say that we require ordained judges [elohim] and there are not any ordained judges in Babylonia.

Rather, what is different about damage to an ox caused by an ox and damage to an ox caused by a man, so that Babylonian judges can rule in these cases even though they are not ordained? The difference is that we, the judges of Babylonia, perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael, just as we do with regard to the halakhot of admissions and loans, as we are permitted to rule in those cases as agents of the ordained judges in Eretz Yisrael. If so, then in cases of damage caused to a person by a person and cases of damage caused to a person by an ox as well, why not say that the judges of Babylonia perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael, just as it is with regard to the halakhot of admissions and loans?

The Sages state, with regard to the distinction: When we, the judges of Babylonia, perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael, we do so in matters where the ruling is clear to us; but in matters where the ruling is not clear to us, such as in the case of an injury to a person, which requires an appraisal, we do not perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael.

The Sages state an objection: In cases of damage caused to an ox by an ox, and damage caused to an ox by a man, cases that we do judge in Babylonia, the ruling is also not clear to us, as the damage must be appraised. Rather, how is the judgment assessed in those cases? We say: Go out and see how much an ox is sold for in the marketplace, and thereby assess the value of the damages, without a detailed appraisal. If so, in the case of damage caused to a person by a person, and damage caused to a person by an ox, say too: Go out and see how a slave is sold in the slave market. Why, then, are these latter cases not judged in Babylonia?

And furthermore, in the case of payment of double the principal incurred by a thief, and in the case of the fourfold or fivefold payment incurred by a thief who stole a sheep or ox and then slaughtered or sold the animal, where the payments are fixed and there is no need for an appraisal, we should perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael.

The Sages state, with regard to the distinction: When we perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael, we do so only in cases where the guilty party pays monetary restitution for a loss he caused. But in cases of a penalty, such as the double, fourfold, or fivefold payments of a thief, we do not perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael.

The Gemara asks: In cases of damage caused to a person by a person, where the liable party pays monetary restitution, should we perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael? The Gemara answers: When we perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael, we do so only in cases that are common. Therefore, in cases of damage caused to a person by a person, cases that are uncommon, we do not perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael.

The Gemara challenges: But accordingly, for indemnities paid to a woman for humiliation and degradation after being raped or seduced, a case that is common, we should perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael. The Sages say in response: Indeed, we do collect compensation for humiliation and degradation in Babylonia, as Rav Pappa collected four hundred dinars as compensation for humiliation when he judged these cases. The Gemara questions this explanation: But the other Sages do not agree with that ruling of Rav Pappa, as Rav Ḥisda sent this question to Rav Naḥman, asking if he should collect compensation for humiliation and degradation, and Rav Naḥman sent him the following reply: Ḥisda, Ḥisda, do you collect a penalty in Babylonia?

Rather, explain the distinction this way: When we perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael, we do so only in a matter that is common and involves, i.e., the payment is for, a monetary loss. But in a matter that is common but does not involve a monetary loss, or in an uncommon matter which does involve a monetary loss, we do not perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, in a case of an injury caused to a person by a person, even though it involves a monetary loss, since it is uncommon, we do not perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael. In a case of humiliation, even though it is common, since it does not involve a monetary loss, we do not perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael.

The Gemara challenges the halakha itself: But is it in fact the case that the courts in Babylonia collect restitution for damage caused to an ox by an ox? But doesn’t Rava say: If an ox caused damage, the courts in Babylonia do not collect the compensation. The Gemara clarifies: To whom did the ox cause damage? If we say that it damaged a person, why did Rava specifically state his halakha in a case where there is an ox that damaged a person? Even in a case of a person who damaged a person, which is more common, the court does not collect the compensation in Babylonia. Rather, it is obvious that Rava meant that the ox damaged an ox. And Rava teaches: The court does not collect the compensation in Babylonia.

The Sages say in response: There, Rava stated his ruling with regard to an innocuous ox, i.e., an ox that was not forewarned, whose owner pays for the damage as a penalty; and penalties are not collected in Babylonia. Here, Rava states his ruling with regard to a forewarned ox, and payment for damage it causes is not a penalty, but rather serves as compensation. The Gemara challenges: But doesn’t Rava say: There are no forewarned oxen in Babylonia, as an ox can be forewarned only by ordained judges? The Sages say in response: This is a case where an ox was forewarned there, in Eretz Yisrael, and then its owners brought it here, to Babylonia.

The Gemara objects: But this is an uncommon matter, as forewarned oxen are not frequently transported from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia. And with regard to an uncommon matter, did you not say that we do not perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael? The Gemara answers: This is a case where the Rabbis from there, i.e., Eretz Yisrael, who are ordained, came and declared this ox forewarned, here, i.e., in Babylonia. The Gemara challenges this interpretation: Ultimately, this is an uncommon matter, and you say that with regard to an uncommon matter that we do not perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael.

Rather, explain that when Rava says that courts in Babylonia collect restitution for damage caused by an ox, he means with regard to damage in the categories of Eating and Trampling, which are forewarned from the outset. All agree that since these are common forms of damage and involve monetary loss, the judges of Babylonia perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael and collect compensation for the damage.

§ The Gemara returns to its discussion of the mishna, which states: How is payment for pain assessed? If one burned another with a skewer or with a hot nail, or even if he burned him on his fingernail, where he would not cause a bruise that would affect the victim’s value on the slave market, the court evaluates how much money a person with a similar threshold for pain as the victim is willing to take in order to be made to suffer in this way. The Gemara comments: This teaches that even when the pain is not in a place that causes damage to the injured party, the one who caused the injury must pay compensation. The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught this statement? Rava said: This is the opinion of ben Azzai, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to the verse: “Keviyya for keviyya, a wound for a wound, ḥabura for ḥabura” (Exodus 21:25), Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: A burn [keviyya] is the first term stated in the verse, and ben Azzai says: A bruise [ḥabura] is the first term stated in the verse.

The Gemara explains the baraita: Ben Azzai certainly agrees that the first term in the verse, “keviyya,” means a burn. With regard to what do they disagree? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that “keviyya” indicates an injury with no bruise, and that one would be liable to pay for injuring another even in that manner; therefore, when the Merciful One writes in the Torah: “Ḥabura,” it is to reveal about the meaning of “keviyya” that if the burn also has a bruise, then yes, the one who caused the injury must pay compensation for pain; but if the burn has no bruise, then no, the one who caused the injury does not pay compensation for pain alone.

And ben Azzai holds that “keviyya” indicates a burn that also has a bruise, and that one would be liable to pay for injuring another only in that manner; therefore, when the Merciful One writes in the Torah: “Ḥabura,” it is to reveal about the meaning of “keviyya” that even if it is a burn with no bruise, the one who caused the injury must pay compensation for pain alone, even though there is no damage.

Rav Pappa objects to Rava’s explanation of the baraita: On the contrary, the opposite stands to reason, as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: A burn [keviyya] is the first term stated in the verse, since he holds that “keviyya” indicates a burn that also has a bruise, and one would be liable to pay for injuring another only in that manner. Therefore, when the Merciful One writes in the Torah: “Ḥabura,” it is to reveal about the meaning of “keviyya” that even if it is a burn with no bruise, the one who caused the injury must pay compensation for pain alone, even though there is no damage.

Rav Pappa continues: And ben Azzai says that a bruise [ḥabura] is the first term stated in the verse, as he holds that “keviyya” indicates an injury with no bruise, and that one would be liable to pay for injuring another even in that manner. Therefore, when the Merciful One writes in the Torah: “Ḥabura,” it is to reveal about the meaning of “keviyya” that if the burn also has a bruise, then yes, the one who caused the injury must pay compensation for pain; but if the burn has no bruise, then no, the one who caused the injury does not pay compensation for pain alone. And according to this explanation, the statements of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and ben Azzai with regard to the meaning of the terms in the verse are based on their final understanding of the verse. The term: The first term stated, is referring to the understanding of the first term after the second term has been written, not what the understanding of the first term would have been if not for the addition of the second term. According to the explanation of Rav Pappa, the mishna here is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

The Gemara offers another explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and ben Azzai: Alternatively, everyone agrees that “keviyya” indicates an injury whether there is a bruise or whether there is not a bruise. And here,