Once the members of the court saw that the priests were demeaning the widows, they instituted for them a marriage contract of two hundred dinars, so that they would treat them with greater esteem. Once they saw that the grooms were distancing themselves from them, as they said: Instead of marrying a widow who is the daughter of priests and paying a marriage contract of two hundred, let us go marry a virgin Israelite woman for the same price. Since men would no longer marry widows from priestly families, they restored matters to their original status. This indicates that the mishna and the baraita are addressing different time periods and different ordinances.

§ It is stated in the mishna that a court of priests would collect a marriage contract of four hundred dinars for a virgin daughter of a priest. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Not only with regard to a court of priests did the Sages say that they could collect a greater sum for the marriage contract of their daughters, but even families of distinguished lineage in Israel. If they wanted to act as the priests do, they may act in that manner.

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: One who sought to act as the priests do, as in cases where an Israelite woman is married to a priest, or the daughter of a priest is married to an Israelite, may act in that manner. The Gemara infers: This allowance is specifically in cases where an Israelite woman is married to a priest, or the daughter of a priest is married to an Israelite, where there is an aspect of priesthood involved. However, apparently, in a case where the daughter of an Israelite is married to an Israelite, no, it is not allowed.

The Gemara rejects that inference. The baraita is stated employing the style of: It is not necessary. It is not necessary to state a case where the daughter of an Israelite is married to an Israelite, as in that case the groom cannot say to her: By marrying you, I am raising your social status, and it is clear that women from distinguished families would demand a marriage contract with a greater sum. However, in a case where an Israelite woman is married to a priest, where he can say to her: I am raising your social status, as you are marrying into the priesthood, you might think to say no, the woman cannot demand a marriage contract with a greater sum. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that even in the case of a woman from a distinguished family of Israelites marrying a priest, she may demand a marriage contract with a greater sum.

MISHNA: There is a case of one who marries a woman and did not find her hymen intact, and she says: After you betrothed me I was raped, and his, i.e., her husband’s, field was inundated, meaning that it is his misfortune that she is not a virgin, as she was raped after betrothal. And he says: No; rather, you were raped before I betrothed you, and my transaction was a mistaken transaction. Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: She is deemed credible. Rabbi Yehoshua says: It is not based on the statement emerging from her mouth that we conduct our lives; rather, this woman assumes the presumptive status of one who engaged in intercourse when she was not yet betrothed and she misled him, until she brings proof supporting her statement.

GEMARA: It was stated: With regard to one who approaches another and says: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the other says: I don’t know, Rav Yehuda and Rav Huna say: The respondent is obligated to pay, because he did not deny the claim, and Rav Naḥman and Rabbi Yoḥanan say: He is exempt from payment. The Gemara elaborates. Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda say that the respondent is obligated to pay based on the principle: When there is a certain claim, e.g., that of the claimant, and an uncertain claim, e.g., that of the respondent, the certain claim prevails. Rav Naḥman and Rabbi Yoḥanan say: The respondent is exempt based on the principle: Establish the money in the possession of its owner, and the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. Since the claimant does not support his claim with proof, the money remains in the possession of the respondent.

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: This ruling of Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda is essentially the statement of Shmuel, as we learned in a mishna (13a): In the case of an unmarried woman who was pregnant, and the Sages said to her: What is the nature of this fetus, i.e., who is the father. And she says: It is from a man called so-and-so and he is a priest and is certainly of valid lineage. Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: She is deemed credible, and the fetus is deemed to be of valid lineage. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel.

And Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda said to Rav Yehuda: Big-toothed one [shinnana], you said to us in the name of Shmuel that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel even in the first dispute, the dispute cited in the mishna, which is the first in a series of disputes with regard to conflicting claims. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of even the first? What is unique about that dispute relative to the others? The Gemara answers: The novel element in the first dispute is that the claim of the bride is accepted despite the fact that although there is room to say: Establish the money in the possession of its owner, and since the money is in the possession of the husband and the woman is the claimant, Rabban Gamliel said that the certain claim of the bride prevails over the uncertain claim of the groom, who can only speculate about when she was raped.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that it is Rav Yehuda and Rav Huna who say their ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, who says that a certain claim prevails over an uncertain one even to collect money from the possession of the respondent. And it is Rav Naḥman and Rabbi Yoḥanan who say their ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, that one does not collect money based merely on a claim.

The Gemara rejects that suggestion. Rav Naḥman could have said to you: That which I said, is even in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel. Rabban Gamliel says his ruling only there, with regard to claims of a groom and a bride, where there is a miggo, a halakhic argument that the ability to make a more advantageous claim grants credibility to the claim one actually makes, that bolsters the bride’s claim. She could have claimed that she wasn’t raped at all, but rather that her hymen was ruptured by wood. That is a more advantageous claim because she is not disgraced in the eyes of the groom. Therefore, her claim that she was raped is accorded credibility. However here, where one claims that another owes him money, what miggo is there bolstering his claim and according it credibility?

Alternatively, Rav Naḥman could have said to you: Rabban Gamliel says his ruling only there, where we say: Establish her legal status according to her presumptive status as a virgin, and the husband’s claim seeks to undermine that presumptive status. However here, what presumptive status does this claimant have supporting the claim that another owes him money? Therefore, even Rabban Gamliel would concede that his certain claim does not prevail.

The Gemara notes: Indeed, it is also reasonable to explain as we are teaching, that it is Rav Naḥman who said his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel.