as there is honey in the beehive during the summer. However, during the rainy season in which there is not honey in the beehive, what can be said according to Rabbi Yitzḥak to explain why it is permitted to cover the beehive at that time? The Gemara answers: This halakha is only applicable in order to permit covering the beehive for those two honeycombs that remain in the hive even during the rainy season so that the bees can feed off of them. The Gemara asks: Aren’t these honeycombs set aside for the bees alone? The Gemara responds: This is a case where one thought of them before Shabbat and, in his mind, prepared them to be eaten. The Gemara asks: By inference, if one did not think about them, what would be the ruling? It would be prohibited to cover the beehive.

If so, this tanna who taught in that same baraita: As long as he does not intend to trap the bees, let him distinguish and teach with regard to that same halakha itself: In what case are these matters stated, that one is permitted to cover the hive? It is in a case where he thought of them before Shabbat. However, if he did not think of them, it is prohibited. The Gemara answers: This teaches us a novel understanding. Even though he thought of them before Shabbat, it is only permitted as long as he did not intend to trap them.

With regard to the matter itself, the Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, he does not hold that there is a prohibition of set-aside. Consequently, there is no distinction between the different beehives. If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, when he does not have intention to trap the bees, what of it? Doesn’t Rabbi Yehuda hold that even an unintentional act is prohibited? The Gemara replies: Actually, this baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. What does: And as long as one does not intend to trap the bees, mean? It means that one should not make the mat like a trap. He must leave space so that the bees will not get trapped on their own.

Rav Ashi said that it can be resolved differently: Did the baraita teach: In the summer and in the rainy season? Actually, it taught: In the sun due to the sun and in the rain due to the rain. That can be interpreted as follows: In the days of Nisan and in the days of Tishrei, as then there is sun shining and there is also cold weather; and there is rain and there is honey in the beehives.

Rav Sheshet said to the Sages: Go out and tell Rabbi Yitzḥak in Eretz Yisrael: Rav Huna already explained your halakha in Babylonia. There is nothing novel in the principle that you established that a vessel may only be moved for the sake of something that may be moved, as Rav Huna said: One may make a partition for the dead for the benefit of a living person, and one may not make a partition for the dead for the benefit of the dead person. It is prohibited to move objects for the sake of a corpse because it is prohibited to move the corpse itself on Shabbat.

The Gemara asks: What is the practical application of this halakha? As Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda said, and likewise the Sage, Sheila Mari taught in a baraita: A corpse that is laid out in the sun and there is concern that it will putrefy and smell, what can be done? Two people come and sit beside it. After a while, when they feel hot from beneath them, this one brings a bed and sits on it and that one brings a bed and sits on it on either side of the corpse, as they are permitted to carry the beds for their own use. When they feel hot from above them, they bring a mat and spread it over their heads. Then, this one stands his bed up so the mat will remain resting atop it and slips away and leaves, and that one stands his bed up and slips away and leaves, and a partition is then created over the corpse as if on its own without erecting it directly for the sake of the corpse. Apparently, the Sages did not permit carrying a mat to cover a corpse for the sake of the corpse. They only permitted doing so in an indirect manner for the benefit of the living.

Incidental to the mention of halakhot related to a corpse on Shabbat, the Gemara cites an amoraic dispute in which it was stated: A corpse that was laid out in the sun, Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: One turns it over from bed to bed until it reaches the shade. Rav Hanina bar Shelamiyya said in the name of Rav: One places a loaf of bread or an infant on the corpse and moves it. The corpse becomes a base for an object that one is permitted to move on Shabbat and, consequently, one may move the corpse due to the permitted object. The Gemara adds: In a case where there is a loaf or an infant, everyone agrees that it is permitted to use that method to move the corpse. Where they argue is in a case where he does not have a loaf or an infant. One Sage, Rav, holds: Moving an object in an atypical manner is considered a bona fide act of moving. Therefore, one may not move the corpse by passing it from bed to bed. And the other Sage, Shmuel, holds that moving an object in an atypical manner is not considered moving. Therefore, it is permitted to move a corpse by passing it from bed to bed.

With regard to this dispute between Rav and Shmuel, the Gemara remarks: Let us say that this dispute is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im in the Tosefta. The Rabbis said: One may not rescue a corpse from a fire on Shabbat. Rabbi Yehuda ben Lakish said: I heard that one may rescue a corpse from a fire. The Gemara seeks to clarify the matter: What are the circumstances? If there is a loaf or an infant available, what is the rationale for the opinion of the first tanna, who prohibited rescuing the corpse from the fire? If there is not a loaf or an infant, what is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda ben Lakish who permits rescuing the corpse from the fire? Rather, is it not that they disagree over moving an object in an atypical manner? As this Sage, the first tanna, holds that moving an object in an atypical manner is considered moving. Therefore, it is prohibited to rescue the corpse in that manner. And this Sage, Rabbi Yehuda ben Lakish, holds that moving an object in an atypical manner is not considered moving. Therefore, it is permitted to rescue the corpse in this manner. The amoraic dispute deals with an issue already disputed by the tanna’im. The Gemara rejects this: No, everyone, both tanna’im, agrees that moving an object in an atypical manner is considered moving. Rather, this is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Lakish: Since a person is agitated about his deceased relative and is concerned about maintaining the dignity of the dead,