this reason that the Rabbis exempt the thief from the fourfold or fivefold payment when he slaughters the animal on Shabbat, as slaughter on Shabbat does not render the meat permitted for consumption. But according to the one who says that the product of a prohibited act on Shabbat may be eaten by Torah law but is forbidden by rabbinic law, why do the Rabbis exempt the thief when he appoints an agent to slaughter the animal for him and the agent performs this action on Shabbat?

The Gemara answers: When the Rabbis exempt him from the fourfold or fivefold payment, they are not referring to the case where the thief’s agent slaughters the animal on Shabbat. Rather, they were speaking of the rest of the cases listed in the baraita, namely, an agent who slaughters the animal for idol worship and one who slaughters an ox that is sentenced to be stoned.

The Gemara asks another question with regard to the interpretation of the baraita presented above: And with regard to Rabbi Meir, granted he maintains that the legal status of an act of slaughter not fit for accomplishing its full ritual purpose is nevertheless considered an act of slaughter. But why is the thief liable to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment when his agent slaughters the animal for idol worship?

Once he slaughtered the animal a bit, at the very start of the act of slaughter, he has prohibited the animal, with regard to deriving benefit, as an animal sacrificed to idolatry. When he slaughters the other part it is already prohibited with regard to deriving benefit, which means that it is not an animal that belongs to its owner that he slaughters, and it is not an animal that belongs to him that he slaughters. Since deriving benefit from the animal is prohibited, it has no value; therefore, there is no ownership.

Rava said: This is referring to one who says prior to the slaughter that only with the completion of the slaughter does he worship the idolatry. Therefore, the prohibition does not take effect until that stage, which is also when the liability to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment is incurred.

The Gemara raises a question with regard to another of the cases of the baraita: An ox that is sentenced to be stoned is an item from which deriving benefit is prohibited. Consequently, when a thief or his agent slaughters this animal, it is not an animal that belongs to its owner that he slaughters, and it is not an animal that belongs to him that he slaughters. Why does Rabbi Meir obligate him to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment?

Rava said: With what are we dealing here? This is a case where the owners entrusted the ox to a bailee and the ox fatally injured someone while in the bailee’s house, and it was forewarned while in the bailee’s house, and it was sentenced to be stoned while in the bailee’s house, and the thief then stole it from the bailee’s house and slaughtered it. Rava continues: And Rabbi Meir holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ya’akov, and he also holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.

He holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ya’akov, who says: Even after the ox was sentenced to be stoned, if the bailee returned it to its owners before it was killed, it is considered returned. Although the ox is now worthless, as no benefit may be derived from it, since the bailee returned a physically intact ox, the owner has no claim against him.

And Rabbi Meir also holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says: An item whose elimination causes financial loss is considered to have monetary value. With regard to an item that is otherwise worthless, if its elimination causes monetary loss due to the fact that it must be replaced, it is considered to be of value. In this case, although the ox is worthless in and of itself, when the thief slaughters it he prevents the bailee from returning it intact to the owner and causes him to be obligated to pay the owner the value of the ox before it was sentenced to be stoned. Consequently, the thief must reimburse the bailee, as the ox effectively has value for that bailee.

As we learned in a mishna (74b): Rabbi Shimon says: In the case of sacrificial animals for which the owner bears financial responsibility to replace any of them with another animal if it is lost or it dies, the thief is obligated to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment if he slaughters the animal. Although one is generally not liable to pay the double payment for stealing consecrated items, Rabbi Shimon maintains that this case is different, since as a result of the animal’s theft the owner sustains a loss by being required to substitute another animal for it. Since the animal’s loss has financial ramifications for the owner apart from any inherent value it has, it has value for him. Apparently, Rabbi Shimon holds that an item whose elimination causes financial loss is considered to have monetary value.

Rav Kahana said: I recited this halakha, according to which the mishna follows the opinion of Rabbi Meir, in front of Rav Zevid of Neharde’a, and I asked him: Is it correct to say that you can establish the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? But isn’t it taught in the last clause of the mishna: Rabbi Shimon exempts the thief from the fourfold or fivefold payment in these last two cases. One can learn by inference that in all the rest of the cases in the mishna, apart from these two, Rabbi Shimon concedes that the thief pays the fourfold or fivefold payment.

Rav Zevid said to him: No; that is not the correct inference from the mishna. Rather, by inference one can learn only that Rabbi Shimon concedes that the thief pays the fourfold or fivefold payment in the cases mentioned immediately prior to this one, specifically in a case where the thief slaughtered or sold the animal in order that it should be used for medicinal purposes or for feeding to dogs. Therefore, it can be correct to establish the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir and not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.

§ The mishna teaches: If one stole an animal of his father’s and then slaughtered or sold it, and afterward his father died, he pays the fourfold or fivefold payment to his father’s other heirs. Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: If one stole an ox belonging to two partners and slaughtered it, and subsequently admitted the theft to one of the partners, which means that he is exempt from paying the fourfold or fivefold payment to that partner, in accordance with the principle that one who admits his own guilt is exempt from fines, what is the halakha with regard to payment to the other partner?

The Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: The Merciful One states in the Torah: “He shall pay five oxen for an ox” (Exodus 21:37), which indicates five full oxen, but not five half-oxen. Or perhaps when the Merciful One states “five oxen,” this means that even five half-oxen must be paid in a case of this kind. Rav Naḥman said to Rava: The Merciful One states: “Five oxen,” which means five full oxen, but not five half-oxen.

Rava raised an objection to him from the mishna: If one stole an animal of his father’s and then slaughtered or sold it, and afterward his father died, he pays the fourfold or fivefold payment. But here, since his father died and the thief has inherited part of the stolen animal himself, it is similar to the case of one who stole from two partners and went ahead and admitted the theft to one of them, i.e., to himself. In the case of the mishna he is exempt from paying the portion of the fine that is for himself, and yet the mishna teaches that he pays the other heirs their portion of the fourfold or fivefold payment.

Rav Naḥman said to Rava: With what are we dealing here? With a case where his father stood against his son the thief in his trial, and the son was convicted for the theft and slaughter of his father’s animal. In this case, the liability to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment was established before the father’s death, and at that time the payment was five full oxen.

Rava asked him: And if the thief had not yet stood trial before the father’s death, what would be the halakha, according to your opinion? Would he not be required to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment? If so, rather than teaching in the latter clause of the mishna (74b): If one stole his father’s animal and the father died, and afterward he slaughtered or sold it, he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment; let the mishna make a distinction within the same type of case, as follows: In what case is this statement, i.e., that the thief is required to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment, said? It is when the thief stood trial in his father’s lifetime; but if he did not stand trial in his father’s lifetime he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.

Rav Naḥman said to him: Indeed, the mishna could have mentioned that case. However, since the tanna of the mishna has to cite the first clause, which discusses one who stole an animal of his father’s and slaughtered or sold it, and afterward his father died, he cites the latter clause as well, by means of a similar case: If one stole his father’s animal and his father died, and afterward he slaughtered or sold the animal.

This discussion between Rava and Rav Naḥman occurred in the evening. On the following morning, Rav Naḥman retracted his statement and said to Rava: The Merciful One states: “Five oxen,” and this means that even five half-oxen are included. Rav Naḥman explained his change of mind: And the reason that I did not say this to you last night