similar to the case of an amulet worn for healing purposes. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from it that this is the correct understanding.

The Gemara further examines the baraita cited earlier. The Master said: Nor may an animal go out with an amulet on Shabbat, even if the amulet proved effective. The Gemara asks: Didn’t we learn in a mishna: One may not go out on Shabbat with an amulet that has not proved effective? By inference: If the amulet proved effective, he may well do so. The Gemara answers: Here too, it is referring to an amulet that has not proved effective.

The Gemara asks: Doesn’t the baraita teach: Even if the amulet proved effective? The Gemara answers: The baraita is referring to an amulet that proved effective for a person, and did not prove effective for an animal. The Gemara wonders: Is there an amulet that proved effective for a person and is not effective for an animal? Healing an animal should be easier than healing a person. The Gemara answers: Yes, an amulet aids a person, who is under the protection of an advocate angel [mazal]; however, it does not aid an animal, which is not under the protection of an advocate angel.

The Gemara poses a question: If so, that the baraita is referring to an amulet that did not prove effective for an animal, but if the amulet proved effective, the animal may indeed go out into the public domain with it; what is the meaning of the phrase in the Tosefta: And this is a stricture that applies to animals beyond the strictures that apply to people? The halakha is the same with regard to both people and animals. If the amulet has proven effective, even an animal may go out with it on Shabbat. If it has not proven effective, even a person may not go out with it. The Gemara responds: Do you hold that this statement is referring to an amulet? It is referring to a shoe; an animal may not go out with a shoe on Shabbat, but a person may.

With regard to whether and to what extent the discomfort of animals is a factor taken into consideration on Shabbat, the Gemara says: Come and hear that which was taught in a baraita: One may smear on oil and scrape off a scab on Shabbat for a person, and one may not smear on oil and scrape off a scab for an animal. Is it not referring here to a case where there is a wound, and he smears on oil and scrapes the scab due to the discomfort caused by the wound, and nevertheless it was permitted exclusively for a person and not for an animal? The Gemara rejects this argument: No, it is referring to a case where the wound has already ceased and healed, and he smears oil and scrapes due to the pleasure caused by the treatment.

The Gemara cites an additional proof: Come and hear that which was taught in the following baraita: With regard to an animal suffering from heart congestion that restricts its blood supply and whose temperature has risen, one may not stand it in water so that it will cool off. However, with regard to a person suffering from heart congestion that restricts his blood supply, one may stand him in water so that he will cool off. Apparently, the suffering of an animal is of no concern. Ulla said: Here, the Sages issued a decree prohibiting all healing on Shabbat due to the crushing of herbs for medicinal purposes, which is prohibited by Torah law. The Sages prohibited cooling the animal in water lest one come to grind the ingredients used in the preparation of medicine.

If so, the same decree should also apply in the case of a person. It should be prohibited to stand a sick person in water to cool him off due to the rabbinic prohibition against engaging in healing on Shabbat. The Gemara answers: In the case of a person, it appears as if he entered the water merely to cool off, not necessarily to cure an illness.

The Gemara asks: If so, say in the case of an animal as well that it appears as if it entered the water merely to cool off, not necessarily to cure an illness. The Gemara answers: An animal does not typically enter the water on its own to cool off. Neither does one typically stand an animal in water to cool it off unless it serves some healing purpose. Apparently, due to a decree, the Sages were stringent and prohibited standing the animal in water even if it will die as a result.

The Gemara now asks: Do we really issue a decree for an animal? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: If an animal were standing beyond the Shabbat limit, a situation in which it is prohibited to go fetch it, he may call the animal and it will come to him on its own? And we do not issue a decree to prohibit calling the animal, lest he come to bring it himself. Apparently, the Sages did not issue a decree in a case where one could incur a loss and there is no actual transgression committed. Here too, it should not be prohibited to stand his animal in water due to a decree lest he come to grind herbs and thereby violate a Torah prohibition.

And Ravina said: No proof can be cited from this case, as here it is a situation where the animal’s Shabbat limit was subsumed within the limit of its owner. The animal strayed beyond its own Shabbat limit, which is determined by the Shabbat limit of the shepherd entrusted with its herding. However, the animal remained within the Shabbat limit of its owner, which extended beyond that of the shepherd. Consequently, the owner is permitted to call the animal so that it will return on its own. Even if he forgets and goes out to fetch the animal, he will not have gone beyond his Shabbat limit. The fact that the animal itself went beyond its Shabbat limit is of no concern.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The matter of the decree due to crushing herbs is itself subject to a dispute between the tanna’im. As it was taught in a baraita: In the case of an animal that ate vetch, which caused a life-threatening case of constipation, one may not run it around in the courtyard to loosen its bowels due to the decree prohibiting healing. Rabbi Oshaya deems it permitted. Apparently, the tanna’im disagree whether or not healing is prohibited with regard to animals. The Gemara adds that Rava taught: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Oshaya.

The Master said: Neither may a zav go out with his pouch, which prevents his clothes from becoming sullied by his emissions, nor goats with the pouch that is on their udders. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a different baraita: Goats may go out with the pouch that is on their udders?

Rav Yehuda said: This is not difficult. This baraita is referring to a pouch that is tied tightly to the udder. It is permitted because there is no concern that the pouch will fall. That baraita is referring to a pouch that is not tightly tied. It is prohibited because of the concern that the pouch will fall and a person will come to retrieve it.

Rav Yosef said: Have you removed the tanna’im from the world? This is subject to a disagreement between the tanna’im, as we learned in our mishna: She-goats may go out with their udders bound. Rabbi Yosei Rabbi Yosei prohibits the animals from going out with all of these items, as he considers them burdens, except for the ewes that are kevunot. Rabbi Yehuda says: Goats may go out on Shabbat with their udders bound to dry their milk supply and discontinue their lactation in order to facilitate conception, as in that case, they are tied with a tight, permanent knot. However, they may not go out with their udders bound to conserve the milk, as in that case they are bound loosely. Apparently, there are tanna’im who rule leniently with regard to attaching pouches to the udders of goats and permit the practice, and others prohibit doing so.

And if you wish, say instead: Both this baraita and that baraita were taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and nevertheless it is not difficult. Here, where the goats are permitted to go out with a pouch on their udders, the baraita is referring to a case where it was done to dry their milk supply. There, where goats are prohibited to do so, the baraita is referring to a case where it was done to conserve the milk.

The Gemara adds: It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident involving the goats belonging to the residents of a house in Antioch whose udders were especially large and they would drag along the ground. And they made pouches for them so that their udders would not get scratched.

The Gemara cites a related baraita in which the Sages taught: There was an incident where one man’s wife died, and she left him a son to nurse, and he did not have money to pay the wages of a wet-nurse. And a miracle was performed on his behalf, and he developed breasts like the two breasts of a woman, and he nursed his son.

Rav Yosef said: Come and see how great this person is that a miracle of that magnitude was performed on his behalf. Abaye said to him: On the contrary, how dishonorable is this person that the order of creation was altered on his behalf. A miracle was indeed performed on his behalf; however, it was performed in a demeaning and unpleasant manner.

Rav Yehuda added and said: Come and see how difficult it is to provide for a person’s sustenance. It is so difficult that the order of creation had to be altered on his behalf, which was apparently easier than providing him a source of financial support. Rav Naḥman said: Know that it is so, as miracles are often performed on a person’s behalf; however, it has not yet happened that food was miraculously created in a person’s home.

The Gemara relates another unusual story. The Sages taught: There was an incident involving one man who married a one-armed woman, and he did not realize that she was one-armed until the day that she died. Rav said: Come and see how modest this woman was that her husband did not realize this about her. Rabbi Ḥiyya said to him: That is typical conduct for her, as a woman typically covers herself. All the more so a one-armed woman makes sure to cover her defect. Rather, say: How modest was this man that he did not recognize this in his wife.

We learned in our mishna: Rams may go out levuvin. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of levuvin? Rav Huna said: Tied [tutri] in pairs. The Gemara explains: From where may it be inferred that this word levuvin is a term of closeness? As it is written: “You have drawn me near [libavtini], my sister my bride” (Song of Songs 4:9).

Ulla said: Levuvin refers to animal hide that one ties over the hearts [lev] of rams so that wolves will not attack them. The Gemara asks: Do wolves attack rams but do not attack ewes? Why is this protection provided only to males? The Gemara answers: Because the males walk at the head of the flock. The Gemara asks: Do wolves attack the head of the flock but not the rear of the flock? Rather, the wolves prey specifically on the rams because they are plump. The Gemara asks: Are there no plump ones among the ewes? And furthermore, do the wolves know how to distinguish between these, the plump ones, and those, the thin ones? Rather, the wolves prey specifically on the rams because they raise their noses and walk while looking to both sides. The wolves think that they are preparing to attack them.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Levuvin refers to animal hide that one ties under their male organ so that they will not mount the females. And from where do we derive that meaning? Because the latter clause states: Ewes may go out sheḥuzot. What is the meaning of sheḥuzot? It means that they fasten [she’oḥazin] their tails with animal hide so that the males may mount them more easily. It is reasonable to explain that the first clause refers to an action undertaken so that the males will not mount the females, and the latter clause to an action undertaken so that the males will mount them.

The Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that this word sheḥuzot is a term of exposure? The Gemara answers: As it is written in the description of a wicked woman: “And behold there met him a woman