that the mother animal became impregnated from an animal with non-cloven hooves that was born from a kosher mother and father. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that the offspring resulting from this, which does not have cloven hooves, is not kosher. Since the animal’s father is not kosher according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, the offspring is also not kosher, in accordance with Rava’s principle.

Rava raises a dilemma: With regard to one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt-offering, and he subsequently set aside a bull for this purpose, and another person came and stole the bull, can the thief exempt himself from liability by repaying the owner with a sheep, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, or by repaying him with a bird to be used as a bird burnt-offering, according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya? This is as we learned in a mishna (Menaḥot 107a): If one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt-offering, he must bring a bull or a sheep as a burnt-offering to fulfill his vow. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: He may even bring a turtledove or a young pigeon as a burnt-offering.

Rava elaborates: What is the halakha in this case? Do we say that he accepted upon himself to sacrifice an animal with the status of a burnt-offering, in which case any animal that fulfills this requirement will suffice? If so, the thief may compensate the owner with a sheep or bird, as the owner can sacrifice that animal as a burnt-offering. Or perhaps the owner can say to the thief: I want to perform the mitzva in the optimal manner, which is by sacrificing a bull. Therefore, you must pay me back with a bull.

After he raised the dilemma, Rava himself subsequently resolved it: The thief can exempt himself from liability by repaying the owner with a sheep, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, or by repaying him with a bird to be used as a bird burnt-offering, according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, teaches this halakha explicitly, i.e., without the question-and-answer format: Rava says: With regard to one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt-offering, and he subsequently set aside a bull for this purpose, and another person came and stole the bull, the thief can exempt himself from liability by repaying the owner with a sheep, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, or by repaying him with a bird to be used as a bird burnt-offering, according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.

MISHNA: If a thief sold a stolen animal in a partial fashion, e.g., except for one one-hundredth of it, which he kept for himself; or if he had a partnership in owning the animal before stealing it; or in the case of a thief who slaughtered the stolen animal and it became non-kosher meat in his hand because he slaughtered it improperly; or in the case of a thief who ripped open the animal rather than slaughtering it halakhically; or in the case of a thief who tore loose the gullet or windpipe of the animal as he slaughtered it, rendering the slaughter invalid, in all these cases he pays the double payment but does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. The fourfold or fivefold payment applies only if the animal is entirely sold or if it is slaughtered in accordance with the halakhic definition of animal slaughter.

GEMARA: What does the mishna mean when it states that the thief sold the animal except for one one-hundredth of it? Which part of the animal must the thief keep for himself for him to be exempt from the fourfold or fivefold payment? Rav says: The mishna means that he sold it except for some part of the animal that becomes permitted through its slaughter. This does not apply to horns or a sheep’s fleece, which do not require slaughter in order to be used. And Levi says: The mishna’s statement applies even if the thief sold the entire animal except for its fleece. And it is likewise taught in a baraita: The thief is exempt even if he sells the whole animal except for its fleece.

The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rav from a baraita: If the thief sold the whole animal except for its foreleg, or except for its hind leg, or except for its horn, or except for its fleece, he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: If the thief sells the animal except for some part of it whose absence invalidates its slaughter, he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi continues: But if he leaves out from the sale a part of the animal whose absence does not invalidate the slaughter, he pays the fourfold or fivefold payment. If an animal is missing one of its vital organs, e.g., its liver, one of its intestines, its gullet, or its windpipe, it is considered already dead and its slaughter at this stage would be invalid. For the thief to be exempt from the fourfold or fivefold payment on the grounds of an incomplete sale, he must retain one of these organs for himself.

The baraita continues: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: If the thief sells the whole animal except for its horn, he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. If he sells the whole animal except for its fleece, he does pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.

The Gemara explains the objection from this baraita: Granted, according to the opinion of Levi this baraita does not present a difficulty, as his ruling is exactly like that of the first tanna. But according to the opinion of Rav it does present a difficulty, as in accordance with whose opinion does his ruling accord? None of the three opinions expressed in the baraita correlate with that of Rav.

The Sages say in response: Rav says his opinion in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it is taught in another baraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: If the thief sold the entire animal except for its foreleg or except for its hind leg, he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. If he sold the entire animal except for its horn or except for its fleece, he does pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.

The Gemara analyzes the four opinions of the tanna’im presented in these baraitot. With regard to what principle do they disagree? The first tanna holds that when the Torah states: “If a man steals an ox or a sheep, and slaughters it or sells it, he shall pay five oxen for an ox and four sheep for a sheep” (Exodus 21:37), the term “and slaughters it” indicates that we require him to slaughter all of it for him to incur liability to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. Likewise, the term “or sells it” teaches that we require him to sell all of it, not leaving any portion at all for himself, even the fleece.

And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the term “and slaughters it” is referring to parts of the animal that are affected by its slaughter, which serves to exclude parts of the animal that are not affected by its slaughter. When the Torah immediately adds the term “or sells it,” this indicates that selling is similar to slaughter. Consequently, if the sale excludes the animal’s fleece or horns, i.e., those parts that are not affected by slaughter, there is still fourfold or fivefold payment.

And Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds, according to the first version of his opinion, that the animal’s horn, which is not meant to be cut off in the animal’s lifetime, is considered a significant withholding if the thief keeps that part for himself, and he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. By contrast, fleece, which is meant to be cut off in the animal’s lifetime, is not considered a significant withholding if the thief keeps it for himself, and therefore he must pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.

And the other tanna of the school of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds that the animal’s forelegs and hind legs, which require slaughter for them to be put to their usual use, i.e., for eating, are considered a significant withholding if the thief keeps one of them for himself, and consequently he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. By contrast, its horns and its fleece, which do not require slaughter in order to be used, are not considered a significant withholding if the thief keeps them for himself.

The Gemara asks: This presents a difficulty, as there is a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar and another opinion presented in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. The Gemara answers: The two rulings represent the reports of two tanna’im, and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.

The Sages taught in a baraita: One who steals an animal that is missing a limb, or that is lame, or that is blind, and he subsequently sold it, and similarly, one who steals an animal belonging to several partners and he subsequently sold it, is liable to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. But several partners who stole an animal together and sell it are exempt from the fourfold or fivefold payment. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in another baraita to the contrary, that several partners who stole an animal together and sell it are liable to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment?

The Gemara resolves the contradiction: Rav Naḥman said that this is not difficult. Here, where the baraita states that he is exempt, it is referring to one partner who stole an animal from another partner. There, where the baraita states that he is liable, it is dealing with a partner, who, together with other thieves, stole an animal from someone else outside their group.

Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman from another baraita: One might have thought that a partner who stole an animal from another partner and slaughtered it, and likewise partners who jointly stole an animal and one of them slaughtered it, should be liable to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. To counter this, the verse states: “And slaughters it,” which indicates that we require liability for slaughtering all of it, and in these cases it is not so. One who steals an animal that he partly owns is not liable for slaughtering his own portion. Likewise, when several partners steal an animal, the one who slaughters it is not liable for slaughtering the portions of his fellow thieves.

Rather, Rav Naḥman said a different resolution of the contradiction: This is not difficult. Both baraitot are speaking of partners who together stole an animal from someone else. Here, where the baraita states that the thief is liable, it is referring to a partner who slaughtered the animal with the knowledge and consent of another partner. In such a case the one slaughtering is acting as the agent of the partner as well and is fully liable for the slaughter. There, where the baraita states that the thief is exempt, it is speaking of a partner who slaughtered the animal without the knowledge of another partner in the theft. Consequently, the one slaughtering is acting solely on his own and is not liable for the slaughter of his partner’s share, which is why he is exempt from any payment.

§ Rabbi Yirmeya raises several dilemmas: If the thief sold the animal except for thirty days, i.e., the thief reserved the right to use the animal himself for thirty days before the sale takes effect, what is the halakha? If he sold it except for its work, i.e., he stipulated with the buyer that any work the animal performs would be for the thief’s own benefit and profit, what is the halakha? If he stole a pregnant animal and sold it except for its fetus, what is the halakha?

The Gemara elaborates on the last dilemma: According to the one who says that a fetus is considered as its mother’s thigh, i.e., a part of its mother, you should not raise the dilemma, as it is clear that the thief, by retaining the fetus, has withheld part of the animal. When you should raise the dilemma, it is according to the opinion of the one who says that a fetus is not considered as its mother’s thigh, i.e., it has the status of an independent being. What is the halakha in this case? Do we say that since it is in fact attached to the mother, if the thief keeps the fetus for himself it is considered a significant withholding? Or perhaps, since it stands to become detached from the mother it is not considered a significant withholding?

There are those who state a different analysis of this dilemma: Since a fetus is not considered as its mother’s thigh, it is not considered a significant withholding, or perhaps, since it needs its mother to be rendered permitted for consumption through the mother’s slaughter, it is considered as though the thief has withheld a part of the mother’s body. The Gemara concludes: All these dilemmas shall stand unresolved.

Rav Pappa raises a dilemma: If one stole an animal, severed one of its limbs, and then sold it, what is the halakha? Do we say that the essential factor is that part of what he stole he has not sold, as the missing limb was not sold, and therefore he is exempt from the fourfold or fivefold payment? Or perhaps the essential factor is that with regard to that which he sold he has not withheld any part for himself. Once again, the Gemara states that this dilemma shall stand unresolved.

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: If one stole an animal and gave it to another and that person slaughtered it for him, or if he stole an animal and gave it to another and that person sold it for him, the thief is liable to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment, as performing these actions through an agent is equivalent to performing them by oneself.