The Gemara answers: Rav Pappa holds that when Rav said that a transfer in the presence of all three parties is effective, it is no different if this is referring to a loan from the first party to the second party, where it is an abstract monetary obligation that is transferred, and it is no different if it is referring to a deposit, where specific money is transferred. Just as the transfer is effective in the case of a loan, in which there is an abstract monetary obligation, it would be effective even if the money were not piled. For this reason, Rav Pappa explained that the mishna is referring to piled money due to the concern about a collection of a buried one hundred dinars.

The Gemara asks the reverse question: What is the reason that Rav Zevid did not say in accordance with the explanation of Rav Pappa? The Gemara answers: He holds that it is not possible to establish the mishna as referring to a person on his deathbed. From where does he learn this? It is from the fact that it teaches: In the case of one who says: Give this bill of divorce to my wife, or: Give this bill of manumission to my slave, and then he dies, one should not give it after his death.

The Gemara infers: The reason for this ruling is that the man died. However, if it was while he was still alive then one gives the document. The Gemara continues: Even during his lifetime the reason for the ruling is specifically that he said: Give, but if he did not say: Give, and merely commanded: Write a bill of divorce, then one does not give it. But this is not the case with regard to a person on his deathbed, as, although he did not say: Give, but simply commanded: Write, nevertheless, one gives the document. Evidently, this halakha cannot be referring to a person on his deathbed.

As we learned in a mishna (65b): Initially the Sages would say: With regard to one who is taken out in a neck chain to be executed and said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, these people should write and give her the document. Although he did not explicitly say: Give, this is understood to have been his intention. They then said that this halakha applies even to one who sets sail and one who departs in a caravan to a far-off place. A bill of divorce is given to his wife under these circumstances even if her husband said just: Write.

Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: Even in the case of one who is dangerously ill who gives that instruction, they write the bill of divorce and give it to his wife. This shows that a dying person need not say: Give. Rather, it is sufficient for him to say: Write. By contrast, the mishna indicates that it is referring to one who says: Give, and therefore it is certainly not speaking about a dying person.

Rav Ashi objects to this claim: And who says to us that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri? Perhaps it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who did not include a dangerously ill person in their list of those who are not required to say: Give. If so, it is possible that the mishna is referring to a person on his deathbed after all.

The Gemara discusses the matter itself. Rav Huna says that Rav says: With regard to one who says to another: I have one hundred dinars in your possession; give it to so-and-so, if this occurred in the presence of all three parties, that third person has acquired it. Rava said: It stands to reason that Rav’s statement is with regard to a deposit, when the owner of the deposit instructs its guardian to transfer specific money under his authority to someone else who is also present. However, in the case of a loan, no, one cannot dispense with an act of acquisition, as repayment of a loan does not involve specific money.

Rava himself adds, in the form of an oath: But by God, in truth, Rav said this halakha even with regard to a loan. The Gemara adds: It was also stated that Shmuel said in the name of Levi that if someone says to another: I have a loan in your possession, i.e., you owe me payment for a loan, give it to so-and-so, and this occurred in the presence of all three parties, that named person has acquired it.

The Gemara asks: And what is the reason for this? In what manner does he acquire it? Ameimar said: The case becomes like that of a borrower who says to a lender at the time of the giving of the money, when he receives a loan: I am beholden to you and to anyone who comes based on your authorization. In this case, the recipient is authorized by the lender to take the loan in the presence of all three parties.

Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: If that is so, that the borrower’s obligation to the third party went into effect at the time of the loan, then if he transferred it in the presence of the three parties to those who will be born, i.e., people who were not yet born when the money was initially given, the halakha should also be that the recipients do not acquire it. The reason is that at the time the lender gave the money to the borrower, the person to whom it would eventually be transferred did not yet exist, and therefore the borrower could not have become obligated to him at that point in time.

Rav Ashi elaborates: As, even according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that a person can transfer ownership of an entity that has not yet come into the world, this statement applies only when he transfers it to an entity, i.e., a person, that has come into the world. However, even Rabbi Meir agrees with regard to the transfer of ownership of an article to an entity that has not yet come into the world, that this is not possible. Since Rav issued his statement in a general manner without any limitations, evidently the method of a transfer in the presence of all three parties applies in all cases, regardless of whether the third party was born at the time when the loan was given.

Rather, Rav Ashi says that this is the reason for the matter: