it is as though she is at the beginning of her period of widowhood, and she has another twenty-five years from that point during which she may demand payment of her marriage contract. And if she has a marriage contract in her possession, she may collect payment of her marriage contract forever.

The Gemara relates that Rav Naḥman, son of Rav Ḥisda, sent the following message to Rav Naḥman bar Ya’akov: Our teacher, instruct us. Does the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis apply in a case where she has a marriage contract in her possession, or does it apply only in a case where she does not have a marriage contract in her possession? And in accordance with the statement of whom is the halakha decided?

Rav Naḥman bar Ya’akov sent back this answer to him: When she does not have a marriage contract in her possession, there is a dispute, but in a case where she has a marriage contract in her possession, all agree that she may collect payment of her marriage contract forever. And in a case where there is a dispute, the halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis.

When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he cited a dispute: Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said in the name of bar Kappara: They taught that a widow is presumed to have waived her rights to payment of her marriage contract after twenty-five years only with regard to one hundred dinars or two hundred dinars, which constitute the principal payment of the marriage contract. However, she still has the right to demand payment of the additional sum recorded in the marriage contract.

And Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: She does not have the right to demand payment even of the additional sum recorded in the marriage contract, as Rabbi Aivu said that Rabbi Yannai said: The stipulation of an additional sum in the marriage contract is like the principal sum of the marriage contract. Consequently, if she waived her rights to the principal sum of the marriage contract, she has waived her rights to the additional sum as well.

It was also stated that other amora’im debated this matter: Rabbi Abba said that Rav Huna said that Rav said: They taught that she is considered as having waived her rights to payment of her marriage contract only with regard to the principal payment of one hundred or two hundred dinars, but she still has the right to demand payment of the additional sum recorded in the marriage contract.

Rabbi Abba said to Rav Huna: Did Rav really say so? Rav Huna said to Rabbi Abba: Did you say that in order to silence me, because you disagree with this ruling? Or did you say that because you are so satisfied with this ruling that you would like to give me wine to drink? Rabbi Abba said to him: I said that in order to silence you. This indicates that Rabbi Abba disagrees with Rav and accepts the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan on this issue.

§ The Gemara relates that the mother-in-law of Rav Ḥiyya Arikha, so named because of his height, as the word arikha literally means long, was also the wife of his brother, and she was a widow who resided in the house of her father, and Rav Ḥiyya sustained her for twenty-five years in the house of her father, from his brother’s estate.

At the end of the twenty-five years, she said to him: Give me my sustenance. He said to her: You do not have the right to continue to demand sustenance. She said to him: In that case, give me the payment of my marriage contract. He said to her: After twenty-five years, you have no right to demand sustenance and you have no right to demand payment of your marriage contract.

She summoned him for judgment before Rabba bar Sheila. He said to Rav Ḥiyya Arikha: Tell me, then, what was the essence of the case? Rav Ḥiyya Arikha said to him: I sustained her for twenty-five years in the house of her father, and I swear by the life of the Master, i.e., by your life, that I delivered her sustenance to her regularly on my own shoulders.

Rabba bar Sheila said to him: What is the reason that the Sages said that as long as the widow is in the house of her husband, she may always collect payment of her marriage contract? It is because we say that it is due to embarrassment that she did not demand payment of her marriage contract, because she is in her husband’s house and his heirs are treating her well. Here too, in this case, it is due to embarrassment that she did not demand payment of her marriage contract, as you treated her with great respect despite the fact that she was living in her father’s house. Therefore, go and give her the payment of her marriage contract.

Rav Ḥiyya Arikha did not heed the ruling of Rabba bar Sheila and did not give her the payment of her marriage contract. Rabba bar Sheila wrote an authorization for her to seize his property in payment of the debt. Rav Ḥiyya Arikha came before Rava, and he said to him: Let the Master see how Rabba bar Sheila has judged me. Rava said to him: He has judged you well.

The woman said to Rava: If so, he should go and return to me the produce that has grown on the property that I have a right to receive as payment, from that day that I received authorization to seize his property until today. He said to her: Show me your document of authorization. He saw that it was not written in it: And it is known to us that these properties are from the estate of the deceased. Rava said to her: The authorization is not written well. Consequently, the property is not considered as though it were yours from the time that the authorization was written, and you do not have a right to the produce.

She said to him: Let the authorization go, i.e., even if I have no right to the produce that grew from the time the authorization was written, I should have the right to take the produce that grew from the time when the days of announcement were completed, after the court assessed the value of the property, until now. He said to her: This applies only in a case where there was no error written into the authorization, but where there was an error written into the authorization, we have no right to collect the debt with it. You therefore have no rights to any of the produce.

She said to him: But wasn’t it you, Master, who said that omission of the guarantee of the sale from the document is a scribal error, and it is considered as though the guarantee were written in the document? Here too, say that the omission of the above clause is regarded as a scribal error and is considered as though it were written in the authorization.

Rava said to her: In this case, it cannot be said that the clause was meant to be included in the document and it was left out due to a scribal error, because in this case even Rabba bar Sheila erred and thought that the clause should not be included. Initially, Rabba bar Sheila thought as follows: Since these properties that always belonged to Rav Ḥiyya Arikha and those properties that had belonged to his deceased brother are all his, i.e., Rav Ḥiyya Arikha’s, as he inherited his brother’s property, what difference does it make to me if she collects from these properties, and what difference does it make to me if she collects from those properties? Although only the property of her deceased husband is liened for the payment of her marriage contract, it should not really matter whether she collects from this property or from other property belonging to the heir.

Rava continues: But that is not so. Sometimes the widow will go and improve the property of the heir, thinking that she will receive her payment from it, and the property of her deceased husband will depreciate due to neglect on the part of the heir, who knows that it is this property that is liened to ensure payment of the widow’s marriage contract. And eventually, the heir will say to her: Take your property, i.e., the property that belonged to your husband, and give me my property. And people will come to cast aspersion on the court as not being concerned for the welfare of the woman, who will be left with the depreciated property. Consequently, the document of authorization to seize property must specify exactly which property belonged to the widow’s deceased husband, which she is entitled to collect. Since Rabba bar Sheila erred and did not write this specification, the document of authorization he wrote was useless.

May we return to you chapter “Hanose.”

MISHNA: There were two prominent judges who issued decrees in Jerusalem, Admon and Ḥanan ben Avishalom. Ḥanan states two matters about which the Sages disagreed; Admon states seven. The mishna elaborates: With regard to the case of one who went overseas and his wife is demanding sustenance, claiming that her husband left her without funds and she is seeking a ruling that would provide for her from her husband’s property, Ḥanan says: