But if the owner of the cross beam stopped, causing the barrel to collide with the beam and break, the former is liable, since the latter had no way of anticipating that he would stop. And if he said to the owner of the barrel: Stop, he is exempt from liability for breaking the barrel.

Conversely, if the owner of the barrel was walking first and the owner of the cross beam last, and the barrel was broken by the cross beam, the owner of the cross beam is liable. But if owner of the barrel stopped, the owner of the cross beam is exempt from liability for breaking the barrel. And if he said to the owner of the cross beam: Stop, the owner of the cross beam is liable. And similarly, these halakhot apply in a case where this one came with his lamp and that one came with his flax, and the lamp set fire to the flax.

GEMARA: Rabba bar Natan asked Rav Huna: With regard to one who causes injury to his wife during sexual intercourse, what is the halakha? Is he liable to pay damages? Is it reasoned that since he is acting in a permitted manner he is exempt, or perhaps he should pay attention and be more careful?

Rav Huna said to Rabba bar Natan: You learned this halakha in the mishna concerning one person walking with a cross beam and another with a barrel, which rules that the owner of the cross beam is exempt because this one had permission to walk and that one also had permission to walk. Similarly, since the husband has permission to engage in intercourse with his wife, if he injures her in the process he is exempt.

Rava disagreed with Rav Huna’s opinion and said: The husband is liable due to an a fortiori inference from the halakha with regard to manslaughter, as it is stated in the Torah: “As when a man goes into the forest with his neighbor to chop wood…and the head slips off the helve, and finds his neighbor, and he dies; he shall flee to one of these cities and live” (Deuteronomy 19:5). And just as in the forest, where this person entered his domain and that person entered his domain, as it is the domain of the public, and nevertheless the one who kills unintentionally is considered like one who entered another’s domain and is therefore liable to be exiled to a city of refuge, then with regard to this husband, who actually enters another’s domain, all the more so is it not clear that he should be liable for the injury he causes her?

The Gemara raises an objection to Rava’s opinion: But what of this mishna, which teaches that the owner of the cross beam is exempt, as this one had permission to walk and that one had permission to walk, and Rav Huna inferred from here that the husband is likewise exempt.

The Gemara answers: The two cases are different. There, in the case in the mishna, both sides were similarly walking, and the one who caused the damage is therefore exempt due to his right to walk there. By contrast, here, the husband is the only active participant in the intercourse. Therefore, since he is the one performing an action, he is liable even though he is acting with permission.

The Gemara asks: And is she not considered an active participant? But isn’t it written with regard to forbidden sexual intercourse: “Even the souls that do them shall be cut off from among their people” (Leviticus 18:29), indicating that both the man and woman are considered to be performing an action?

The Gemara answers: The verse is referring to the fact that they both have pleasure from the act. The woman’s pleasure is tantamount to active transgression, and she is therefore punished if she participates willfully. But with regard to a wife’s injury, he is the one who is considered to be performing an action, and he is therefore liable.

§ The mishna teaches: In a case where the owner of the cross beam was walking first and the owner of the barrel was walking behind him, if the barrel was broken by the cross beam, the owner of the cross beam is exempt. Reish Lakish says: If two cows were in the public domain, one of them prone and one walking, and the cow that was walking kicked the cow that was prone, its owner is exempt. If the prone cow kicked the cow that was walking, its owner is liable to pay.

Let us say that the mishna supports this statement, as it states: If the owner of the cross beam was first and the owner of the barrel was last, and the barrel was broken by the cross beam, he is exempt. But if the owner of the cross beam stopped, the owner of the cross beam is liable. The Gemara explains the proof: But here, it is clear that it is like a case where the prone cow kicked the cow that was walking, since the one carrying the barrel was walking and the one carrying the cross beam stopped in the public domain, causing damage to the former. And the mishna teaches in this case that the owner of the cross beam is liable.

The Gemara responds: And how can you understand that reasoning? You wanted to support the statement of Reish Lakish from the mishna. Not only does it not support Reish Lakish; it even raises a difficulty to his opinion. The reason Reish Lakish stated that the owner of the prone cow is liable is that it kicked the walking cow; but if the walking cow was damaged because by itself it collided with the prone cow, he would be exempt. But the mishna discusses a case where the one carrying the barrel ran into the cross beam by himself, without the one carrying the cross beam actively hitting it, and it teaches that the owner of the cross beam is nevertheless liable.

The Gemara explains: The mishna is referring to a case where the cross beam blocked the entire width of the road like a carcass. Since the one carrying the barrel could not avoid it, the one carrying the cross beam is liable although he did not actively break the barrel. By contrast, here, Reish Lakish’s statement is referring to a case where the cow was lying down on one side of the public domain, and the other cow should have walked on the other, unobstructed side. Therefore, if the damage is caused only as a result of their collision, the owner of the prone cow is exempt.

The Gemara suggests: Rather, it is the latter clause of the mishna that supports Reish Lakish’s statement, as it teaches: Conversely, if the owner of the barrel was walking first and the owner of the cross beam last, and the barrel was broken by the cross beam, the owner of the cross beam is liable. But if the owner of the barrel stopped, the owner of the cross beam is exempt from liability for breaking the barrel. But here, it is clear that it is like a case where the walking cow kicked the prone cow. And the mishna teaches that the owner of the cross beam is exempt, lending support to Reish Lakish’s ruling.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: The mishna exempts the one carrying the cross beam because he was walking in his normal manner when he hit the barrel. Here, perhaps the owner of the prone cow can say to the owner of the walking cow: Although you have permission to walk over me, i.e., for your cow to walk over my cow, you have no permission to kick me, i.e., for your cow to kick my cow.

MISHNA: With regard to two people who were walking in the public domain, or one who was running and another one who was walking, or who were both running, and they damaged one another, both of them are exempt.

GEMARA: The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Isi ben Yehuda. As it is taught in a baraita: Isi ben Yehuda says that one who runs in the public domain and causes damage is liable to pay for any damage he causes because his behavior is unusual in the public domain. And Isi concedes with regard to one who runs and causes damage at twilight on the eve of Shabbat that he is exempt, because he is running with permission.

Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Isi ben Yehuda. The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say this, that if one runs and causes damage he is liable? But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say, as a principle, that the halakha is in accordance with an unattributed mishna? And we learned in this mishna that if one was running and the other one was walking, or if they were both running, they are exempt.

The Gemara answers: The mishna, which exempts one who was running, is referring to twilight on the eve of Shabbat, when people are permitted to run in the public domain.

The Gemara explains: From where is it inferred that the mishna is referring to twilight on the eve of Shabbat? It is inferred from the fact that it teaches: Or who were both running, they are exempt. Why do I need this case as well? Now that the mishna teaches that if one was running and the other one was walking, the one running is exempt, is it necessary to state that he is exempt when both of them were running? Rather, this is what the mishna is saying: If one was running and the other one was walking, he is exempt. In what case is this statement said? It is said with regard to twilight on the eve of Shabbat, when running in the public domain is permitted. But on a weekday, if one was running and the other one was walking, the one who was running is liable. If both were running, even on a weekday, they are exempt. This emendation explains the need to mention the case where both were running.

The Master said above: And Isi concedes with regard to one who runs and causes damage at twilight on the eve of Shabbat that he is exempt, because he is running with permission. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that running at twilight on the eve of Shabbat is considered to be with permission?

The Gemara answers: It is like that which Rabbi Ḥanina would say, as Rabbi Ḥanina would say at twilight on the eve of Shabbat: