses a case involving a minor who has reached an age in which when others humiliate him he feels humiliation. This is how Rav Zevid understands the dilemma of Rabbi Abba bar Memel.

Rav Pappa explains Rabbi Abba bar Memel’s dilemma differently: Rav Pappa said that this is his dilemma: Is the compensation for humiliation due to his own embarrassment, and this one died and was not embarrassed? Or perhaps the compensation for humiliation is due to his family’s humiliation, and therefore the one who humiliated him must pay compensation to his family?

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from the same baraita: A deaf-mute and a minor have the right to receive compensation for humiliation; an imbecile does not have the right to receive compensation for humiliation. The Gemara explains: Granted, if you say that the compensation is due to his family’s humiliation, this explanation is consistent with that which the baraita teaches concerning a minor, whose family can experience humiliation based on what was done to their relative; but if you say that the compensation is due to his own embarrassment, is a minor subject to humiliation?

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Rather, what do you mean by stating that the compensation is due to the humiliation of members of his family? If this is the case, an imbecile should receive compensation as well. The Sages say in response: If one is an imbecile, you can have no greater humiliation than this.

The Gemara returns to the original suggestion: In any case, resolve from this that the compensation is due to his family’s humiliation, as, if it is due to embarrassment, is a minor subject to embarrassment? Rav Pappa said: Yes, he is subject to embarrassment, as the baraita discusses a case involving a minor who has reached an age in which when others humiliate him he feels humiliation.

The Gemara adds: And this distinction is taught in a baraita, as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: A deaf-mute has the right to receive compensation for humiliation; an imbecile does not have the right to receive compensation for humiliation. With regard to a minor, sometimes he has the right to receive compensation for humiliation, and sometimes he does not have the right. Why is this so? This case where he has the right to receive compensation for humiliation is one involving a minor who has reached the stage in which when others humiliate him he feels humiliation; that case where he does not have the right to receive compensation for humiliation is one involving a minor who has not reached the stage in which when others humiliate him he feels humiliation.

§ The mishna teaches: One who humiliates a blind person is liable to pay compensation. The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: A blind person who humiliated another does not have liability for humiliation. And in this way Rabbi Yehuda deemed a blind person exempt from being among those liable to be exiled for killing unintentionally, and from being among those liable to receive lashes, and from being among those liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment, if he transgresses a prohibition for which the Torah mandates one of these punishments.

The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda? He derives a verbal analogy to: “Your eye shall not pity” (Deuteronomy 25:12), stated with regard to humiliation, from: “Your eye shall not pity” (Deuteronomy 19:21), stated with regard to conspiring witnesses. The analogy teaches that just as there, with regard to the halakha of conspiring witnesses, blind people are not included, as blind people cannot see events occur in order to testify, so too here, with regard to the halakha of compensation for humiliation, blind people are not included.

The Gemara continues its explanation: Why did Rabbi Yehuda deem a blind person exempt from being among those liable to be exiled for killing unintentionally? As it is taught in a baraita that the verse states with regard to an unintentional killing: “Or with any stone, whereby one may die, seeing him not” (Numbers 35:23), this formulation serves to exclude a blind person; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: The verse serves to include a blind person.

The Gemara explains the dispute: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda? He would say to you: The verse states with regard to an unintentional killing, without any further limiting clause: “As when one goes into the forest with his neighbor to hew wood” (Deuteronomy 19:5), and this includes even a blind person; therefore, the Merciful One wrote in the Torah: “Seeing him not” (Numbers 35:23), to exclude a blind person.

And what is the reasoning of Rabbi Meir? The Merciful One wrote in the Torah: “Seeing him not” (Numbers 35:23), apparently to exclude one who happened to not see the one he killed; and the Merciful One wrote in the Torah: “Who kills his neighbor unawares” (Deuteronomy 19:4), apparently to exclude a blind person, who is not aware of where others are standing. This is a restriction following a restriction, and there is a hermeneutical principle that a restriction following a restriction serves only to amplify the halakha and include additional cases. Therefore, a blind person is included in the halakha of those liable to be exiled for unintentional killing.

The Gemara asks: And what would Rabbi Yehuda respond to this reasoning? The Gemara explains: That verse: “Who kills his neighbor unawares,” does not exclude one who could not see, but rather, it comes to exclude one who was intending to kill a particular person and unintentionally killed someone else. That killer is not exiled.

The Gemara continues to explain the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Why did he deem a blind person exempt from being among those liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment? That halakha is derived by means of a verbal analogy to: “But if he smote him with an instrument of iron so that he died, he is a killer; the killer shall be put to death” (Numbers 35:16), written with regard to capital punishment, from: “You shall appoint for yourselves cities, to be cities of refuge for you, that a killer who killed any person unintentionally may flee there” (Numbers 35:11), written with regard to those liable to be exiled.

Why did Rabbi Yehuda deem a blind person exempt from being among those liable to receive lashes? That halakha is derived by means of a verbal analogy to: “Then it shall be, if the guilty one deserves to be beaten” (Deuteronomy 25:2), written with regard to lashes, from: “Moreover you shall take no ransom for the life of a murderer, that is guilty of death” (Numbers 35:31), written with regard to those liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment.

The Gemara presents another statement of Rabbi Yehuda: It is taught in another baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: A blind person does not have humiliation,