That even with regard to his daughter, there is no obligation to provide her sustenance, however, there is a mitzva to do so.

And if you wish, say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and this what he said in the mishna: A father is not obligated to provide sustenance for his daughter, and all the more so he is not duty-bound to provide for his son. It may be inferred from here that there is at least a mitzva with regard to a son, and the same applies by a fortiori inference with regard to the daughters. And the reason that the mishna teaches the case of his daughter is because it teaches us this: That even with regard to his daughter there is no obligation, despite the mitzva to guard her from dishonor.

And if you wish, say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, and this is what he said in the mishna: A father is not obligated to provide sustenance for his daughter, and the same is true with regard to providing for his son. And the same is true with regard to a mitzva; there is not even a mitzva to feed either one’s sons or daughters, but since the tanna wanted to say with regard to daughters that after their father’s death there is an obligation to sustain them from his estate, he also taught in a parallel manner that the father is not obligated to provide sustenance for his daughters during his lifetime. Consequently, it is incorrect to infer from here that there is a mitzva to sustain them despite the lack of obligation; rather, the tanna means that there is no obligation and not even a mitzva to do so.

§ Rabbi Ile’a said that Reish Lakish said in the name of Rabbi Yehuda bar Ḥanina: In Usha the Sages instituted that a man should sustain his sons and daughters when they are minors. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is the halakha in accordance with his opinion or is the halakha not in accordance with his opinion? Must a man feed his young children in practice or not? The Gemara answers: Come and hear: When they would come before Rav Yehuda to complain about a father who refused to sustain his children, he would say to them: The jackal [yarod] bears offspring and casts the obligation to feed them on the residents of the town? Even a jackal feeds its young, and it is certainly proper for a father to support his children.

When they would come before Rav Ḥisda to register a similar complaint, he would say to them: Turn over a mortar for him in public, as a raised platform, and let that father stand up and say about himself: The raven wants to care for its sons, and yet this man does not want to support his sons. The Gemara questions this statement: And does the raven want to feed its sons? But isn’t it written: “He gives to the beast its food, to the young ravens that cry” (Psalms 147:9)? This verse indicates that the parents of young ravens do not feed them. The Gemara responds: This is not difficult, as in this case it is referring to white ones, and in that case it is referring to black ones. There are different types of ravens, some of which feed their young while others do not.

The Gemara further relates: When an incident of this kind would come before Rava, he would say to the father: Is it satisfactory to you that your sons are sustained through charity? All these incidents prove that the halakha is not in accordance with the enactment of Usha; although these Sages stated forcefully that it is proper for a father to support his children, they did not force him to do so by the authority of the court.

The Gemara adds: And we said this halakha only when he is not wealthy and must toil hard to provide food for his children, but if he is wealthy we coerce him against his will to sustain them. Like this case of Rava, who coerced Rav Natan bar Ami, who was a wealthy man, to donate to charity, and collected from him four hundred dinars for charity. This shows that even in the absence of a particular obligation, the court will compel a person to give charity if he can afford it. The same reasoning certainly applies to a man’s own children.

§ Rabbi Ile’a said that Reish Lakish said: In Usha the Sages instituted that in a case of one who writes a document stating that he is giving all his property as a gift to his sons in his lifetime, he and his wife are sustained from the property until their deaths.

Rabbi Zeira objects to this, and some say this objection was raised by Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani: What is the significance of this ruling? After all, the Sages said a greater novelty than that: A man’s widow is sustained from his property even if his estate was inherited by his daughter and therefore belongs to her husband. Although the property is comparable to property from the estate that was sold to a third party, from which a widow is not entitled to claim her sustenance, in this case the Sages decreed that she can claim her livelihood from her late husband’s estate to prevent her from losing out entirely. With this in mind, is it necessary to state that he and his wife, during his lifetime, receive their sustenance from property he gave as a gift to his sons?

The Gemara provides the background for this ruling: As Ravin sent in his letter to Babylonia: With regard to one who died and left a widow and a daughter, his widow is sustained from his property, as this is a stipulation of the marriage contract. If the daughter, who is her father’s heir, married, the estate is considered usufruct property whose produce belongs to her husband, but even so his widow is sustained from his property.

If the daughter died and her husband inherited from her, Rabbi Yehuda, son of the sister of Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina, said: I was involved in an incident of this kind when this very question came before the Sages for a ruling, and they said: Even in this case, his widow is sustained from his property. The Gemara reiterates: With all that said, is it necessary to state that he and his wife are entitled to receive their sustenance from property he gave his son?

The Gemara responds: The ordinance is necessary lest you say that it is in that case there, with regard to a widow, that they instituted this halakha, as there is no one to toil on her behalf, since she is by herself, but here, where the husband is alive, he can toil for himself and for her, i.e., his wife. The ordinance of Usha therefore teaches us that the court does not force him to do so, and they may claim their sustenance from his former property.

A dilemma was raised before the scholars: Is the halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ile’a, or is the halakha not in accordance with his opinion? The Gemara answers: Come and hear, as Rabbi Ḥanina and Rabbi Yonatan were standing together, and a certain man approached, bent over, and kissed Rabbi Yonatan on his foot. Rabbi Ḥanina said to Rabbi Yonatan: What is this? Why does he owe you such a mark of gratitude? He said to him: He wrote a document stating that he was giving his property to his sons,