One who intended to lift a plant detached from the ground on Shabbat and mistakenly severed a plant still attached to the ground, which under other circumstances constitutes performance of the prohibited labor of reaping, is exempt from bringing a sin-offering for his mistaken act, since he did not intend to perform an act of cutting. One who performs an action unawares [mitasek], i.e., he had no intention to perform the act at all, incurs no liability whatsoever. One who intended to cut a detached plant and unwittingly severed a plant still attached to the ground, Rava said: He too is exempt. Abaye said: He is liable. The Gemara elaborates: Rava said that he is exempt because he did not intend to perform an act of prohibited severing. He intended to perform an action completely permitted on Shabbat. He had no misconception with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat. It was merely a mistaken act. And Abaye said that he is liable because he intended to perform a standard act of cutting. Since he intended to perform that act, and he carried out his intent, the Torah characterizes it as unwitting and not as unawares.

Rava said: From where do I derive to say this opinion? As it was taught in a baraita: There is a stricture with regard to the prohibitions of Shabbat that is greater than the stricture with regard to other mitzvot, and a stricture with regard to other mitzvot that is greater than the stricture with regard to Shabbat. The Gemara elaborates: A stricture with regard to Shabbat that is greater than the stricture with regard to other mitzvot is that, with regard to Shabbat, one who performed two transgressions on Shabbat, even if he did so in the course of one lapse of awareness, is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every one, which is not the case in other mitzvot. In other mitzvot, if an individual commits a transgression several times in the course of one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring only one sin-offering. And a stricture with regard to other mitzvot that is greater than the stricture with regard to Shabbat is that, with regard to other mitzvot, one who performs an act unwittingly without intent is liable, which is not the case with regard to Shabbat. Apparently, the phrase unwittingly without intent refers to the case disputed by Abaye and Rava. Therefore, this is proof for Rava’s opinion that, with regard to Shabbat, one who acts unawares, i.e., whose action resulted from involvement in another matter and who had no intention to perform an action that is prohibited, is not considered to have performed an unwitting act.

Before the Gemara discusses the baraita in the context of the dispute between Abaye and Rava, the Gemara analyzes its text. The Master said in the baraita: A stricture with regard to Shabbat that is greater than the stricture with regard to other mitzvot is that, with regard to Shabbat, one who performed two transgressions on Shabbat, even in the course of one lapse of awareness, is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every one, which is not the case with regard to other mitzvot. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If you say that he unwittingly performed acts of reaping and grinding on Shabbat, the corresponding situation with regard to other mitzvot is a case where he ate forbidden fat and blood. If so, there is no difference between Shabbat and other mitzvot. Here one is liable to bring two sin-offerings and here one is liable to bring two sin-offerings. Rather, what are the circumstances in other mitzvot where he is liable to bring only one sin-offering? It is in a case where he ate forbidden fat and again ate forbidden fat within one lapse of awareness. The corresponding situation with regard to Shabbat is a case where one performed an act of reaping and performed another act of reaping within one lapse of awareness. However, in that case too there is no difference between Shabbat and other mitzvot. Here one is liable to bring one sin-offering, and here one is liable to bring one sin-offering.

The Gemara explains: Actually, it is referring to a case where one performed acts of reaping and grinding. And what is the meaning of the phrase: Which is not the case with regard to other mitzvot? It is not referring to all mitzvot in general. It is referring to the prohibition of idolatry, which is comprised of separate component prohibitions, each of which incurs independent liability. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ami, as Rabbi Ami said: One who sacrificed to idolatry, and burned incense before it, and poured wine as a libation before it in the course of one lapse of awareness is liable to bring only one sin-offering. That is the ruling, even though, had he performed those rites separately, he would be liable to bring a sin-offering for each. That, then, is the stricture of other mitzvot relative to Shabbat.

The Gemara asks: In what case did you establish the baraita, in the case of idolatry? If so, state the latter clause and determine whether that explanation applies there as well. The latter clause states: A stricture with regard to other mitzvot that is greater than the stricture with regard to Shabbat is that, with regard to other mitzvot, one who performs an act unwittingly without intent is liable, which is not the case with regard to Shabbat. One who acts unawares with no intent to perform a prohibited act is not considered to have performed an unwitting act. That case of performing an act unwittingly without intent with regard to idolatry, what are the circumstances? If you say that it is referring to a case where he thought that it was a synagogue and bowed to it, and it turned out that he bowed to idolatry, he committed no transgression. Since his heart was directed toward Heaven, it is not even an unwitting transgression. Rather, it is referring to a case where he saw a statue [andarta] in the image of the king and bowed to it. What are the circumstances? If the baraita is referring to a case in which he bowed because he accepted that image upon himself as a god, he worshipped idolatry intentionally and is not liable to bring a sin-offering. And if he did not accept that image upon himself as a god and bowed merely in deference to the monarch, it is meaningless and is not an act of idolatry.

Rather, it is referring to a case where one bowed due to love of someone who requested that he bow before the statue and due to fear of someone coercing him to do so. He is under the impression that unless he wholeheartedly has the intention to worship the idol, there is no prohibition involved. This works out well according to the opinion of Abaye, who said: One who bows due to love or fear is liable to bring a sin-offering. However, according to the opinion of Rava, who said: One who bows due to love or fear is exempt from bringing a sin-offering, what can be said? According to Rava’s opinion, the problem remains. There is no case in which there is a difference between the ruling in the case of idolatry and the ruling in the case of Shabbat. Rather, it is referring to a case where one says to himself that this is permitted. He is under the impression that idolatry is permitted, and his unwitting act was the result of ignorance, not forgetfulness. The statement in the baraita: Which is not the case with regard to Shabbat, is referring to one who was under the impression that performing labors on Shabbat is permitted. One who performs prohibited labors under those circumstances is completely exempt.

That conclusion contradicts another statement of Rava. With regard to one who is unaware of both the essence of Shabbat and the individual prohibited labors, Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman only whether to deem him liable to bring one or whether to deem him liable to bring two sin-offerings. However, the possibility to exempt him completely did not enter Rava’s mind. That explanation of the baraita is incompatible with Rava’s opinion.