From where is it derived that a person should not say: To the Lord a burnt-offering, or: To the Lord a meal-offering, or: To the Lord a thanks-offering, or: To the Lord a peace-offering, but should mention the offering first and then state that it is for the Lord? The verse states: “An offering to the Lord” (Leviticus 1:2). The reason for this is that if one first says: To the Lord, perhaps he will change his mind and not complete the sentence in order to avoid consecrating the offering, and he will have uttered the name of God in vain.

And it is an a fortiori inference: Just as with regard to this individual discussed in the baraita, who intended to mention the name of Heaven only upon an offering, the Torah said that he should say: An offering to the Lord, in order to avoid possibly mentioning the name of God in vain, with regard to one who actually mentions the Divine Name in vain, all the more so it is clear that he has committed a severe transgression.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im, as it was taught in a baraita that Beit Shammai say: If one expresses a vow with substitutes for the substitute terms mentioned in the mishna, the vow takes effect and the items are forbidden. And Beit Hillel say: If one expresses a vow with substitutes for the substitute terms mentioned in the mishna, the vow does not take effect and the items are permitted.

What, is it not correct that the one who says that a vow expressed with substitutes for the substitute terms mentioned in the mishna takes effect and that the item is consequently forbidden likewise holds that substitutes for the language of vows are terms from the language of other nations, and therefore substitutes for those terms, which are also from foreign languages, should be equally acceptable? And similarly, according to the one who says that the vow does not take effect and the item is permitted, it must be that he holds that these terms are language that the Sages devised. Consequently, substitutes for those terms, which the Sages did not declare to be acceptable terms for expressing a vow, do not cause a vow to take effect.

The Gemara responds: No, it is possible that everyone holds that substitutes for the language of vows are terms from the language of other nations, and Beit Shammai hold that the nations speak using these substitutes for the terms mentioned in the mishna also, and Beit Hillel hold that the nations do not speak using these terms.

And if you wish, say an alternate response: Substitute terms themselves are terms from a foreign language. Beit Shammai hold that we issue a decree with regard to substitutes for the substitute terms mentioned in the mishna, despite the fact that these terms themselves are not valid terms even in a foreign language, due to a concern that if they are not considered to express a vow, one will come to act leniently with regard to a vow expressed with the substitute terms mentioned in the mishna. And Beit Hillel hold: We do not issue a decree with regard to substitutes for the substitute terms mentioned in the mishna due to a concern that one will come to act leniently with regard to a vow expressed with the substitute terms themselves.

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of substitutes for substitute terms for vows? Rav Yosef teaches that they include the following terms: Mekanamna, mekanaḥna, and mekanasna. These are verb forms of the terms konam, konaḥ, and konas respectively, mentioned in the mishna. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of substitutes for substitute terms for dedication [ḥerem]? The Sage Mafsha’a teaches: Ḥarakim, ḥarakhim, and ḥarafim. The Gemara continues: What are the substitutes for substitute terms for naziriteship [nezirut]? Rav Yosef teaches: Meḥazakna, menazaḥna, and mafiḥna.

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If one uses the term mifḥazna, what is the halakha? If one uses the term mitḥazna, what is the halakha? If one uses the term mitazna, what is the halakha? Ravina said to Rav Ashi: If one uses the term kinma, what is the halakha? Is he saying that the item should be like a konam, in which case the vow takes effect, or perhaps he is saying sweet cinnamon [kineman besem] (see Exodus 30:23) and does not intend to express a vow with the word konam?

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ḥiyya, said to Rav Ashi: If one uses the term kina, what is the halakha? Is he saying this term in reference to a chicken coop, which is also called a kina, or perhaps it is a term for konam and expresses a vow? With regard to these cases, the Gemara says: The dilemma remains unresolved.

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of substitutes for substitute terms of oaths [shevua]? The Gemara answers that this category includes the terms shevuel, shevutiel, and shekukael. The Gemara asks: Why is the term shevuel included? This word indicates Shevuel, son of Gershom, the proper name of an individual (see I Chronicles 26:24), and therefore it should not be considered a substitute term for an oath. Rather, the list of terms includes shevuvael, shevutiel, and shekukael. What is the halakha? Shmuel said: If he said ashivta he has not said anything, despite the fact that there is some similarity between this term and the word oath [shevua]. Similarly, if he said ashkika he has not said anything. If he said karinsha he has not said anything, although it is somewhat similar to konam.

§ It is taught in the mishna: If one used the terms shevuta or shekuka, or took a vow with the term mohi, these are substitute terms for an oath. It is taught in a baraita that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One who says that he is taking an oath by mohi has not said anything. However, if he says: By an oath [bemomata] that Mohi said, these are valid substitute terms for an oath.

MISHNA: If one says to another: That which I eat of yours shall be considered laḥullin, it is interpreted as though he said: La ḥullin, not non-sacred, and the food is thereby forbidden to him. Similarly, if he said that food shall be considered not valid or not dekhi, i.e., not ritually pure, or if he said the food shall be considered an offering that has become ritually impure, left over [notar], or piggul, i.e., an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its appointed time, it is forbidden.

If one says that food shall be considered like the lamb of the daily offering, like the animals designated as offerings and kept in special enclosures, like the wood of the altar, like the fires on the altar, like the altar, like the Sanctuary, or like Jerusalem, or if he took a vow with any of the accessories of the altar, although he did not explicitly mention that the food should be like an offering, it is considered a vow that associates a different item with an offering. Rabbi Yehuda says: One who says that an item shall be considered Jerusalem, instead of saying that it shall be considered like Jerusalem, has not said anything.