he maintains that she does not receive money from his property for charity, as the court does not take donations of charity from one’s property without his knowledge. Conversely, the one who said that the court does not give money for charity would argue: However, they do give her ornaments, as it is assumed that it is not satisfactory for him for his wife to be degraded by a lack of jewelry.

The Gemara further suggests: Come and hear: With regard to a yevama, a woman whose husband died childless and he has a brother [yavam], and who is waiting either to enter into levirate marriage with the yavam or perform ḥalitza, for the first three months after her husband’s death she is sustained from the property of her husband.

From then on, as long as she has not entered into levirate marriage, she is not sustained, neither from the property of her husband nor from that of the yavam. If the yavam stood in judgment and the court ruled that he should enter into levirate marriage, and he fled, she is sustained from the property of the yavam. This apparently contradicts Shmuel’s ruling, as here the woman is provided with sustenance from the estate of the yavam in his absence, despite the fact that his obligation toward her is less than that of a husband.

The Gemara answers that Shmuel could have said to you: With regard to what need we be concerned in this case? If the concern is due to the possibility that he gave her a bundle of money before his departure, the mind of the yavam is not that close to this woman that he would leave money with her; if the concern is due to her earnings, i.e., that he said to her: Spend your earnings to sustain yourself, she is not yet obligated to give him her earnings.

Come and hear: With regard to a wife who went with her husband overseas, and she came back and said: My husband died, if she wishes she is sustained from his property, and if she wishes she collects payment of her marriage contract. If she said: My husband divorced me, but she does not present a bill of divorce, she is continually sustained from his property up to the amount of her marriage contract. The reason is that she may collect this money whether or not her claim is believed: If she is still married, she is entitled to her sustenance, and if she is divorced she receives the marriage contract. This once again presents a difficulty for the opinion of Shmuel, as she collects money from her husband’s estate in his absence.

The Gemara answers: Here, too, it is referring to a case where they heard concerning the husband that he died. The Gemara asks: And what is different about the sum up to the amount of her marriage contract; why is she given no more than this? If he is dead, she should be allowed to sustain herself from all his property until she weds another. The Gemara answers: The reason is that she is the one who caused the loss to herself. By claiming that she was divorced, she forfeits her right to more sustenance.

The Gemara further suggests: Come and hear: How, i.e., in what case, did the Sages say that a minor who refuses her husband does not receive sustenance? You cannot say that this halakha applies to a young girl who is living under the authority of her husband, as her husband is obligated in her sustenance. Rather, it applies to a case where her husband went overseas, and she borrowed money and sustained herself for a while, and subsequently she arose and refused him. The Gemara infers: The reason is that she refused him, which indicates that if she did not refuse her husband, the court gives her sustenance. This apparently shows that a woman is sustained from her husband’s property when he goes overseas.

The Gemara answers that Shmuel could have said to you: With regard to what need we be concerned here? If the concern is due to the possibility that he left her a bundle of money before his departure, one does not give a bundle of money to a minor. If the concern is due to the possibility that he instructed her to subsist on her earnings, the earnings of a minor are not enough to cover the expenses of her sustenance. In summary, no resolution has been found for the dispute between Rav and Shmuel, notwithstanding the numerous sources cited by the Gemara.

The Gemara asks: What is the conclusion that was reached about this dispute? How should this case be treated in practice? When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael, he said: An incident of this kind came before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in Beit She’arim, and he apportioned sustenance for her. However, a similar incident came before Rabbi Yishmael in Tzippori, and he did not apportion sustenance for her. Rabbi Yoḥanan wondered about this ruling: And what did Rabbi Yishmael see such that he did not apportion sustenance for her? After all, the sons of High Priests and Ḥanan disagreed in the mishna only with regard to whether she is obligated to swear an oath, but as far as sustenance is concerned, they concur that the court gives it to her.

Rav Shemen bar Abba said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: Our Rabbi in Babylonia, Shmuel, already interpreted it as referring to a case where they heard concerning the husband that he died. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him in astonishment: Have you gone that far in your analysis of this case that you were able to resolve this problem?

When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael, he said a different version of this discussion: An incident came before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in Beit She’arim, and he did not apportion sustenance for her; an incident came before Rabbi Yishmael in Tzippori, and he apportioned sustenance for her. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And what did Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi see such that he did not apportion sustenance for her? As, the sons of High Priests and Ḥanan disagreed only with regard to an oath, but when it comes to sustenance, the court gives it to her. Rav Shemen bar Abba said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: Shmuel in Babylonia already interpreted it as referring to a case where they heard concerning him that he died. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him in astonishment: Have you gone that far in your analysis of this case?

The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav, and therefore one apportions sustenance for a married woman whose husband went overseas. In passing, the Gemara mentions other rulings of halakha. And the halakha is in accordance with that which Rav Huna said that Rav said. As Rav Huna said that Rav said: A woman can say to her husband: I will not be sustained by you and in turn I will not work, i.e., you will not keep my earnings. The reason is that this arrangement was enacted by the Sages for the wife’s benefit. Consequently, she can relinquish her rights to her sustenance in this manner.

And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Zevid with regard to glazed [kunya] vessels. As Rav Zevid said: With regard to these glazed vessels [manei dekunya], i.e., earthenware vessels that are glazed over, the white and black ones are permitted after they have been washed, as the glazing prevents the vessels from absorbing the foods placed inside them. Some earthenware vessels absorb the food and drink that is cooked in them and are therefore rendered forbidden if at any time they contained forbidden food, e.g., wine poured as a libation or leaven on Passover. The white and black vessels are not considered like regular earthenware vessels, which are rendered permanently forbidden.

Conversely, green ones are forbidden, as they absorb from the substances placed inside them. And we said that white and black ones are permitted only if they do not have cracks; however, if they have cracks they are forbidden, as the forbidden food is absorbed by the earthenware through the cracks.

MISHNA: In the case of a husband who went overseas, and someone arose and sustained his wife in his absence, and upon the husband’s return the provider demands from him the money he spent on his wife, Ḥanan says: He has lost his money, i.e., the husband is not obligated to repay him, as the provider acted of his own free will and was not instructed to do so by the husband.

The sons of High Priests disagreed with Ḥanan’s opinion and said: The man swears how much he spent on behalf of the woman, and he takes that sum from the husband. Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas said that the halakha is in accordance with their statement. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Zakkai said: Ḥanan spoke well in this case, as this man is like one who placed his money on the horn of a deer in midflight, i.e., he has no reasonable expectation of reimbursement.

GEMARA: We learned in a mishna there (Nedarim 33a): With regard to one who is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another,